On September 11 of this year, Asif Ali Durrani, Pakistan’s special representative for Afghan affairs, visited Tehran to engage with Iranian officials, including Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The discussions primarily centered around addressing the situation in Afghanistan. This meeting holds significance as it underscores the shared concern of both countries regarding Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Additionally, Islamabad had hosted Iran’s Foreign Minister in August of this year, where Afghanistan took center stage in their discussions.
In Islamabad’s efforts to collaborate with Iran on the current Afghan situation, three key factors can prove effective:
1. The Absence of the United States
One of the factors driving Islamabad’s cooperation with Tehran in addressing the Afghan situation is the absence of the United States from the region. While the United States maintained an active presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan held a leading position and didn’t consider the need for collaboration with regional governments concerning Afghan matters. This stance was rooted in strong U.S. support and the desire to maintain that support without drawing closer to Washington’s regional competitors. China is perhaps the only country in the region with which Islamabad has maintained a consistent relationship, primarily driven by economic needs.
One of the factors driving Islamabad’s cooperation with Tehran in addressing the Afghan situation is the absence of the United States from the region. While the United States maintained an active presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan held a leading position and didn’t consider the need for collaboration with regional governments concerning Afghan matters. This stance was rooted in strong U.S. support and the desire to maintain that support without drawing closer to Washington’s regional competitors. China is perhaps the only country in the region with which Islamabad has maintained a consistent relationship, primarily driven by economic needs.
With the waning U.S. role in Afghanistan and the growing prominence of its rivals, Islamabad now faces the necessity of engaging with regional countries on Afghan issues. Iran, a staunch rival of America, is a prime example, and Pakistan’s partnership with Iran to manage the Afghan crisis underscores the inevitability of such cooperation.
2. Common Concerns
Although Tehran and Islamabad have differing views on the Taliban, the group’s two-year and several-month dominance over Afghanistan has given rise to a shared concern for both nations. One of the pressing concerns is the increasing influx of Afghans into these two countries. Despite both nations having utilized refugees as a means of exerting pressure, they have opened their doors to millions of Afghans since mid-August 2021. Notably, Islamabad played a more prominent role because Afghans seeking refuge in Pakistan often aimed to eventually reach European countries. Iran, despite lacking a proper asylum procedure, has also hosted a significant number of Afghans.
Furthermore, terrorism is a mutual concern for Islamabad and Tehran. Pakistan is apprehensive about the presence of terrorist activities by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while Iran has expressed concerns about the presence and actions of the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) along its eastern borders. Additionally, Tehran faces a water dispute with the Taliban, which has escalated in recent months. What unites both countries is that the Taliban have not met their respective demands. Pakistan remains deeply concerned about containing the TTP, and Iran continues to press for its rightful share of the Hirmand River’s water.
3. Utilizing Alignment with Iran as a Pressure Tactic
Pakistan continues to firmly support the Taliban without conditions, while Iran maintains a relatively positive relationship with the Taliban, exemplified by handing over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to the group. However, there are differing positions between these two countries regarding the Taliban.
The likelihood of Pakistan supporting anti-Taliban forces, particularly armed groups, appears very low, at least for now. In contrast, Iran has provided shelter to forces opposing the Taliban, hosting meetings with a more cultural, rather than political, focus on its soil. It is probable that Iran will sever ties with the Taliban and back opposing factions. Historically, Iran has been a supporter of the anti-Taliban front.
Pakistan aims to establish a Taliban-style government in Afghanistan but has not yet garnered regional recognition for this approach. Conversely, Iran seeks to establish an inclusive Afghan government, a stance repeatedly emphasized by Iranian authorities over the past two years and several months. The Taliban do not welcome the fact that Iranian officials characterize them as a part of Afghanistan’s reality rather than its entirety. Additionally, recent tensions have cooled the previously warm relationship between Iran and the Taliban, primarily due to water disputes.
By engaging with Tehran, Islamabad may be seeking to challenge the Taliban. This implies that if the Taliban do not take measures to rein in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistan could opt to persist in its strategy of aligning with countries opposed to the establishment of a purely Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan has not yet contemplated ending its support for the Taliban; instead, it might aim to leverage this support as a future bargaining chip against the Taliban.
Furthermore, Iran views the Pakistani government as having influence over the Taliban. Consequently, it welcomes collaboration with Pakistan in dealing with the Taliban, as it seeks to mitigate its own risks by seizing the opportunity to fulfill its demands.
