The most significant flaw in Taliban governance lies in their disbelief in the participation of all ethnicities and social strata in decision-making. They pursue monopolistic tendencies, suppress dissenting thoughts and tastes, tread the path of extremism, and recognize no limits or boundaries, utilizing any means to impose their will on the people. The Taliban’s second stint in power over three years has brought many truths to light for younger generations. Many who were deceived by the religious slogans of this group and showed solidarity in the name of enforcing God’s law have now recognized the true face of the Taliban, expressing regret for their past support. However, those who joined this group driven by short-term personal and material interests, evaluating any group or tribe solely based on petty personal gains, are judged separately. Their judgment is governed by personal interests rather than universal standards, rendering their credibility questionable.
On the verge of the fourth session of the Doha meeting regarding Afghanistan, representatives of anti-Taliban coalitions gathered in Vienna to enhance cohesion through negotiations. This gathering serves as a response to an upcoming session in Qatar, where Taliban representatives are expected to attend. Reports suggest the agenda for this meeting has been prepared in consultation with the Taliban, indicating efforts to pave the way for broader international engagement with them. The opponents of the Taliban in Vienna sought to demonstrate that they are a part of Afghanistan’s realities and dismissing them in political equations would be erroneous. Nevertheless, Western countries and regional powers seemingly decided to acknowledge Taliban control over Afghanistan’s entire geography, using it as a platform to emphasize that the Taliban are a tangible reality of Afghanistan and must engage in comprehensive interaction with them.
The topics raised by participants at the Vienna meeting are notably significant as they articulate their solutions for Afghanistan’s future and clarify whether opponents in exile, represented by a broad spectrum at the Vienna conference, still possess the ability to connect with the concrete realities within the country. One of the emphasized issues in Vienna, highlighted by a leader of the opposition in exile, was the assertion that the Taliban do not belong to any specific ethnicity, tribe, or religion; rather, they are an external and intelligence-driven phenomenon. Any attempt by individuals or groups to associate the Taliban with a particular ethnicity, language, or religion would be an injustice to the people of Afghanistan. To what extent does this statement align with reality, and do the Taliban truly have no affiliation with any specific ethnicity, language, or religion, but are merely an external phenomenon?
The performance of the Taliban, both during their initial rule and over the past three years, should have opened our eyes to many realities. One such reality is their serious advancement of their own ethnic and linguistic goals, without a moment of doubt in this endeavor. A report from a relevant foreign organization indicated that in the Taliban government, 90% of governmental positions belong to the Pashtun ethnic group. Categorizing these positions based on their influence in decision-making decisively shows that individuals from other ethnicities have no role in major Taliban decisions. Is there a clearer indication that the Taliban belong to a specific ethnic group? Perhaps those opposition politicians who disregard the ethnic nature of this group are attempting to display their nationalism and demonstrate their broad-mindedness towards all of Afghanistan. This approach may serve some politicians well, but its flaw lies in failing to provide an accurate analysis of the country’s situation, instead concealing the true face of the Taliban behind misconceptions and false assumptions. Without a correct analysis of one’s adversary or enemy, it is very difficult to devise effective strategies to confront them.
Badakhshan is one of the provinces where the Taliban claim indigenous power and have appointed Fasihuddin Fetrat, from the Wurduj district of this province, as the head of their military command. Yesterday, an incident occurred in the Tagab district of Badakhshan that reflected certain realities. As a result of clashes between the residents of Tagab district and the Kuchis, two people from Badakhshan were killed and several others were injured. Since the Taliban came to power, the Kuchis feel more empowered than before. In the northern and border regions of Afghanistan, they engage in aggressive and confrontational behavior towards the indigenous people. They brazenly use all means, damaging agricultural lands, and freely roam with their livestock. Indigenous people in Panjsher are not allowed to go to the mountains, yet the Taliban permits the Kuchis to move freely and graze their livestock wherever they please.
Interestingly, the Taliban even discriminate in their approach towards what they label as “immodesty.” Last year, Taliban moral police forces rigorously enforced veiling among women in Kabul, employing violence, according to their claims. The United Nations report indicated that Taliban actions in this regard were concentrated in areas populated by Tajiks like Khairkhana and Hazaras in Dasht-e Barchi in Kabul and did not extend to other areas. Meanwhile, the Taliban are less violent towards women in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban exhibit extreme prejudice towards other ethnic groups and do not differentiate significantly between men and women within those groups. Taliban leaders manipulate the minds and psyches of their fighters to incite them against the republican system, injecting them with deceitful propaganda, and preparing them for destruction and slaughter. It is extremely difficult to cleanse their minds of hateful and divisive thoughts in a short time. If we strip away hatred and prejudice from the Taliban group, what is left of them?
Over the past three years, the Taliban have pursued policies aimed at eliminating Persian and Uzbek languages from Afghanistan, echoing the ethnically divisive and language-suppressive practices of previous secular governments but with greater determination. Official correspondences are predominantly conducted in Pashto, occasionally incorporating Persian words under the guise of respecting national terminology while actively removing Persian signage from institutions. They exhibit coldness towards visitors in government offices unable to speak Pashto, hindering their proceedings, and insulting symbols of other ethnic identities and historical heritage.
Recently, the Taliban subjected an individual carrying books on Ahmad Shah Massoud’s achievements to torture, humiliation, and degradation. What crime does Massoud commit beyond being Tajik and speaking Persian? The Taliban label themselves as jihadists, despite Massoud having been more effective in resisting Soviet occupation and serving as an inspiration to liberation forces globally.
In essence, any effort to unite anti-Taliban forces finds majority approval among the Afghan populace. People consider any alternative to escape Taliban rule. In the current chaotic environment, ordinary citizens look with interest at any possibility offering them even the slightest hope. However, presenting a viable alternative to Taliban rule, which currently controls Afghanistan’s geography, is crucial. Merely playing with words and slogans will not solve the problem. If you think the only point of contention between the majority of Afghans and the Taliban is elections, you are heading towards a dead-end. A comprehensive definition and careful consideration of the real enemy, the Taliban, is essential. Even if they have external origins, the Taliban’s primary focus remains, alongside religion and creed, on ethnicity. Their leaders understand well that adhering to ethnic goals is crucial to maintaining the satisfaction of those they have risen from. Amidst this, promoting religious slogans holds significance in deceiving the naïve.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here: