An intriguing aspect of our time is the coexistence of three Islamic systems nearby: the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban, each with distinct similarities and differences. Among them, Iran and present-day Afghanistan exhibit greater political parallels as both are governed by theocratic regimes where Mullahs, as a social class, exert influence over various sectors. Notably, the term “clerical rule” in political science, often associated with the Middle Ages, is seemingly obsolete and persists into the twenty-first century. This emergence of a class claiming representation from the unseen world is a bitter satire, resulting in the suffering of millions of deprived and oppressed people in these countries, despite advancements in sciences, expertise, and professions.
Adding to this historical-geographical coincidence is the theocratic nature of both the Iranian and Afghan systems, with one deeply rooted in Shiite religious bias and the other in Sunni religious bias. Consequently, each considers a portion of its citizens as secondary. In Iran, a Sunni individual faces insurmountable barriers to reaching leadership, presidency, ministerial positions, or governorships, and vice versa for Shiites. Unless political exigencies dictate otherwise, these regimes, fueled by religious biases, harbor profound hatred and hostility toward each other. For a devout Shiite regime, reconciling with a devout Sunni regime is the last option, just as reconciling with a devout Shiite regime would be the last option for a devout Sunni regime.
However, despite this deep-seated animosity based on religious faith, a seemingly friendly relationship has emerged between these two nations. This is particularly evident as the Iranian regime is perceived as a superior model for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban, by granting unlimited authority to their Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), closely mirrors Iran’s Guardianship of the Jurist system. Moreover, the Taliban’s reliance on ideological soldiers instead of the conventional Afghan army parallels Iran’s dependence on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as the backbone of the Islamic regime. The appointment of key government positions to individuals close and loyal to the leadership is another shared trait between the two systems. Consequently, the external relations of Iran and Afghanistan with extremist groups in other countries, viewed as strategic arms in regional manipulations and pressure tools for extortion, seem to be intertwined.
Nevertheless, significant differences exist between these two theocratic systems, stemming not from their religious ideologies but from their infrastructures. One notable distinction lies in their approach to elections; while the Iranian government, despite its fluctuations, upholds them, the Taliban regime staunchly opposes them. Iran’s governance infrastructure traces back to modernizing reforms initiated during the constitutional era, aiming to establish a modern, accountable, and law-abiding government. This period witnessed imprisonments, the formation of political parties, and substantial efforts toward institutional reform. Notably, reforms during the Pahlavi era, guided by Iranian intellectuals, institutionalized the separation of powers, expanded modern education, and established crucial institutions in art, culture, and thought. Despite the upheaval of the Islamic Revolution, these reforms endured, elevating the concept of popular sovereignty. Even the Guardianship of the Jurist system, which inherently denies people’s authority, was compelled to acknowledge their significance. This duality emerged, with a clerical leader positioned as divine on one side and people asserting themselves as true owners of the country and its system on the other, refusing absolute denial of their rights.
In contrast, the Taliban ascended to power in a context lacking such infrastructural foundations, where the intellectual groundwork for transformative reform was insufficient. Traditional institutions prevail over modern ones in Afghanistan, impeding the implementation of power separation and hindering the emergence of a political sense of citizenship. The Taliban fear elections and resist the idea of people entering the political sphere, apprehensive of subjects claiming rightful citizenship and determining their destiny. While democracy necessitates more than just elections and requires mechanisms to counter rulers’ tyranny and empower people, elections remain a transparent and measurable mechanism. Addressing their deficiencies and effectively leveraging opportunities for transparency can lay the cornerstone of democracy.
The introduction of elections signifies breaking the cycle of violence, transitioning from bloodshed to peaceful power exchange. It underscores that power acquisition doesn’t mandate resorting to arms or inciting warfare to overthrow rulers. In many stable democracies, liberation from this futile cycle has been instrumental in achieving stability. Even amid widespread citizen dissatisfaction, the Iranian regime garners some legitimacy through elections, offering a conduit for societal dissatisfaction and minor changes. If the Taliban were to embrace elections, it would mark the first step toward reconciliation with the people, signaling their readiness for dialogue, albeit acknowledging the lengthy journey ahead toward achieving the desired system.
