Thirty-two years ago today, Dr. Najibullah’s government, the last relic of the former Soviet Union’s alliance, fell, and the Mujahideen seized power in Afghanistan. The emergence and rise to power of jihadist forces were the most significant political events of that time. Jihadist parties, each with its supporters among the people, fought for fourteen years against the former Soviet forces and the leftist government in Afghanistan. The necessity of defending the homeland against foreign invasion and safeguarding religion against the invasion of non-religious culture were two influential factors in people joining jihadist groups. The Soviet army’s invasion of Afghanistan necessitated defending the homeland against it. It is also claimed that the government at that time, under the leadership of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was less committed to the Islamic and national values of the people and sometimes violated sanctity. These two issues accelerated people’s joining of jihadist forces.
The jihadist factions that came to power soon turned on each other without tasting the flavor of power. The issue of defending the country and Islam, which was previously important to them, quickly lost its value and was replaced by other things. The jihadist forces indeed succeeded in what they called the struggle against the Soviets and the government under its protection, but they failed to create a government that could represent all of Afghanistan. That failure left a bitter legacy for the people of Afghanistan: a civil war that harmed millions of individuals and families. Afghanistan may have experienced dangerous crises even before the rise to power of the Mujahideen, but it did not experience such devastating and all-encompassing ethnic conflict.
The failure of jihadist forces to establish an all-inclusive government and the aversion to internal conflict underscore several key points, with “political Islam” being one of them. The implementation of political Islam in Afghanistan, as envisioned by Islamist forces, has so far been largely unsuccessful. Jihadist groups, purportedly aiming to overthrow non-Islamic regimes, not only failed to establish a modern state inclusive of Afghanistan but also plunged the nation into the abyss of civil war. The mujahideen epitomized a clear manifestation of political Islam at that time, including the Taliban. However, even the Taliban, upon seizing power from the initial group and consolidating their control, behaved even worse, to the extent that people longed for the return of “the lesser evil.” In their second phase, the Taliban continue to act in a manner that has yet to earn them national and international legitimacy. While it cannot be claimed that political Islam per se is ineffective, it can be argued that it has not proven successful in Afghanistan and some neighboring countries. The common people pay attention not to the nature of political Islam but rather to its agents and advocates. Nonetheless, the incapacity of political Islam to establish modern governance in Afghanistan is becoming increasingly evident by the day. However, it cannot be asserted that other intellectual and political movements have succeeded in this regard.
Secondly, one cannot overlook the role of foreign actors in examining Afghanistan’s past and present. The events of the 7th and 8th of Saur (Solar Calendar dates), instructive as they are, have been influenced by foreign intervention. The former Soviet Union’s support was pivotal to the infamous events of the 7th of Saur. Similarly, without the involvement of the United States, some Arab states, and Pakistan, Islamist forces might not have prevailed in Afghanistan. Both events were products of foreign support, while their proponents claimed victory solely through their meager resources. Nevertheless, the defense of citizens’ homeland, unaware of the complexities of foreign political games, remains crucial.
The United States supported jihadist forces to counter the Soviet Union up until they reached power but quickly abandoned them, leading to their eventual downfall. America and its allies’ support for Islamist forces aimed to dismantle the former Soviet Union rather than necessarily liberating Afghanistan and establishing a strong, all-inclusive government there. Hence, when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, America’s interest in jihadist forces waned. Had Washington continued its support for them as before, we might not have witnessed subsequent catastrophic collapses.
America’s deal with the mujahideen mirrors its deal with the former government of Afghanistan. After signing the Doha Agreement, America found a new ally and abandoned the previous government it had supported for years, paving the way for the Taliban’s return to power through other means. While America had the right to withdraw from Afghanistan, it could have managed the withdrawal process in a way that preserved the previous government’s survival rather than facilitating the resurgence of the Taliban.
Now, history seems to be repeating itself. The United States, seen as the facilitator of the Taliban’s return to power, neither officially recognizes nor makes serious efforts to reform the group. Completely eradicating the Taliban’s influence seems unlikely for now. More importantly, by failing to uphold its commitment to the previous government, which valued the rights and freedoms of its citizens more than any other government in Afghanistan, America will not honor the Taliban, a terrorist group violating all values. Of course, depending on its interests, America may exploit them for a while.
One reason America did not support jihadist groups in the post-war period was its concern about the establishment of a Sunni Islamist government influenced by the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Afghanistan. Washington feared a repetition of the experience of political Islam in Iran under the Islamic Republic, and it did not want that experience to be repeated in Afghanistan. Although the Biden administration understood from experience that the procrastination of the former American government in supporting the Pahlavi government led to its downfall and the emergence of the Islamic Republic, it once again indirectly contributed to the return of the Taliban to power. A group that, in many respects, behaves worse than jihadist parties and Iranian clerics.
The rise and fall of the mujahideen should serve as a lesson for the Taliban. However, the Taliban themselves have once traversed this path, and if the situation remains the same, they will do so again. Neither America’s financial support nor Russia’s efforts to remove this group from the terrorism list and give it a seat at the United Nations will ensure the Taliban’s long-term survival. It is better late than never for the Taliban to emulate the will of the people of Afghanistan and demonstrate readiness to establish an all-inclusive government based on the will of its citizens.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
هشت ثور؛ در ضرورت پرهیز از نفاق و تاکید بر وفاق