The Russian news agency TASS reported on Monday, May 27th, citing Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s special representative for Afghanistan, that the country is on track to remove the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations. Kabulov claimed that proposals to this effect had been submitted to Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, by the country’s foreign and justice ministries. He further asserted that the formal recognition of the Taliban by Russia is now more likely than ever before. Concurrently, media outlets, citing the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, reported Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, referring to the Taliban as the “real power” in Afghanistan. He stated that the potential removal of the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations reflects this reality.
Before these statements, Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, had already unveiled the matter. On Tuesday, April 2nd of the current year, he claimed that his country was working towards removing the Taliban from the list of terrorist groups. Now that three Russian officials have emphasized the same point, it becomes necessary to examine it. Reading the statements of these three Russian figures raises three specific questions in the mind of the reader, to which answers are provided:
1. Why is Russia willing to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list?
Four factors that may be influential:
1.1 Russia, due to its entanglement in the Ukraine crisis, feels isolated and threatened. Understanding that its main adversaries are the European Union, NATO, and Ukraine, which seek Russia’s defeat, clarifies the level of threat against the country. Hence, it seeks to reduce its enemies and increase its allies. Recent foreign trips by Putin signify the isolation of his country. With such isolation, trips to Belarus and Uzbekistan, both obedient to Russia, would not be necessary. Of course, the trip to China is also necessary and important, but Minsk and Tashkent, both allies of Russia, slipping towards the rival bloc is unthinkable. They cannot play a significant role in Moscow’s liberation from its numerous entanglements. More importantly, Lavrov stated: “Kazakhstan has already made this decision, and we also want to decide to remove the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations.” This perspective by Lavrov speaks of the isolation of his country. While Kazakistan removed the Taliban from the terrorism list at the end of 2023, it should not be the basis for Russia’s behavior because it is subordinate to Moscow, not vice versa. If the Kremlin is determined to favor the Taliban, it can do so independently, rather than basing its behavior on the threshold behavior, which is quite surprising. Therefore, Moscow seeks to keep the Taliban satisfied and prevent any threat to its interests from this group. That’s why Peskov previously said: “Afghanistan is close to us, and we are somehow in contact with the Taliban. They are the de facto authorities of the country.”
1.2 Ignoring the threat of ISIS is not an option. Perhaps for many, the issue of ISIS and Russia’s fear of this group has become cliché. Moscow’s enthusiasm for engaging with the Taliban to contain ISIS has also become clichéd. Whatever it may be, field realities indicate the increasing strength of ISIS in Khorasan. As ISIS becomes stronger, its enemies inevitably see themselves forced to approach the Taliban. Moscow only strengthened its ties with the Taliban when ISIS Khorasan emerged. In March of the current year, when ISIS targeted a concert hall on the outskirts of Moscow, the country took the threat of this group more seriously. However, Russian officials are also suspicious of Ukraine and its Western allies. More importantly, after that attack, Peskov announced the possibility of removing the Taliban from the terrorism list by his country. This indicates that Moscow has taken the ISIS threat seriously and still believes in the enmity between the Taliban and that group. After that deadly attack, the prevailing assumption was based on a change in Russia’s approach to the Taliban. Therefore, the Kremlin wants to contain the ISIS threat by continuing its “interaction strategy” with the Taliban; a strategy that has not been fruitful and may not be in the future.
1.3 The dispersion within the anti-Taliban front cannot be overlooked in Russia’s recent positioning. It is a fact that anti-Taliban forces lack real coherence. Even figures and factions within the anti-Taliban sphere have repeatedly admitted to the lack of internal unity. Although some factions, especially the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, have emphasized the need to maintain unity, the desired outcome has not been achieved. The result of the third Vienna meeting aimed to create a broad-based political structure, but so far, no significant progress has been observed. Hence, it is not unlikely that Moscow has become disheartened by the dispersion within the anti-Taliban sphere and has seen interaction with caution as the solution. Indeed, not only Moscow but many countries are troubled by the lack of real cohesion among the anti-Taliban forces.
1.4. The role of Zamir Kabulov in normalizing Moscow’s relationship with the Taliban cannot be ignored, just as ignoring Zalmay Khalilzad’s role in popularizing the Taliban in the eyes of America is not feasible. Kabulov’s behavior from distant pasts to the present demonstrates his particular interest in the Taliban. Some believe he has Central Asian roots and thus has a connection to the Taliban on a tribal basis. However, this claim was previously raised by Abolfazl Zohrevand, Iran’s former ambassador to Afghanistan, in a video interview. If not, why would someone like Kabulov have such a warm middle-of-the-road approach to the Taliban, who are staunchly Islamist and anti-infidel? Kabulov also stated on May 16th: “I don’t mean the Taliban are our number one friends, but they are not our enemies.” This is not the first time Kabulov has expressed affection for the Taliban. In December 2015, he stated: “Russia’s interests coincide with those of the Taliban; because suppressing ISIS is a priority for both parties.” Again in May 2018, he claimed that the Taliban controlled 40 percent of Afghanistan’s territory, statements that drew a sharp reaction from the former Afghan government and led to the summoning of the Russian ambassador. Even senators in the Senate at that time demanded a joint session with the Moscow ambassador and an explanation from him. These instances speak to Kabulov’s mixed approach and excessive optimism towards the Taliban. Therefore, Putin views Afghanistan, especially the Taliban, through the lens of Lavrov’s and Kabulov’s perspectives.
2. Will Putin sign the proposal to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list?
At first glance, considering the statements of these three Russian officials and their reflections in the media, it seems probable that Putin will sign the proposal, but it’s not that simple. Putin knows that approving such a proposal from a major power is the biggest concession given to the Taliban and by doing so, their most significant leverage will be lost. Therefore, he will not sell that valuable asset to the Taliban cheaply and will exercise more caution. It is not unlikely that the proposal will disappear from the corridors of the Kremlin before being tinted with Putin’s signature. For Putin, the viewpoints of the Central Asian republics and also Iran are important, and he might seek their opinions. Statements by high-ranking Russian military officials about the increasing terrorism threat in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s rule may also create doubts in Putin’s mind.
The most crucial question is, if signed, what does Russia stand to gain? If field realities are the yardstick for analysis, it will remain unrewarded unless there’s a clandestine deal in play, unbeknownst to anyone. Afghanistan under Taliban rule is, in Russia’s view, akin to a ticking time bomb, primed and calibrated by the United States, and now Kremlin officials are seeking to defuse it skillfully and gradually. Hosting the Taliban twice at the Moscow Format talks, hosting a representative of this group at the 25th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in 2022, hosting diplomats, and more, all serve the purpose of defusing that bomb. Kabulov also recently announced the invitation of the Taliban to the St. Petersburg Forum, to which the group has promised participation.
3. If the proposal is approved, what then?
Russia is a prominent global power, whether strong or weak. Even if weak, its role in the Afghan conflict has always been significant. Thus, Putin’s signature matters and has consequences; as the Taliban’s biggest demand will be met, and Moscow takes a step further towards formal recognition of this group. The Taliban, in turn, becomes more ambitious and will perceive the world as more compliant with their demands. More importantly, some other countries are following Moscow’s lead. As mentioned earlier, when Russia follows Kazakistan’s lead, undoubtedly other countries will take Moscow’s behavior as a precedent. However, any country intending to recognize the Taliban would first remove this group from the terrorism list. Despite all this, the prospect of Taliban recognition as a state by Russia still appears murky.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here: