Rosemary DiCarlo, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, recently visited Kabul and held discussions with Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, the Deputy Prime Minister for the political affairs of the Taliban. The revival of the third round of the Doha talks, initiated by the United Nations, underscored the necessity of the Taliban’s participation in the dialogue. It could be said that Ms. DiCarlo had no mission in her trip to Kabul other than inviting the Taliban to attend the Doha Meeting. The objective of the Doha Meeting has been defined as the intensification of the “engagement strategy” with the Taliban. It seems that the world has been at war with this group for nearly three years. The Taliban were absent from the first round of the Doha Meeting in the month of May of last year because they were not invited. In the second round held in late February of the same year, despite the official invitation, they did not participate because their demands were not accepted by the host. Now, invited to the third round, they have again conditioned their presence on the acceptance of their terms by the United Nations.
Thus, the question arises: Will the Taliban attend the third round of the Doha Meeting?
Although a definitive answer to this question cannot be given, recent events over the past few weeks indicate the Taliban’s eagerness to participate in the meeting, unless an obstacle or deterrent is created. To defend this assumption, the following points are cited:
1. Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, in his meeting with Ms. DiCarlo, conditioned the Taliban’s representative’s presence at the Doha Meeting to accept this group’s demands. This Taliban official has claimed that Afghanistan has only one leader and everyone obeys him. This implies that only someone representing absolute obedience to the Amir is eligible to participate in the meeting. However, DiCarlo responded to highlight the UN’s stance against the Taliban: “The Taliban’s conditions for attending the third round of the Doha Meeting are not difficult.” Her statement suggests that the United Nations this time has prepared itself to accept the expectations of the Taliban, even if it means legitimizing this group’s regime. Antonio Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, stated during the second round of the Doha Meeting that accepting the Taliban’s expectations means formal recognition of this group. For this reason, he fell short at that time.
2. As mentioned in the introduction, despite the insistence and repeated pressures from the United Nations and some other countries to participate in the second round of the Doha Meeting, the Taliban refrained. This action by the Taliban was perceived as a kind of disrespect to the world, especially the United Nations. Therefore, the predominant expectation for the third round was based on exerting pressure on the Taliban, not on the UN’s concession to this group. Now it is evident that this expectation has largely been proven wrong. Not only has the United Nations, but also some other countries, shown more leniency towards the Taliban than before. Following the second round, Mawlawi Yaqub Mujahid, the Taliban’s defense minister, became a guest of Qatari officials for several days. It was after this meeting that a White House spokesperson admitted that the best way to safeguard America’s interests in Afghanistan is to maintain strategic engagement with the Taliban. Likewise, Russia announced its efforts to remove the Taliban from the list of terrorism. In pursuit of this, Zamir Kabulov, Moscow’s special representative for Afghanistan, admitted that if the Taliban are not strategic enemies of his country, they are not enemies at all.
The recent visit of the Qatari delegation, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al Khalifa, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Qatar, in Kabul is also noteworthy. This delegation separately met with Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, Mawlawi Khalid Hanafi, Mullah Abdul Ghani Brother, Mawlawi Yaqub Mujahid, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, Sarajuddin Haqqani, and others. While it could have been a collective meeting with all, witnessing these warm and seemingly grandiose meetings does not suggest anything in the viewer’s mind except that Qatar, as before, remains determined to support the Taliban and gain legitimacy for this group. The Taliban have also claimed, quoting the head of the Qatari delegation, that “the conditions of the Taliban for participating in the Doha Meeting are justified, and without the presence of this group, no result will be achieved. Doha has clarified its position on this matter to the United Nations.” Given the above points, it is not unlikely that the United Nations is prepared to accept the Taliban’s conditions.
3. The announcement of the timing of the Doha Meeting also carries a special significance. Until Ms. DiCarlo came to Kabul and officially invited the Taliban, the timing of the meeting was unclear. Still, thereafter the United Nations officially announced the date of the meeting in a statement: the first and second of July this year. It seems that DiCarlo has assured the UN officials of the Taliban’s possible presence. Otherwise, it could have been postponed to ensure the Kabul regime’s satisfaction. More importantly, the Taliban also swiftly organized a meeting chaired by Mawlawi Abdul Kabir to discuss how to participate in the Doha Meeting, which also became media coverage.
4. DiCarlo has claimed that representatives of civil society will also be among the guests of the meeting; a group whose presence is unacceptable to the Taliban. From DiCarlo’s statements, it appears that both sides have chosen a middle ground this time: inviting civil society activists sympathetic to the Taliban. For example, Stephane Dujarric, Guterres’s spokesperson, stated that Ms. DiCarlo, during her trip to Kabul, discussed the Doha Meeting with Taliban officials, the diplomatic community, and representatives of civil society. It is unclear with whom DiCarlo spoke in Kabul representing civil society. There is no doubt that the Taliban have individuals as part of civil society alongside them to leverage them in important forums. Similarly, they also have some women’s rights activists with them. For instance, in a confidential and contentious meeting held a few days ago in Oslo, the capital of Norway, between civil society representatives and UN officials, the Taliban did not participate, but media outlets reported that this group had recommended its civil society supporters to attend that meeting. Therefore, the risk of a repeat of this scenario exists in the third round of the Doha Meeting.
5. So far, the main absentee from the third round of the Doha Meeting, like the two previous rounds, appears to be the anti-Taliban movements. Unlike this group, which has repeatedly called for shared participation and criticized the United Nations, none of the anti-Taliban forces have issued a clear statement regarding the recent meeting between UN representatives and the Taliban, and the official announcement of the timing of the resumption of the Doha Meeting. It is interesting that while the Taliban conditions their presence at the meeting, the anti-Taliban factions do not. The former is warmly invited, while the latter is not. The United Nations’ failure to heed the anti-Taliban forces implies acquiescing to the Kabul regime’s most important condition.
6. The presence and hospitality of Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah among foreign diplomats is also noteworthy. It was previously claimed that the Taliban, especially, kept Karzai under house arrest and restricted his meetings and foreign travels. However, in the past month, their place of residence has witnessed heavy traffic of foreign diplomats. Both also have public engagements, apparently obtained through Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Islamic Party. Ms. DiCarlo had a joint meeting with Karzai and Abdullah, making the Doha Meeting a trilateral discussion hub. European Union diplomats, Britain, and Spain also had joint meetings with Abdullah, and the Doha Meeting was on their agenda. Karzai has also managed to travel to Germany. Both are attractive to the Taliban and foreigners at present because their sole demand is the reopening of girls’ schools. More importantly, both do not support war against the Taliban, which appeals to the palate of the United Nations and some countries. Foreigners are discussing these two figures regarding the Doha Meeting because there is a need to address consultations with anti-Taliban fronts and avoid excessive criticism.
7. The issue of implementing the UN Security Council resolution regarding the appointment of a special envoy for Afghanistan, which was previously hotly debated, has not been discussed for a long time. It seems to have fallen into oblivion. While countries opposing the resolution have adopted a milder stance compared to the past. For example, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran’s ambassador to Afghanistan, recently told Tolonews that appointing a special envoy, if it helps solve the Afghan crisis, is worthy of support. Despite all efforts, the previous Doha Meeting failed to implement the provisions of the resolution. This time, it seems that according to the UN position, the proposal to introduce a special envoy may not even be on the agenda. If so, it certainly suits the Taliban’s desires.
Considering the above points, it indicates that the United Nations has plowed the ground for the Taliban and made it smoother. Therefore, the likelihood of their presence at the Doha Meeting is higher compared to the second round, but it is not certain.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here: