The Taliban have established a regime in Afghanistan that they have named “the Islamic Emirate.” This regime represents a form of religious governance unparalleled in the world due to its excessive rigidity. In this governance structure, individuals make decisions instead of institutions, and Sharia law takes precedence over secular law. The private sphere is not separated from the public sphere, and the rulers interfere even in the most private affairs of the people, with no adherence to any rules. This system, besides failing to gain domestic and international legitimacy, has also severely failed in providing services to the people and fulfilling its duties. This religious governance, by its very nature, cannot establish relationships based on national interests with the people domestically or with other countries beyond borders. Even if relations are established for a while, they are not sustainable. This situation has many reasons, with one of the most important being the lack of rule of law and disregard for international norms.
The Taliban’s Islamic governance in Afghanistan marks the second time such an experiment has been undertaken, yet neither has been successful, neither domestically nor internationally. Before the Taliban, the Mujahideen also established an Islamic government, which also failed, marking a completely unsuccessful experience in the country’s political history. Other experiences with religious governance also demonstrate that this type of system cannot meet the demands of modern-day people. Therefore, transitioning from religious governance to a secular order is vital for Afghan society.
The world, particularly Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, has made a strategic mistake in dealing with the Taliban. By opting for a strategy of “engagement” with the Taliban, they are pursuing a form of political appeasement instead of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Sending ambassadors to Kabul or handing over the Afghan embassy to the Taliban, while they do not recognize this group officially, is aimed at political appeasement. This kind of confrontation with Taliban governance neither pushes the Taliban towards governance nor ensures the long-term interests of countries. One of the flaws of religious order is that Sharia law takes precedence over secular law, and individuals make decisions instead of institutions. These personal decisions can stem from personal biases and in many cases be incorrect and contrary to the public interest. Sharia law, besides being unable to rationalize all aspects of the modern world and, for example, having nothing to say about modern technologies, is susceptible to various interpretations and readings. Sometimes interpretations of the same matter can be completely contradictory. Therefore, the sect or faction that holds more political and military power in religious governance imposes its interpretation of Sharia law on others, which in turn triggers negative reactions from followers of other sects and factions in their initial feedback.
On the other hand, religious rulers, if not considering themselves divine, at least perceive themselves as superior to other humans and assign a similar status to their team and group. To promote such a false position, they resort to irrational storytelling and mythologize their religious leaders. These sanctified leaders, who consider themselves superior to others, feel entitled to disregard any limits when dealing with people, impose their interests on the people in the name of religion and Sharia law, and their political behavior both domestically and internationally is often not normative. Essentially, Sharia law cannot guarantee a unified approach in a territory because it is susceptible to different and sometimes contradictory interpretations.
Religious governance, especially the Taliban type, does not accept international conventions, is not bound by international norms, and lacks a defined foreign policy. Therefore, it cannot maintain stable relations with other countries. A prime example is the Taliban regime, which occasionally engages in verbal tensions and border skirmishes with its supporting governments in the region.
This type of governance does not recognize any rights for the people it rules over and strips away the freedoms of the citizens. It imposes its preferred definitions and values onto phenomena and values, attempting to impose them onto the people; however, such behavior is met with negative reactions from the citizens and leads to conflict. Two religious governments in the region (the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) exemplify numerous instances of such behaviors. For example, the Taliban’s religious government in Afghanistan and the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist in Iran both claim that a woman has no inherent rights in society, her movements should be controlled by the government, her clothing style and color should be determined by the government, she should be confined from public spaces to the kitchen, and she should lose her right to education and employment. Despite both the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic in Iran having belief enforcement police and controlling the clothing and behavior of people, especially women, they claim to respect women’s fundamental rights and grant them freedom. Both governments preach that what people know about human rights, women’s rights, and freedom of expression is wrong and a creation of the West, and the correct form is what these governments impose. They practically imprison and torture people even for liking a Facebook post, but claim not to oppose freedom of speech. Since there is no law to control the behavior of the rulers (in the Taliban version) and interpretations of Sharia law vary greatly, the hands of the rulers are open to prosecuting and oppressing the people.
Religious governance is constantly embroiled in conflict and discord. It deems itself obligated to engage in “jihad” against non-Islamic countries, discriminates against its people, and also exhibits hostility towards indigenous cultures. This type of animosity is abundantly observed in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Common behaviors of discrimination include opposition to “Sada and Nawruz” celebrations festivities, discriminatory treatment towards speakers of specific languages, discrimination against followers of particular religions, and so forth, evident in both of these religious-political regimes. Due to the essence of a particular interpretation of religious law, it cannot even tolerate differing interpretations of the same religious doctrine. Actions like the collection of Shia jurisprudential books from libraries, the prohibition of Ja’fari jurisprudence education in universities, and attempts to shut down the Khatam al-Nabieein School and Tamadun Television by the Taliban serve this purpose; essentially, religious orders cannot tolerate alternative readings of the same religion and thus engage in inter-religious conflict. Here, religious governance wages war against a religious school. Hence, that very religious school has the right to operate within a secular system, but cannot have such rights within a religious system. Therefore, even for religious institutions, transitioning from a religious to a secular system becomes a necessity. In a secular system, no restrictions are imposed on the activities of schools and other religious institutions. Instead, the government transitions from a godlike to a humanlike position and controls the behavior of both the state and its citizens through laws. In this manner, the people of a country in a secular system transition from the position of “subjects” to that of “citizens.”
However, a religious government, especially of the Taliban type, is not acceptable to the general public domestically or to governments abroad. For this reason, the Taliban faces internal legitimacy issues in Afghanistan, and countries do not recognize this group. Therefore, the main problem in Afghanistan is the Taliban’s governance and the religious system; a governance that is not reformable but rather sees itself as tasked with reforming the world. Such governance cannot behave legally towards its own country’s people or proceed with stable peace with its neighbors. Efforts such as those pursued in regional formats, from the Moscow format to the Regional Contact Group or Doha series of meetings, to reform an irreformable system seem futile. The Taliban’s religious system itself is a political deadlock for the country, and until this deadlock is broken, all other short-term solutions will be ineffective. Engaging with the Taliban to change their behavior is like administering pain relief to a sick person suffering from an infection; it may alleviate the pain momentarily, but as long as the infection persists, there can be no real cure.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here: