Badakhshan has experienced a period of extreme insecurity under the rule of the Taliban regime. The unrest, primarily targeting native Taliban officials, is considered an internal conflict and issue within the Taliban group. Although ISIS largely claims responsibility for these attacks there are no major differences between Taliban fighters and the ISIS group in the country including Badakhshan. Terrorism has now become a profitable business for both sides (Taliban and ISIS) and have opened shops in this market. It is also possible that internal conflicts within the Taliban are settled in coordination with ISIS Khorasan fighters. Mullah Abdul Haq Omar, the former Taliban commander in Badakhshan, is among the popular casualties of these internal conflicts, have was killed in an explosion a year ago. This spring was also bloody for the Badakhshan Taliban. Nasir Ahmad Ahmadzai, the former deputy governor of the Taliban in Badakhshan, who was killed in an explosion on June 16th of this year, was another prominent figure among the Taliban who fell victim to these disputes. During his funeral, another attack took place, and this time, alongside several others, the former Taliban commander in Baghlaan province was also killed.
These massacres and assaults marked the initial step in pushing the Taliban of Tajik descent away from authority. Since then, for a while, the circumstances in Badakhshan have been similar to other parts of the country; it has become a prison for the people, but the situation is normal for the Taliban. However, recently, efforts have been made by the Taliban leadership to completely exclude the Badakhshani Taliban from power in this province and implemented the second phase of that same process. In this phase, significant reshuffling has taken place, with the most notable being the removal of the governor, deputy governor, security commander, faction commander, security command’s security officer, and intelligence chief. Mullah Amanuddin Mansoor remembered as a fearless Tajik-origin Badakhshani Taliban, saw most of the personnel he had appointed in this sector removed when he was ousted from leading the Taliban’s air forces. When he was appointed as the governor of Badakhshan, given that significant military sections of this province were also under the control of the Tajik and Badakhshani Taliban, he carved out a niche for himself. The Taliban leadership became concerned about this situation and halted the transition process from Badakhshan. In this process, Mullah Amanuddin was removed from Badakhshan and was placed in charge of the Kunduz operations, essentially isolating him from his power base. While commanding the Kunduz operations is an important military position, for someone like Amanuddin, it is considered a form of punishment, the Badakhshan faction is more important than the Kunduz operations in another province.
While Mullah Amanuddin was on a pilgrimage trip, the Taliban leadership removed him from the governorship of Badakhshan and appointed Mohammad Ayoub Khalid in his place. Mr. Khalid had previously served as the Taliban’s governor in Konar and belongs to the Pashtun tribe. Subsequently, Mullah Hafiz was removed from the command of the 219th Omar al-Third faction in Badakhshan, and in his place, Mullah Azizullah Haqyar, who is also Pashtun, was appointed. Currently, Azizullah Omar is the security commander of the Taliban in Badakhshan, and Qari Tayeb is the deputy governor of this province. Both of these individuals are ethnically Pashtun. Mullah Zeinalabedin, known as Nasrat Agha, has been appointed as the security officer under the security commander of this province, and Khan Mohammad, known as Haji Asad, has become the head of the Taliban governor’s office in Badakhshan. Both of them are Pashtun. The head of the Taliban’s intelligence is also Pashtun, and it was expected that he would be removed from this position yesterday and appointed as the head of mines in Badakhshan, but this decision has been postponed.
If the Taliban group is supposed to create an identity for itself, it is nothing more than a radical nationalistic-religious group. Ethnic and religious background is a significant factor in determining the level of trust among the group’s members. The Badakhshani Taliban, who are predominantly of Tajik origin, do not share common ancestry with the Taliban leadership in Kandahar and Kabul and are, therefore, not considered trustworthy.
The Taliban leadership worries that a shift in circumstances could spark internal disputes within their group. They fear that if the Tajik-origin Badakhshani Taliban, particularly those based in resource-rich areas of the same province, unite, they might present a significant challenge.
The worry intensified when the Taliban leadership began relocating Pashtun families in Badakhshan and Takhar. Such movements have stirred unease among the local inhabitants, including the native Taliban, regarding possible ethnic tensions ahead and shifts in the area’s demographics.
Recognizing the situation, the Taliban leadership is worried about possible resistance from the Badakhshani Taliban to their decisions, especially if these factions are armed. To address this, they have removed military leaders from Badakhshan and taken away their official positions. Additionally, steps are being taken to disarm these fighters. Given these challenges, the Taliban governor in Badakhshan has directed districts to firmly handle any resistance to disarmament.
On the other hand, the new security commander of Badakhshan has arrived in the province with 200 fighters to begin his tenure. The deployment of 200 fighters from Kabul to protect the security commander signifies heightened concerns. One of the main reasons the Badakhshani Taliban were replaced in key roles by Pashtun-origin Taliban in this province seems to be concerns related to ethnicity.
However, concerns about the presence of native Taliban in Badakhshan are not the key reason for this significant relocation of individuals. The second critical reason is the influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir and ISIS-Khorasan in this province. It is said that some Taliban forces in Badakhshan have connections with ISIS. The head of the former Taliban intelligence office in Badakhshan reportedly was a member of the ISIS group, but the intelligence chief was either unaware of it or overlooked it. Mullah Noorullah’s removal from the leadership of Badakhshan’s intelligence was for this very reason. One factor contributing to the current instability in the country is ISIS-Khorasan. This group has extensive infiltration in some eastern and northeastern provinces. On the other hand, after the fall of the government to the Taliban group, Badakhshan has become a hub for various terrorist groups. Members of the TTP, who have been transferred there by the Taliban, along with the Ansarullah group (Tajikistan Taliban), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkestan fighters, and other terrorist groups, are present in this province. Some of them have come with their families and reside in the provincial capital and districts. It is said that the Taliban have distributed Afghan ID cards and passports to some of them. Now that some of these groups are displeased with the Taliban’s hospitality, they may lean towards ISIS-Khorasan. This is a very serious threat. The rise of ISIS in Badakhshan has intensified concerns about the potential recruitment from among these groups.
Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has extensive influence among the youth in northern Afghanistan, although not militarily active, is extremist and fundamentalist, striving for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. This party works within the society to promote fundamentalist ideas and in this regard aligns with groups like the Taliban and ISIS. Even during the Republic era, this party had widespread activities but operated illegally. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was concerned about this party, and Abdullah Abdullah referred to it as a non-military branch of the Taliban group. When the Taliban reached Panjshir, reports emerged of their allegiance with Hizb ut-Tahrir; however, subsequently, the Taliban suppressed members of this party. In the most recent incident, the Taliban detained members of this party amass in Badakhshan twice; the first time, 16 individuals were detained, and the second time, 45 individuals. The possibility of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir having connections with ISIS-Khorasan is one of the reasons for this series of detentions.
Given that Hizb ut-Tahrir continued its activities under the control of the Taliban in Badakhshan and ISIS gained power, it seems that the Taliban leadership, by placing other individuals in political and military positions in this province, is also likely gearing up for a confrontation with ISIS. The mass dismissals in Badakhshan have various dimensions, one of which is the concern about the widespread presence of ISIS and the empowerment of this group.
The third significant reason is the revenue sources of Badakhshan. The Taliban is perceived as a group heavily reliant on narcotics. Since its formation, a significant portion of the Taliban’s budget has been derived from the production and trade of narcotics. High-ranking members of the Taliban leadership are involved in this trade. Now, Badakhshan in northeastern Afghanistan is the most important producer of narcotics, including opium. The extensive production of narcotics in Badakhshan has caught the attention of the Taliban leadership. On the other hand, Badakhshan is a border province, sharing borders with three countries: Tajikistan, Pakistan, and China. The location of this province is crucial for the Taliban’s black trade. Since black trade does not have clear accounting practices, the control of this province by native Taliban is not particularly favorable for the Taliban leadership in Kabul and Kandahar.
Another significant revenue source that has attracted the attention of the Taliban leadership is the numerous mines in Badakhshan. Control over the mines has been a factor in some of the internal disputes within the Taliban group. In the early stages after the fall of the Republic, when the Haqqani network had conquered more provinces, it had positioned itself around revenue sources, metaphorically sitting on a treasure trove. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who arguably deserved more due to his more extensive warfare and the capture of more provinces, had taken control of customs, mines, and some high-revenue departments like the passport office. However, the Taliban from Kandahar gradually wrested all these resources from the grip of the Haqqanis.
Nonetheless, the mines of Badakhshan remain under the control of the native Taliban. The leadership in Kabul and Kandahar is keen on gaining even more control over these mines. The rumor of removing the head of the mines, who is currently a Tajik Taliban member, and appointing a Pashtun Taliban member as the new chief of intelligence is taken very seriously. If this appointment occurs, the grip of the native Badakhshan Taliban on the bureaucracy, military power, and revenue sources of Badakhshan will significantly weaken.
Thus, the triangle of “ethnicity, terrorism, and mines” has contributed to these extensive dismissals in Badakhshan.
