Zamir Kabulov, the Russian President’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, has said that his country will not allow the United States to regain control of the Bagram military base. At the same time, he has called on the Taliban and Pakistan to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. He also expressed concern over the presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
These remarks reflect a multilayered and complex Russian game in Afghanistan. While it may appear that the Russians are confused in the Afghan arena, deeper analysis shows that Russia’s strategy in Afghanistan is neither the result of an intelligence failure nor confusion. Rather, it represents a complex, multilayered, and calculated game at both regional and transregional levels. Moscow is deliberately pursuing a path that may seem ambiguous, contradictory, and even misleading to other actors, but this ambiguity is in fact part of its strategic design. Simultaneous engagement with the Taliban and Pakistan within the framework of counterterrorism is less a sign of a simple choice and more an indication of a tactical reliance on unreliable actors to maintain intelligence oversight and an effective presence in the Afghan arena.
At the core of this approach is the preservation of Russia’s “strategic backyard” in Central Asia, a region that holds a central place in its Eurasian security doctrine. By highlighting threats emanating from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Russia is in fact creating the grounds to strengthen and justify its security presence in Central Asia. This amplification of threats is not merely a reaction to real dangers but part of an active strategy to consolidate regional influence.
By leveraging the complex relationships among the Taliban, Pakistan, and the United States, Russia is expanding its room for maneuver. It is well aware that relations among these actors have always been marked by mistrust, divisions, and competition, and it uses these weaknesses precisely to advance its operational objectives. Unlike during the Cold War, Russia’s foreign policy today is less ideological and far more pragmatic and flexible, focusing on temporary alliances and short-term interests rather than fixed partnerships.
Within this framework, Moscow is simultaneously considering multiple scenarios. If Pakistan shifts toward other actors or if the Taliban change their behavior under external pressure, Russia seeks to avoid being caught off guard. For this reason, maintaining relations with the Taliban is more of an intelligence and tactical necessity than a long-term strategic choice. The Taliban are not a final partner but rather one of several temporary tools in a broader and more complex game, much like their role for other powers.
In this context, Russia is also deliberately using issues such as the Bagram base. Raising this matter, even without concrete signs of U.S. action, creates a kind of “information shock” that can provoke reactions from various actors while simultaneously laying the groundwork for a defensive shield against potential scenarios. This approach is part of a preemptive information strategy aimed at buying time, increasing regional sensitivity, and preventing strategic surprise.
What may appear as contradictions in Russia’s policies is, in reality, a tool for managing multiple risks and opportunities simultaneously. Moscow is neither seeking a complete victory in Afghanistan nor absolute stability in the country. Rather, its primary objective is to prevent the emergence of a stable order under the influence of rivals such as the United States. From Russia’s perspective, an unstable but manageable Afghanistan offers multiple advantages: justifying a security presence in Central Asia, maintaining active intelligence channels, shifting the costs of the crisis onto others, and preventing the consolidation of rival powers’ influence.
Ultimately, Russia’s strategy is based on the principle that it should not remain alone in the Afghan arena. The simultaneous presence of multiple actors, in an ambiguous and competitive environment, is more tolerable and even preferable for Moscow than an empty stage in which a single power could dominate without challenge. From this perspective, Russia prefers the continuation of a complex, costly, and multilateral game over the emergence of a simple order that would benefit its rivals.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
