Since the 1990s, the Taliban have constructed and disseminated certain clichés within Afghan society, garnering varying degrees of acceptance among the populace. Much of this relative acceptance stemmed from the filtered information reaching the people, particularly during the Taliban’s initial rule when independent media was absent, and access to information was limited to what the Taliban themselves propagated. The Taliban’s propaganda machinery intentionally injected these narratives into society, staging displays to convince the public of their manufactured clichés. Some of these clichés were promoted to the extent that they gradually acquired a sanctified aura. Over the twenty years of the Islamic Republic, a significant portion of which was marked by armed conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government, some of these sacred clichés have been shattered. However, several others remained resilient, aided indirectly by the weaknesses of the Afghan government in providing security, especially on the highways, leading some segments of the population to believe that the Taliban could be providers of security in a society like Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the second iteration of Taliban rule has also shattered these remaining clichés, with free media, the internet, and citizen journalism playing significant and serious roles in debunking them.
- Blind Obedience to Leadership
One of the clichés regarding the Taliban is the notion of blind obedience to their leadership. This cliché is a product of the Taliban’s propaganda efforts, extensively promoted over nearly three decades of the group’s existence. Ordinary people in Afghanistan, and sometimes even outside the country, believe that within the Taliban, the leader’s word is final, and the body of the group adheres to absolute obedience. However, events and incidents prove otherwise.
In all fundamentalist and traditionalist groups, blind obedience to leadership is a common principle. However, experience has shown that whenever the interests of the group members in lower ranks dictate, they simply ignore their leader’s orders. The situation is no different within the Taliban regime. One document that challenges this clichéd narrative of the Taliban is a collection of leadership directives within their two emirates. In the first era, Mullah Omar issued orders repeatedly, and when he realized that the Taliban body did not comply with his commands, he issued pursuit orders, and this pattern continued. One example is Mullah Omar’s successive orders regarding the prohibition of “bacha bazi” (child play) within the ranks of the group. Given that Taliban officials from commanders to ministers were involved in this phenomenon, Mullah Omar repeatedly issued orders prohibiting it. In the officially published directives of Mullah Omar, at least three orders were issued regarding the prohibition of this practice, and in the second and third orders, it was mentioned that previous orders were not implemented. In the third order, a warning was even issued that if obedience to the leadership’s order is not observed this time, he will be forced to punish the offenders. Aside from the ease with which the Taliban punish others and the difficulty they face in disciplining group members, the repeated issuance of orders in one matter demonstrates that when the leadership targets the interests of the group body and its members, there is no such thing as pure obedience.
Another decree issued by Mullah Omar regarding disobedience to his orders further demonstrates that the Taliban body does not adhere blindly to their leader, contrary to what is propagated. In decree number 788, Mullah Omar states: “To all Taliban civilian and military officials, may peace and mercy and blessings of Allah be upon you! If you have harbored corrupt individuals for reasons of ethnicity, kinship, or acquaintance, concealed weapons, engaged in theft, violated the rights of Muslims, or committed oppression with them, or engaged in adultery, sodomy, or neglect of prayers, or shown insubordination to the leader’s command, or failed to comply with religious matters under the command of the leader, then this leads to the destruction of God’s religion…”
Similar instances can be seen in the collection of directives by Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. All of these illustrate a situation that contradicts the cliché of blind obedience within the Taliban’s structure. On the other hand, in the second era of this group’s emirate, we practically witness that the body of this group did not obey the Taliban leader’s orders. The “general amnesty” decree issued by Mullah Hibatullah is violated daily by the body of this group. This decree prohibits the prosecution of former government officials and specifically security forces, but in practice, they are not only subject to judicial persecution but are directly targeted by bullets. The fact that the Taliban leader has forbidden retaliation by the members of this group proves the ground realities contrary to that. Prohibiting polygamy, preventing individualism and nepotism, refraining from sexual assault, and other issues dictated by the Taliban leader are disregarded by the members of this group, and they commit such crimes.
Another aspect can be seen in the families of Taliban members. The ban on educating girls in Afghanistan by the Taliban leader is justified by their claim that the educational environment in the country is not entirely Islamic. They argue that education has not been entirely Islamic before, and now conditions for Islamizing education, especially women’s education, are not available. In practice, however, members of the leadership and high-ranking officials of this group, whose families live abroad, make different decisions. Even now, according to the admission of Taliban members, some girls from the families of this group, including Sohail Shaheen, receive education in schools and universities that have a more liberal environment compared to Afghan schools and universities. In these educational centers, it is not even mandatory to wear a burqa or headscarf, and girls participate in classes and discussions with optional and self-chosen coverings, while before the Taliban returned to power, girls and female teachers in educational centers in Afghanistan wore Islamic hijab.
In conclusion, the events in our surroundings and the few documents leaked from the Taliban all indicate that the principle of blind obedience does not exist absolutely within this group’s apparatus. Obedience only exists in areas where the leadership’s orders target the people’s interests, not the group members’ interests.
- Cohesion
Another cliché is the unity and internal cohesion within the Taliban group. The past couple of decades have clearly shown that within this group, contrary to the grand narrative and cliché constructed and propagated by their propaganda apparatus, there is no absolute cohesion and unity. However, if we categorize people in Afghanistan into Taliban and non-Taliban, the cohesion within the Taliban is much greater than that of the non-Taliban ranks; however, it must be noted that the non-Taliban ranks are not a homogeneous entity in the first place. Non-Taliban Afghans are those who believe in political and cultural pluralism, and this belief creates smaller units within the non-Taliban ranks. On the non-Taliban front, women and men with different political, cultural, and religious inclinations each have their priorities. Their diverse priorities have undermined their cohesion. One of the reasons for the Taliban’s dominance over Afghanistan has also been the lack of cohesion in the anti-Taliban camp, just as this now provides the groundwork for the Taliban’s continued rule over Afghanistan. Therefore, expecting cohesion within the non-Taliban ranks, which are themselves divided into different factions, is futile.
However, the Taliban’s story is different. They are simply one group with a unified religious, political, and nationalistic agenda. Thus, they have more cohesion compared to the anti-Taliban camp, if we consider them as one camp. Nevertheless, the smaller divisions within this group demonstrate their lack of cohesion.
This group is primarily divided into two factions: the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. The conflicts that have arisen between these two factions reflect the lack of cohesion within the group itself. Examples of these struggles and conflicts were discussed in the first part of this article regarding the control of offices and revenue-generating units.
Secondly, the Taliban group also includes some non-Pashtun members. Considering that the Taliban is an ethnic group, non-Pashtun members of this group see their interests at risk in many cases and resist it as much as possible. The story of Mawlawi Mahdi’s departure from the Taliban ranks and then the Taliban’s military campaign against him is a concrete example. Another example is the conflict between the Taliban with a prominent member of this group in Faryab province named Mullah Aalam. He, not being ethnically aligned with the main body of the Taliban, faced the wrath of the leadership of this group and showed resistance. The Taliban’s military campaign in Faryab and their suppression and detention of him ended the dispute, but it demonstrated that the grand narrative of cohesion within the Taliban apparatus is a blatant lie. This narrative of cohesion, which has turned into a cliché about the Taliban, has been shattered by these internal conflicts.
Therefore, most of the clichés constructed about the Taliban have been due to the restrictions imposed by this group on the circulation of information. When information does not circulate freely, the propaganda apparatus of the group fabricates some false information about them and injects it into society. The repetitive promotion of such fabricated narratives can make a portion of the population believe in them. Recognizing this human characteristic, the Taliban repeatedly promotes a fabricated narrative and, in this way, can distort the thinking of ordinary members of society to some extent. However, these clichés have now been shattered thanks to free media and social networks. The Taliban also understand this issue and have pressured free media to control them or eliminate them from the information circulation field. Despite the widespread pressure they have exerted, some free media outlets have shown resistance and are present in the field. Therefore, they pose a challenge to the fabricated narratives of the Taliban.
Social networks, especially Facebook as a popular platform in Afghanistan, have also been effective in breaking the narratives of the Taliban. People share and repost Taliban violations, abuses, and crimes on social networks, thereby challenging the Taliban narrative. The Taliban are aware of this issue and, for this reason, alongside filtering the internet and blocking the domains of free media, they are now trying to shut down Facebook as well. Even if they succeed in closing Facebook, there are still platforms that they cannot avoid closing for their use, and people will continue to use them for the free circulation of information. Therefore, the clichés of the Taliban no longer simply survive.