In the 1990s, in response to the destructive anarchism launched by the predecessors of the Taliban, during the first few years of their rule, the Taliban had only one mission: suppressing anarchism. Through speeches and actions, the Taliban leaders tried to define a system that was mostly based on negation. But because they did not have formal schooling, they denied anything that they did not understand. In the five years that they ruled the country, they left nothing in the administrative and legal memory of the country, except for a number of orders that were written to negate, destroy and suppress. At the Ministry of Justice, there is an issue of their official newspaper that has the orders of Mullah Mohammad Omar with disciplinary and moral themes and some administrative decisions of Taliban.
In the 20 years of war (from 2001 to 2021), the Taliban continued to play with the same simple method that was based on the denial of the existing situation. They took advantage of people’s growing dissatisfaction and the growing tensions between the government branches, and turned it into a terrifying machine of killing and denial. It also happened that foreigners were also present in Afghanistan. Inside the country, a group of powerful people pulled their Jihadi records from the backwaters to make it a means of connection and closeness with the Taliban. Meanwhile, foreigner also had their own separate reasons to get close to the Taliban as well. One can see the prominent influence of Pakistan on the Taliban leadership that had to celebrate the return of the Taliban for weeks; and sent a wave of advisers one after the other to help the Taliban in forming an administration that is friendly to Islamabad. Iran, China, and Russia considered the Taliban’s desire to build a non-elected government as “progress” and each showed their readiness to help the Taliban in shaping their “Afghan” version. The U.S. and its allies probably took advantage of the Taliban’s addiction to free money, violence, and contract wars to use that group against their opponents in the regional chess game.
Ambiguity in the affirmative position of the Taliban became their strength and displayed them as a naïve and “manageable” group. But overtime, everyone has realized that it is not easy to work with this one-sided force that knows nothing but negation. From the desperation, one can see that the deceived Afghans are realizing their mistakes every day. The foreigners also show their trouble in justifying their cooperation with the Taliban and take contradictory positions. The Taliban themselves are obviously confused too. They do not know how to build their Islamic Emirate in this big gap between today’s realities and the vague ideas they have of the Islamic system. All their cards are alien and un-Islamic; they have nothing tangible and material to shape anything.
