The welcoming of an ambassador from a country is viewed as a significant step in the advancement of cooperation between two nations within the international system. This practice usually follows the formal recognition of countries. In a unique occurrence, China has accepted the ambassador of the Taliban without officially recognizing it. While diplomatic relations may be established without embassies in each other’s capitals or with lower-level diplomatic ties, this marks the first instance in modern diplomatic history where a country accepts another’s ambassador without formal recognition of the government.
Afghanistan and China, as two neighboring countries, have enjoyed good relations over the past decades; even with the collapse of governments and the emergence of new regimes in Afghanistan, there has never been any serious tension observed in the history of the two countries. China has consistently pursued a conservative policy towards its neighbors and the region, focusing primarily on economic interests. Additionally, Afghanistan has never become a part of China’s economic interests, which caused significant bridging Chinese investments in Afghanistan.
Over the two-decade period of the previous Republic government in Afghanistan (2001 – 2021), diplomatic efforts, including seven visits by President Hamid Karzai to China and the first state visit of President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani to Beijing, failed to persuade China to take significant measures for Afghan stability and security. China’s economically oriented policy found limited economic interests in Afghanistan, hindering sincere steps towards Afghan security and stability.
The sole concern that could put China under pressure is the security threats stemming from members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, who have bases in Afghanistan and are supported by the Taliban. In the past, Afghanistan believed that as security cooperation with China increased and threats from Uyghurs in Afghanistan diminished, China would become more involved in the Afghan peace process. However, the outcome was the opposite, as Afghanistan, even after arresting Uyghur members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and handing them over to the Chinese government, failed to leverage China’s involvement in Afghanistan affairs.
Today, the Taliban have a policy opposite to the Republic’s government. By supporting the Uyghur of ETIM, they have heightened China’s concerns, leaving the country with only two options. First, exerting pressure on the Taliban and escalating tensions with this group to compel them, through force, to distance themselves from the support of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. The second option involves engaging with the Taliban, offering economic incentives, opening the door for Chinese intelligence members to enter Afghanistan as traders and investors, and monitoring and tracking all activities of the ETIM. For a country like China, with its conservative policies and considering the existing conditions in the region, where most of its regional allies are engaged in various forms of direct and proxy conflicts, it does not wish to resort to violence.
Hence, the simplest solution for China is the second option. Engaging with the Taliban, maintaining and strengthening direct communication with them—which includes accepting the Taliban ambassador—and ultimately allowing the free movement of Chinese intelligence to Afghanistan. This enables China to stay informed about any activities of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement members.
Alternatively, the Taliban, reliant and needs China’s bilateral and regional support and unable to sever its ties with the Uyghurs, both Taliban and ETIM share a common religion of Islam and a goal of establishing an Islamic government. This shared objective has cultivated robust connections between the Taliban and the ETIM, spanning at least the last two decades.
China has embarked on a dangerous game; engaging with a terrorist group like the Taliban cannot secure its security interests. The more China engages with the Taliban, the more the security interests at the regional level are jeopardized. The issue is not limited to just the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Afghanistan; at least 21 terrorist groups are operating in the country. They already have access to billions of dollars worth of military equipment left behind by the United States after its withdrawal.
Reflecting on history, when the Taliban refused to surrender Osama bin Laden in 2001, risking the collapse of their regime, it remains uncertain how swiftly they will address the activities of Muslim Uyghurs who have sought refuge with the Taliban due to fears of the Communist government of China.
