Since 2001, the international community has played a significant role in Afghanistan, which can be divided into three distinct periods. From 2001 to 2018, it can be characterized as a period of intervention, reconstruction, and state-building. From 2017 to 2021, is a period focused on reducing the international community’s role and seeking a political agreement between the Taliban insurgents and the government of Afghanistan. From 2021 onwards, the international disengagement from Afghanistan and efforts for re-engagement have taken place.
Following the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, according to the World Bank, Afghanistan received around $90 billion in bilateral and multilateral development assistance from the United States and other donors until 2020 (excluding military aid). These aids, which played a crucial role in improving the country’s situation, included increasing life expectancy, infrastructure development, economic growth, and broader access to education and basic healthcare services. However, with the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 and the suspension of development and military aid, according to the report of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), humanitarian donors have pledged nearly $8.3 billion in humanitarian aid from 2021 to date to address the escalating humanitarian crisis in the country.
Throughout these periods, the role of the international community, primarily under the control of the United States, has involved contradictions that have undermined its goals of establishing stability in Afghanistan and preventing its resurgence as a haven for terrorist groups. These contradictions of foreign intervention, which unintentionally undermined many achievements of the past two decades since 2001 and posed risks to Afghanistan’s future, can be divided into three distinct waves of contradictions.
The first wave of contradictions occurred from 2001 to 2017. During that period, the United States and its allies bypassed the Afghan government more often and established parallel institutions financially and politically. More than half of the aid bypassed the national government, and instead, donors’ interests took precedence over Afghanistan’s national priorities. While corruption and governmental weakness largely facilitated this approach, bypassing the government had unintended consequences. In my book “Aid Paradoxes in Afghanistan: Building and Undermining the State,” three contradictions related to foreign intervention are documented: the government’s shift from being accountable to its citizens to donors, creating distance in the relationship between the government and society, and fragmentation of the tax system. Such an approach unintentionally hindered investments and essential reforms for the government and prolonged its weakness and fragility.
The second wave of contradictions, from 2018 to 2021, instead of learning from past mistakes, repeated the same mistakes of the past. During this period they were involved in a political negotiation process for a political agreement and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. However, the United States repeated a similar approach that had weakened development and state-building efforts in Afghanistan in some cases. The United States bypassed the elected government of Afghanistan and other national institutions and directly negotiated with the Taliban insurgents. Despite growing concerns about the consequences of a hasty agreement (even voiced by former U.S. diplomats to Afghanistan) and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces without changes in the conditions in Afghanistan, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban in February 2020. However, no progress was made in the ceasefire and political agreement, the two primary conditions of the Doha Agreement. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the Republic government collapsed on August 15, 2021, and many of Afghanistan’s achievements since 2001 were jeopardized. The collapse of the multi-party republic was significantly influenced by the U.S.-Taliban agreement. This agreement deprived the Afghan government of legitimacy and decision-making power, reduced aid and military support, and created confusion among local and regional actors.
The third wave of contradictions of foreign intervention began with the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021. The Taliban dissolved the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan and imposed restrictions on women, including banning education after the sixth grade and employment, except for limited cases such as in the health sector. These policies resemble those implemented during the first Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001. In response, the United States and other Western donors cut off development and military aid to Afghanistan. However, humanitarian aid and some development assistance were provided to address humanitarian crises and maintain essential services, leading to two contradictions related to intervention emerging.
First, while humanitarian aid prevented deepening humanitarian crises and economic collapse, sanctions imposed on Afghanistan weakened the economy and perpetuated poverty. Second, the international community’s engagement with the Taliban without a clear path forward lacked policies that the global community claimed to support, including the protection of basic women’s rights and the establishment of all-inclusive governance.
Despite holding a conference with foreign envoys for Afghanistan under the leadership of the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in Doha on February 17 and 18, 2024, expected outcomes such as a clear roadmap for international engagement with Afghanistan or the appointment of a special UN envoy for the country did not materialize. This outcome largely stemmed from disagreements among permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Among the assistance provided by the international community, especially through humanitarian and development aid, three waves of contradictions of foreign intervention in Afghanistan demonstrate unintended consequences and, in some cases, detrimental effects of foreign intervention. The future of Afghanistan remains in a haze of uncertainty. There is no easy path for the country to break free from the cycle of fragility, conflict, and oppression, nor is there a one-size-fits-all strategy for the international community to aid in resolving these crises. However, these contradictions underscore the importance of learning from past mistakes and adopting more informed and comprehensive approaches to international engagement and national processes in Afghanistan, perhaps in similar situations.
A long-term perspective strategy and performance that prioritizes the needs and aspirations of the citizens of Afghanistan from all walks of life are essential. This approach must be based on a clear roadmap aimed at achieving sustainable stability and ensuring dignity and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan.
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