With Israel’s apparent response to Iran’s attack, it may be necessary to examine the gains and losses for both parties. Following the events in Isfahan, neither the Israeli side nor the Iranian side has clearly stated their position. Iranian authorities told the media that their air defense downed several unidentified drones in the skies of Isfahan. While Israel, though opting for meaningful silence in the past, Western media, citing some Israeli officials, confirmed the attack on the city of Isfahan. Whatever the case, the attack was not of the nature expected. Now that tensions seem to have at least temporarily subsided, discussions about the extent of gains and losses for both sides have emerged, which will be briefly examined below:
1- Gains of Islamic Republic Iran
1.1. Iran benefits from the fact that the United Nations Security Council has not condemned its attack on Israeli soil. Tehran has been seen as an accused by the Security Council in the past. Whether this view is fair or not is certainly debatable. After Iran’s nuclear program came under scrutiny by the Council, crippling sanctions were imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was automatically lifted last October based on the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Still, three permanent members of the Council accuse Iran of human rights violations, support for terrorism, and destabilizing the region. Therefore, the predominant expectation was for a unified condemnation of the attack, which did not happen. Hence, it can be said that Tehran has neither gained nor lost.
1.2. The Islamic Republic of Iran has invested heavily in strengthening its military power. Therefore, its nuclear, drone, and missile programs have raised concerns for some Western and regional governments. It was widely believed that despite its rhetoric, the Iranian side lacked any real defense capabilities. Hence, Iran’s response, considering the quantity of its missiles and drones, is more aimed at showcasing military power rather than necessarily inflicting heavy casualties on its adversary. If the Israeli side had suffered heavy damage in that attack, a full-scale war would not have been unlikely. The fact that the attack received widespread coverage in the global media and was closely watched by both large and small countries suggests that the Iranian side has been somewhat successful in what is perceived as demonstrating military prowess.
1.3. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been accused by both its supporters and opponents of being inactive, meaning that it did not show a serious response to Israeli attacks. The prevalent assumption was based on Tehran’s fear of direct engagement in war with Israel and the United States. Therefore, by launching “Operation True Promise,” Iran managed to remove the stigma of inaction to some extent and attract more support from its backers. Some Iranian citizens came to the streets at night and expressed support for the retaliatory attack. Government-affiliated media claimed that the attack also benefited Palestinians. For example, some Iranian media reported that Gaza residents had not been killed only on the night of April 13, which could be seen as a credibility boost for Tehran.
2- Losses for the Islamic Republic of Iran
2.1. Iran suffers losses in that it will face increased sanctions from Western allies of Israel. The G7 condemned the Islamic Republic’s response and spoke of further sanctions against its drone and missile programs. Israel is also making serious efforts to intensify sanctions against Tehran by its allies. Tel Aviv’s goal is to blacklist the IRGC in the European Union, which does not seem likely to succeed anytime soon. President Biden announced two days ago that new sanctions have been imposed against Iran’s drone program, steel industries, and automotive sector. Political pressures will also intensify more than ever before. Although the Iranian side has been accustomed to sanctions from Western governments, the continuation of sanctions, with greater intensity than before, will result in significant losses.
2.2. Not only Israel but also some Sunni Arab countries in the Middle East fear the empowerment of Shia Iran. The April 13 attack has also sounded the alarm for them. Hence, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were reported to participate practically and informatively in tracking Iranian missile launches. They will now take Iran as a serious “major threat” and have no choice but to intensify their dependence on the United States of America and close ties with Israel. Perhaps the normalization process between Riyadh and Tel Aviv will follow at a faster pace than before.
3- Gains for Israel
3.1. Israel was under heavy global pressure for its actions in Gaza. Even the case of genocide against it had been opened; a country whose residents still claim to bear the scars of genocide. Israel, which had been turned into a suspect, is now remembered by many as a victim because the Gaza war and the humanitarian disaster it caused have been sidelined recently. According to some media reports, 48 countries have condemned Iran’s response, which could be a temporary consolation for Israel.
3.2. Western governments were uneasy with Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, to the extent that they held him back from attacking Rafah, the southernmost city of Gaza. But now they stand decisively by his side. A clear example of this is their timely and effective participation in tracking Iranian missiles. The sanctions they impose on Iran are intended to support Tel Aviv. At least in recent weeks, their criticism of Israel’s military operations in Gaza has ended. However, it is still unclear whether Israel will continue its operations in Gaza, especially Rafah. However, indications suggest that perhaps the Biden administration will continue to keep the Netanyahu government away from attacking Rafah because the ongoing tragedy in Gaza does not necessarily have a direct link to tension with Iran.
3.3. Netanyahu has previously been heavily pressured domestically: conceding to a ceasefire agreement with Hamas for the release of hostages, holding early elections, and stepping down from power. Until April 1st, the streets of Tel Aviv witnessed large demonstrations by Israeli citizens. Following that, the April 13th attack marked a turning point for Netanyahu, carrying both a healing aspect and potential repercussions for his future. Israelis prefer to contemplate more on curbing external threats in the current circumstances rather than overthrowing the Netanyahu government. However, the continuation of operations in Gaza and the unresolved fate of the hostages may spark protests anew in Israel.
- Losses for Israel
4.1. An attack on Israel, especially by a government, had almost become an impossible task, as it possesses military power, responds decisively and swiftly, and has the support of the United States. Since October 1973, Israel’s territory has not been subjected to any government’s aggressive attack. However, Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi leader did launch a limited missile attack on Israel in February 1991, which was not responded to following America’s advice. Armed groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad remain exceptions. Given these points, the attack on Israel by governments was considered a “taboo” by many, and Iran’s response may be called “Breaking Taboo.” Assuming Israel attacks Iran’s interests again and Tehran responds, this taboo will be further broken.
4.2. According to some neutral observers, Israel’s deterrent power has also come under question. Based on this belief, firstly, Israel’s territory should not be targeted, and if it is, the missiles should be completely neutralized. Moreover, if Western countries and Jordan did not come to Israel’s aid, its defense systems might have faced challenges, and more missiles could have hit their targets. Tel Aviv’s solicitation of Western powers in tracking missile launches has strengthened the notion that despite all its military capabilities, Israel’s defense still relies on others.
4.3. As noted above, the Security Council was unable to issue a unified statement condemning Iran’s attack on Israeli soil, which is detrimental to Tel Aviv. The Council predominantly views Israel as a victim. Failure to comply with the resolutions has not held it accountable, while other countries are simply sanctioned. However, the attack on the Iranian consulate did not prompt condemnation from the Security Council, which seemed natural given the stance of its three permanent members. As Washington, London, and Paris hold sway in the Council, issuing a unified statement in Israel’s favor seemed possible but was not realized for certain reasons.
4.4. If we accept that the attack on Isfahan was carried out by Israel, it can be argued that there is a lack of proportionality between the retaliatory actions of the parties. Iran’s response appeared severe, to the extent that Western governments intervened to contain it. It also received widespread coverage in global media, with Iranian officials taking responsibility with a mix of pride. However, not only did Israel’s attack appear weak, but as of this writing, its officials have not officially taken responsibility. Even according to statements from Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s Minister of National Security, the attack on Isfahan was deemed “weak” by media reports, sparking a notable reaction from Yair Lapid, the leader of the Israeli opposition: “Never before has a minister in the security cabinet dealt such a heavy blow to Israel’s security, prestige, and position.”
Apart from the gains and losses of the parties involved, as predicted by the writer in the previous text, tensions between the parties have temporarily subsided. However, it may continue in other forms and other places in the future.