It has been nearly three years since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, and interaction with this group remains one of the most controversial topics.
One arena of contention is the approach to engaging with the Taliban, particularly the series of meetings initiated by the United Nations in Doha. The second session, held in February 2024, proceeded without Taliban presence but included several Afghanistan civil society representatives. However, the upcoming third session in June/July aims to include Taliban representatives by their invitation, shaping the agenda accordingly.
The world’s approach to Afghanistan, as evidenced by the Doha meetings, reflects a stark reality: short-term polarization of engagement is unrealistic. Efforts to sideline a broad spectrum of Afghan stakeholders from politics or outright opposition to engaging with the Taliban are both impractical. Future international forums may continue with exclusive Taliban participation or shared representation with civil society delegates. Therefore, it is crucial to engage in deeper, more intelligent dialogues beyond the third Doha meeting with global communities.
Elites of Afghanistan opposed to Taliban policies are primarily divided into two categories regarding engagement strategies: one seeks to use international engagement as a tool for influence (the “impact” approach), while the other views it not only as ineffective but as a means to bolster the Taliban (the “change” approach).
At a macro level, both groups claim to safeguard the interests of the people of Afghanistan. A true commitment to the common good demands seeking common ground among Afghan elites residing inside and outside the country. The term “elites” encompasses civil society, academic elites, diplomatic circles, politicians, and other influential groups.
This article proposes moving beyond polarized views on engagement and offers practical solutions aimed at creating common ground among Afghan elites.
Achieving this goal requires a thorough evaluation of both aforementioned approaches.
The “Impact” Approach
Just weeks after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, discussions began among foreign entities and some Afghan elites regarding their potential impact. The impact here refers to influencing the behavior of the Taliban with the goal of reform. Both internal and external actors argued that engagement was a pathway towards exerting significant influence over Afghanistan’s current ruling group. Concurrently, the United Nations described Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation as unprecedented and emphasized assistance to vulnerable populations as a primary reason for engagement.
Countries have employed a series of tools over the past three years to exert influence on Afghanistan, tailored to specific issues. These have included direct diplomatic dialogue, mediation by Muslim countries, especially religious scholars, presenting religious arguments, emotional appeals, ethical recommendations, and issuing statements and resolutions. Furthermore, world powers, particularly the United States, also resorted to a strategy of “reciprocal action,” believing that concessions made to the Taliban would yield reciprocal responses. Thus, financial aid under Taliban control began and continues, despite reductions in the severity of Taliban penalties, as evidenced by numerous individuals, including those listed in blacklists such as the 1988 list, being granted travel permits.
In determining world relations with the Taliban, reality has justified the ends justifying the means. Various actors regionally and globally, including Western nations, engage with the Taliban for diverse reasons: intelligence gathering on the ruling regime, high surveillance of Al-Qaeda and ISIS activities, the release of foreign hostages, geopolitical rivalries, and, finally, superficial inclusion of priorities such as human rights and women’s rights on the agenda.
Supporters of the impact approach must answer a fundamental yet crucial question based on concrete evidence: what are the priorities of the people of Afghanistan, and to what extent has engagement with the Taliban thus far addressed these priorities?
The “Change” Approach
The primary distinction between proponents of the “Change” approach compared to those of the “Impact” approach lies in prioritization: the former emphasizes political and governance frameworks, while the latter focuses on immediate humanitarian issues. Although these emphases are not inherently contradictory, such prioritizations have significant political ramifications.
Supporters of “Change” express concerns that the Taliban regime, perceiving international leniency and global indifference towards Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation, will consolidate its power and perpetuate ongoing crises. Advocates of this approach believe that the Taliban will not engage in meaningful dialogue until there is a balance of power. Here, power denotes control over the country’s geography, access to revenue and financial resources, military capabilities, and governance institutions. The author detailed how to create conditions for political dialogues in a separate article.
To effect change, proponents of this approach wield three main tools:
Firstly, societal cohesion: Increased repression, restrictions, and severity by the Taliban escalate the need for greater unity among the populace. Amidst dire economic conditions and the regime’s escalating injustices, public resentment towards the Taliban intensified over time. Injustice fuels both resistance and provides kindling for further resistance.
Secondly, global advocacy: A significant number of Taliban opponents currently seek refuge in the capitals of powerful countries worldwide. This has granted them unprecedented access to global leaders and influencers. For instance, over the past three years, Afghan women have been the sole representatives to speak at major United Nations Security Council meetings. Likewise, women have engaged directly with European Union bodies and member states, advocating for improvements in the dire living conditions of Afghan women in every council and speech.
Thirdly, military struggle: According to United Nations reports (UNAMA), Taliban opponents, specifically the Afghan Freedom Front, have begun military operations to challenge the ruling regime. While these military groups currently face serious challenges, their objective is not to launch extensive military operations but to sustain pressure on the Taliban regime. With the continuation of political crises and other current crises, it is unlikely that oppressed people will refer more than ever to these addresses
Potential Convergence Point For Proponents And Opponents Of Engagement
Supporters and detractors of engagement strategies each justify their positions based on the perceived legitimacy of their stance and the perceived shortcomings of the opposing side, viewing them not only as unrealistic but also as detrimental to the people of Afghanistan. If these two major factions genuinely intend to support the interests of the general populace, they must seek common ground. Only then can the urgent needs of the people—such as humanitarian aid—and longer-term political crises be addressed.
Creating a constructive dialogue requires emphasizing long-term interests over tactical positioning for oneself and others. Absolute engagement with the Taliban at the expense of excluding others is not sustainable and does not practically negate the governing role of the group in the short term.
Securing the interests of all Afghan factions necessitates transforming the current “Taliban-centric” global approach into an “Afghanistan-inclusive” strategy.
While it is true that the leadership of Afghanistan’s governing bodies currently lies under Taliban control, Afghanistan, like any other country, comprises not just one but various actors. Civil society, tribal elders, political movements, social movements, media, and the country’s academic community, both domestic and international, all play distinct roles within society and cannot be disregarded. Despite security threats from the Taliban, diverse segments of society continue to seek direct engagement with the global community, as they have in the past. Considering the ultimate goal, engaging with these actors may prove more critical than engaging solely with the Taliban.
Who Are The Other Actors?
Recent systematic research into Afghan actors has been conducted over the past three years, and the global community can use these studies to identify partners in Afghanistan. For instance, joint research by the Krak Institute for Global Studies and a local entity known as the Afghanistan Peace Initiative indicates approximately 64 political and social groups are active in Afghanistan, with many emerging in recent years. It is crucial to note that all these movements can potentially serve as international community partners for engagement.
Concerns typically arise regarding engagement with other movements. One primary concern is that the people of Afghanistan hold bitter memories of most politicians and leaders from the republican era. The suffering and disillusionment of the people of Afghanistan are entirely justified. These same people hold even bitterer memories of the Taliban group. If the criterion for engagement focuses on the actions of groups, interaction should not be limited to numerous groups, including the Taliban. Instead, the country’s interaction should only be with women and youth, who are either not invited to decision-making or have symbolic roles.
However, the criterion of the world for interaction is the current actual and potential influence of geography on a population. The Taliban group is, in fact, in power, but there is no guarantee that they can maintain their power for a long time. If this happens, it means that other people may fully or partially hold power in the future. In that case, the world will justify interaction with these groups. A crucial point is that the argument that emphasizes “actions” is irrelevant to the discussion of interaction.
Secondly, the diversity of political and social movements in the country is another reason cited for not engaging with them. Indeed, there is not sufficient unity among these movements, but some of them have a history of forming alliances and political unity. The foundation of the republic was initially based on a coalition of parties. Recently, in anticipation of the Second Doha Summit in February 2024, where the United Nations indicated readiness to invite civil society, the number of political and social coalitions has increased. Despite their lack of cohesion, the diversity among these movements serves as an excuse for not engaging with them.
The presence of Afghan forces from women’s movements to civil society unions and political alliances demonstrates the potential for collaboration among influential groups in Afghanistan. From human rights issues to the form of future governance, from humanitarian crises to counterterrorism efforts, all these matters require more than one group to engage with the international community. This will enable a wide spectrum of people to collaborate with the global community and incorporate diverse perspectives in addressing current crises.
Conclusion
It is now acknowledged that the Taliban group has seized control of governance but lacks the knowledge and capacity for effective governance. Additionally, the Taliban group is included in various international sanction lists, including those of the United Nations, making financial transactions significantly cumbersome and sometimes impossible despite attempts at engagement. The governing group does not represent the people of Afghanistan but only represents itself.
Despite this and due to the current control of governmental institutions by the Taliban group, countries worldwide engage with this group based on their interests, and it does not appear this will change soon. Foreign actors often present vague explanations to the people of Afghanistan regarding their short-term goals or emphasize secondary and tertiary objectives, even though they have been unsuccessful in achieving these goals, such as supporting efforts to secure women’s rights or improving the economic situation of the people.
However, an absolute denial of engagement, while important in principle, will not yield practical benefits. Countries determine their strategies towards Afghanistan and its actors not necessarily based on the principles and interests of the people of Afghanistan but rather on their own domestic and foreign policy calculations.
Nevertheless, if we consider the impact of engagement on the fate of the people of Afghanistan, widening the scope of engagement is necessary for it to be more effective. To achieve this goal, the “Taliban-centric” approach must give way to an “Afghanistan-inclusive” strategy. Such an approach is not detrimental in the long run to external countries and is beneficial to Afghanistan.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
تعامل جهان با افغانستان: چگونه میتوان از راهکار طالبانمحور عبور کرد؟ | روزنامه ۸صبح