A few days ago, former Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani stated in an interview that he would prepare a series of podcasts, discussing the issues of Afghanistan and outlining things to be done. It was stated in the interview that the plan of the program was initiated by Ashraf Ghani himself and the interviewer serves only as a presenter. In this interview, he substituted the title of president or former president, appearing with the title of professor. Abandoning his tumultuous presidential term in mid-August 2021 and taking refuge in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), he is still called the president by some of his supporters and is expected to symbolically hold the title until the formation of a legitimate government in Kabul. However, Ashraf Ghani has not done accordingly and it does not seem that he has consulted with his supporters. Does Ashraf Ghani call his political life over? Has he acknowledged his political failure by returning to the teaching seat abandoning the political arena and wanting to announce that we should no longer expect political action from him?
Ashraf Ghani entered politics in his sixties. In the most important period of his life (middle age), he was engaged in tabulation, survey, teaching, and administrative work. Therefore, compared to his political rivals such as Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, he was green, lacking a power-building relationship with the internal sources of power, such as ethnicity, religion, local economic and social networks, and parties and organizations. He did not possess a mature political organization and relations in Afghanistan nor did he have a native experience in political work. However, he had three important assets that were effective for his rise to power. First, the relationship with aid organizations and Westerners who were the main players in Afghan politics. Second, his academic background and academic reputation made him a significant figure among the influential people of Kabul. Third, enthusiasm for power and a strong desire to be the leader.
It appears that Ashraf Ghani was not a politician from a theoretical point of view, and he lacked sufficient knowledge of the nature of political work and consolidation of power. With those characteristics and shortcomings mentioned above, if he had a political perspective, he would probably have firmly established his footing in Afghanistan’s politics during his twenty years of presence in Kabul and seven years of government. For example, he, who did not have a party, organization, or network, had to strengthen institutions, support and empower the army, and strengthen his relations with foreign sources of power.
Ashraf Ghani destroyed the institutions, which ultimately at the end of his rule, most of the ministries and directorates had been stripped of their authority, with the competing parallel departments neutralizing each other’s influence. During Ashraf Ghani’s era, the army experienced extreme management instability and most generals and military officials did not feel job security. Ashraf Ghani’s relationship with external sources of power, such as neighbors and Westerners was turbulent and unstable. He failed to understand the significance of American cooperation for the survival of his power.
Ashraf Ghani had tried to introduce himself as a nationalist who wanted progress and was inclined to stabilize the rule of Pashtun elites. There was no stability in this work either. His stance towards former Afghan Kings Ahmad Shah Abdali and Amanullah Khan during his rule had offended a group of Pashtun nationalists. He once stated that since the era of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the rulers of Afghanistan have been engaged in fratricide and civil war. Once again, in the last days of his rule, he had called Amanullah Khan a deserter, asserting that he would not repeat his mistake.
Ashraf Ghani has not been able to clarify his political dealings with the political tradition of the past and to say which spectrum he belongs to and which tradition he is going to follow. Therefore, some people thought of him as a continuation of Amanullah Khan’s work, and others as a follower of Abdul Rahman Khan’s legacy. Some even expected him to do Ahmad Shahi’s work, granting him the nickname “Baba”.
Nonetheless, he could fulfill none of the expectations. He feels more comfortable in the title he spent his youth and middle age: professor. Therefore, he readily passed the title of president, launching his new podcasts with the title of master to tell people that Afghanistan has water and mines, it is a transit crossroads, and in 2047, the era started from the kingdom of Ahmad Shah Abdali will turn 300 years. Will it be more effective to repeat this information to save Afghanistan from these difficult conditions or to insist on creating a system in which the law is valid and not a decree, rulers come to power through elections and not military domination and repression, and civil rights are inalienable as education?
He is going to define frameworks and provide general information about Afghanistan to his audience in the coming months. He no longer claims to work for the republic and “complete unfinished business” of Amanullah Khan. If he valued his political role more than being a teacher, he would have noticed how important it was to keep the flag of the republic up until the formation of a legitimate government in Kabul. If he sticks to the title of president and the symbolic claim of completing the mission of Amanullah Khan, his political weight would be very heavy and he could play a part in the developments we are facing.
