In the past two to three days, three ethnocentric incidents related to Taliban rule have occurred in Afghanistan. The first incident took place in Badakhshan province. Taliban fighters in the Darayem district of this province, under the pretext of destroying poppy fields, destroyed legitimate people’s farmlands and then stormed homes, committing acts of robbery against the people, including women. In response to this aggression and disrespect, the people of Darayem protested against the Taliban, who, in turn, responded by opening fire on the people. Although the bullets resulted in casualties and injuries, they did not quell the protest; instead, it intensified. To suppress it, the Taliban dispatched fresh forces. These protests spread on the second day to two other districts in Badakhshan (Jurm and Argo), widening their scope. These protests have not subsided yet and continue to assert their strength. The Taliban, in an attempt to address what they call the conflict, sent a delegation to Badakhshan from the capital, but the protesters blocked their path. The ethnic dimension of this conflict lies in the fact that the invading and aggressing fighters against the people’s homes and women are predominantly Pashtun, while the residents are mostly Tajik and Uzbek. Therefore, the protesters have demanded the expulsion of Pashtun-origin Taliban fighters from these districts.
The second conflict occurred in the Behsud district of Maidan Wardak province. In this district, armed Kuchis, as in previous years, have raided villages and people’s farms, intimidated them, and warned them not to use their agricultural lands anymore. Additionally, they have demanded that they pay compensation for the twenty years of use of these lands. The conflict between Kuchis and settled residents, mainly in Hazara-populated areas, is a longstanding one. This conflict dates back to land policies initiated by Abdul Rahman Khan and continued by Amanullah Khan. Amanullah Khan formalized land policy for the first time in the country and enacted the “Transhumance Ordinance towards Qataghan,” which was implemented. According to the orders of these kings, Kuchis had to move their herds to central Hazara-inhabited areas and some northern areas of the country for grazing, where these grazing lands were considered their property. However, now that Kuchis, who acted as Taliban’s arms during the republic, are acting with impunity, attacking people with arms, setting fire to their homes, and destroying their farms. Now, Kuchis not only claims grazing lands but also considers the homes and farms of the people as their property. They enjoy full support from the Taliban, enabling them to carry weapons and use force against the people. Although the situation was similar during the republic, now, due to the weak power base of non-Pashtuns, especially Hazaras, Kuchis have imposed a much worse situation on the people. Consequently, the local people, who have relatively little ethnic affinity with Kuchis, have come under attack. Therefore, this conflict has practically taken on an ethnic form.
In Baghlan province, a third conflict erupted when Taliban fighters of Pashtun descent assaulted local women, prompting a public outcry. Non-Pashtun Taliban members stood in support of the people. The Taliban security commander in that district, Pashtun himself, deployed his forces and severely humiliated the non-Pashtun fighters, arresting and imprisoning them. This action by the Taliban security commander was heavily interpreted as ethnically motivated, sparking dissent among non-Pashtun members of the group.
The Taliban, predominantly Pashtun in composition, represent a nexus of ethnic and religious identity. Besides suppressing followers of other religions, they have also deeply divided people along ethnic lines, often ridiculing non-Pashtun ethnicities. Attacks on women by Taliban fighters and commanders predominantly target non-Pashtun women, as reported by media outlets. Hence, the Taliban exploit assaults on women as a tool for intimidating and demeaning non-Pashtuns, essentially punishing them through these heinous acts. Therefore, it seems that sending delegations to resolve these conflicts might not yield lasting results. The Taliban do not refrain from their ethnic and religious policies, and the continuation of these policies will likely fuel further conflicts in the future.
On the other hand, attacks on Hazaras and Shias in various parts of the country are not unrelated to the Taliban. After the recent attack on Shia worshippers in Herat, Rahmatullah Nabil, former head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS ) of Afghanistan stated that “a senior Taliban commander was accused of involvement in these attacks”. Analysts have previously suggested that the Taliban exploit ISIS as a lever of pressure on the Afghan people and sometimes attribute their attacks to ISIS. The fact that ISIS claims responsibility for these attacks may be because they also benefit from such attacks.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
