Currently, the relations between the Taliban and the Pakistani government are at a peak of tension and mistrust. In response to these tensions, the Pakistani government has opted to collectively expel “illegal Afghan immigrants” from the country. Government officials in Pakistan attribute the escalating insecurities within their borders to Afghanistan and argue that the mass expulsion of illegal immigrants can alleviate security concerns. Moreover, the Pakistani government anticipates that relocating hundreds of thousands of migrants from Pakistan to Afghanistan will exert pressure on the Taliban, compelling them to refrain from supporting the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Pakistani authorities are criticizing the Taliban for providing refuge to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), thereby enabling the Pakistani Taliban to carry out anti-security actions within Pakistan. At times, Pakistani officials claim that some Taliban fighters actively participate in conflicts alongside TTP. In a recent incident, it was reported that the perpetrator of a suicide attack on the joint forces center in the Dera Ismail Khan region in Pakistan was a member of the Afghan Taliban and a resident of Musa Qala district, Helmand province, named Qari Shakir.
As a result, the Pakistani government sent a letter to the Taliban embassy in Islamabad, expressing objection to the actions of the mentioned Taliban member. In the letter, while protesting the conduct of the Taliban member, the government urged the group to explicitly clarify its stance regarding the TTP.
In the serious claim that Afghan immigrants residing in Pakistan are involved in the insecurities of the country, there is considerable doubt and skepticism. The majority of immigrants who settle in that country have sought refuge from dire circumstances and strive day and night to make ends meet, with no connection or interest in political and military activities. Furthermore, there are no published statistics that suggest the level of crime among Afghan immigrants may be higher compared to Pakistani citizens. The reality is that, over the years, the Pakistani government’s comprehensive support for the Taliban in Afghanistan has, in itself, contributed to the strengthening of terrorism and insecurity. It has fostered militant groups and radical factions in the region, and the consequences of these efforts are now evident. While water can be managed at its source, once it turns into a flood, it becomes impossible to combat.
The Far-Reaching Implications of the Extensive Return of Migrants to Afghanistan
Regardless of the solidity and factual basis of Pakistan’s documentation for the mass expulsion of Afghan migrants, and the the extent to which it aligns with human rights standards and international conventions, the undeniable reality is that in the past two months, Pakistan has successfully expelled over 500,000 Afghan migrants and repatriated them to their home country. Undoubtedly, the widespread return of migrants to Afghanistan has considerable and tangible political, social, and economic consequences. In this regard, the Taliban administration and relevant international bodies must take necessary measures to minimize the impacts of this extensive return.
One of the perilous implications of the mass and extensive return of migrants to Afghanistan is their exposure to psychological and social harms, including falling prey to radical and extremist religious groups such as ISIS Khorasan (IS-K). It is evident that families abruptly uprooted from an environment where they have lived for years, learned its secrets, and adapted to its ways, are vulnerable to serious consequences. Such families face mental and economic instability and a sense of insecurity. They may find themselves ensnared by groups lurking in the shadows, seeking refuge with these groups as a means of escape.
There are numerous cases indicating that oppressed, defenseless, and discontented individuals and families, disillusioned with the injustices and chaotic conditions, have joined dangerous and destructive groups. These groups, promising lofty ideals and a bright future, have, in reality, done nothing but exacerbate their suffering and problems without delivering on their grand promises.
The primary method of attracting and recruiting for ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) involves soliciting volunteers through the dissemination of promotional videos on the internet and contacting individuals through social networks or direct communication with those deemed suitable. The provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar are the main strongholds and origins of ISIS Khorasan (IS-K). The group was active in this region during its peak strength in Afghanistan, instigating conflict. The Taliban have decided to establish camps for a portion of the returning migrants in Torkham and other areas of Nangarhar province. Have the Taliban considered the extent to which they can manage these camps to prevent dangerous groups like ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) from infiltrating and spreading their ideology? Why settle migrants in places where the risk of ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) intrusion is higher? Are the Taliban and Pakistan, through these actions, inadvertently exposing migrants to terrorist groups?
The majority of individuals affiliated with ISIS in Pakistan and Afghanistan consist of dissatisfied former members of the Taliban. Although the Taliban view ISIS as a fierce enemy, and thousands are incarcerated under charges of ISIS affiliation in Taliban prisons under harsh conditions, the commonalities between these two groups are not negligible. Reports suggest that after the Taliban’s victory, some lower-ranking members are discontent with the leadership’s performance, accusing them of betraying the declared objectives. These individuals may collaborate with the TTP for what they perceive as the enforcement of Islamic law or join ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) seeking retribution against the Taliban leadership, whom they believe has betrayed them. Many current ISIS members had initial affiliations with the TTP.
Qari Shakir, a resident of Musa Qala district of Helmand province, though originally a member of the Taliban, joined the TTP without obtaining permission from his Taliban commanders and carried out a recent suicide operation in Dera Ismail Khan.
The Central Role of International Organizations in the Reintegration Process of Returning Migrants
Assistance from global humanitarian organizations for returning migrants from Pakistan is vital. Given that the Taliban regime cannot meet the needs of these migrants, the role of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other relevant organizations becomes more significant in this regard. If international organizations do not play their role, there is a high likelihood that some of these migrants may perish due to the harsh winter conditions in Afghanistan. However, these organizations must recognize that merely providing food and clothing for migrants is insufficient. Instead, they should implement comprehensive and interconnected programs to ensure the smooth integration of these individuals into their new environment with minimal harm.
Learning from the experiences of international organizations in other countries could be beneficial in this regard. Housing migrants in larger cities may expedite the integration process. The more these migrants live in remote areas, the more vulnerable they become to criminal and extremist groups. Additionally, providing vocational training to assist them in finding employment is of paramount importance. Generally, individuals with suitable and prosperous jobs, and economic stability, are less likely to join extremist and radical groups. Many who have joined war-mongering groups had economic and livelihood factors influencing their decisions.
Another significant challenge in the process of settling returning migrants from Pakistan is how to accomplish this without creating tensions between migrants and the indigenous people in various regions of Afghanistan. Due to historical attempts by various governments in the country to manipulate the demographic composition of some villages and cities in Afghanistan, especially in the northern regions, the local people are skeptical about the central government’s resettlement plans. They suspect that the central government is trying to marginalize and suppress them, depriving them of their natural rights.
Since the reign of Amanullah Khan about 100 years ago, the central government has sought to distribute vast lands in northern Afghanistan to the tribal people on both sides of the Durand Line, succeeding in altering the ethnic composition in many areas in the north of the country. Even now, occasionally, reports emerge about conflicts between the Kuchis and the indigenous people in the northern and central regions of the country. The indigenous people in these areas perceive the Kuchis as invading forces supported by the central government, occupying their lands and pastures unjustly.
What further complicates this challenge is that the Taliban lack experience in resolving disputes between ethnic groups and tribes; instead, they exacerbate these conflicts. Additionally, the group’s approach in such cases involves using force and violence to implement their desired programs, adding to the tensions.
There are various rational solutions for the gradual integration of returning migrants with minimal harm and tension. One such approach is to settle migrants gradually in different areas rather than concentrating them in one or a few specific regions. It is also advisable for the Taliban administration to consider regions for settlement that are culturally and linguistically compatible with the migrants, expediting their assimilation into the new environment. Additionally, settling them in larger cities not only avoids sensitivities and tensions but also provides them with better economic opportunities.
Launching vocational training courses and ensuring employment for these migrants is another crucial step to prevent the consequences of this widespread migration. Such measures, if undertaken sincerely by the Taliban without intending to provoke ethnic sensitivities, can not only prevent migrants from falling into the trap of terrorism, especially ISIS but also reduce or even eliminate tensions between migrants and indigenous populations.
The Presence of Fundamentalist Groups in Afghanistan
ISIS Khorasan (IS-K), active in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2014, managed to control parts of the Nangarhar and Kunar provinces for a period. However, during the Republic era, Afghan security forces, with the aerial support of foreign forces, inflicted severe blows on this group, rendering it relatively powerless. Despite this, the group has not been eradicated entirely and occasionally engages in destructive activities. The name ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) came back into the spotlight when the group carried out a bloody suicide attack at the entrance of Kabul Airport on the days of the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. This attack claimed the lives of dozens of American soldiers and Afghan civilians attempting to escape the country. With the complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) continued its attacks, even assassinating some prominent Taliban leaders.
The suicide operation by ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) on July 31 this year during a political gathering led by Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, head of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, revealed that the group’s activities are not limited to Afghanistan but also extend into Pakistan. According to reports, this suicide attack resulted in 56 casualties and around 200 injuries.
Despite the Taliban’s claim of controlling the entire country and prohibiting any group from using Afghanistan’s soil against other countries, on-the-ground realities reveal a different story. The undeniable presence of ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s second rule is evident. During this period, the group managed to launch over a hundred operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This indicates that, despite the Taliban’s efforts to violently suppress ISIS Khorasan (IS-K), they have been unable to eradicate the group. Dissatisfaction among lower-ranking Taliban members with the leadership’s performance provides a fertile ground for ISIS to infiltrate Taliban ranks and recruit dissatisfied members.
The term “Wilayat Khorasan,” or The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K) as used in the media literature of ISIS, refers to a vast region that includes parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran. However, military operations by the ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) branch are primarily concentrated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with occasional activities in Iran. The group has not been successful in expanding its influence into Central Asia so far.
Other fundamentalist groups are also present in Afghanistan, engaging with the Taliban in a somewhat cooperative manner and maintaining a dialogue with their host group. However, historical experiences have shown that managing such groups is not an easy task. Since the survival of these groups depends on war and bloodshed, preventing their destructive activities and entry into conflicts permanently proves to be challenging. A clear example is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which, to some extent, benefits from the support of the Afghan Taliban. Nevertheless, it maintains its operational independence and seemingly continues its war against the Pakistani government without consulting the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. This example illustrates the validity of some analysts’ claims that under the shadow of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan has turned into a paradise for global fundamentalists.
The Story of ISIS Khorasan (IS-K): Origins and Evolution
The ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) branch emerged in 2014 when some militants from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, and Afghan Taliban splintered off, forming a separate organization. ISIS dispatched envoys to meet with local fighters, including some commanders from the TTP. In mid-2015, ISIS officially announced the establishment of its activities in the “Khorasan Province,” appointing Hafiz Khan Saeed as the leader of the “Islamic State in Khorasan.” Hafiz Khan Saeed, a former TTP commander and operations chief in tribal areas, leveraged his connections to expand the influence of the newly-founded ISIS branch in Khorasan in Pakistan. He succeeded in rallying more recruits for ISIS, taking advantage of his relationships in the tribal regions.
Several high-ranking TTP commanders who joined ISIS were among the first to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Many of these commanders were active in the tribal border regions and engaged in the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan. This strategic move reinforced ISIS’s foothold in the strategically important tribal border areas, attracting a significant number of members to join the group.
Since 2015, ISIS has been simultaneously engaged on three fronts, resorting to violence and ruthless massacres against Western military forces, the Afghan government, and the Taliban. At that time, Mullah Mohammad Mansour, who had taken over Taliban leadership after the death of Mullah Omar, encouraged Taliban fighters to unite under a single flag with the Taliban and fight against foreign forces and the Afghan government. However, tensions and conflicts between the two groups gradually escalated, leading the Taliban to decide to reclaim areas lost to ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) and suppress and isolate the ISIS branch and its allied groups.
The leadership council (Quetta Shura) permitted Taliban fighters to launch an aggressive offensive against ISIS. From December 2015, they assigned their commando units, known as the “Red Unit,” to combat ISIS. The first major and serious confrontation between the Taliban and ISIS took place in Jawzjan Province. After continuous and bloody clashes, ISIS was ousted from the province in 2018, and its fighters surrendered to the Taliban.
While the suppression of the Taliban played a crucial role in weakening ISIS, the primary factor in isolating ISIS was the aerial attacks by U.S. forces. After U.S. airstrikes claimed the lives of several top ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) leaders between 2016 and 2018, internal divisions surfaced within the group. Consequently, members affiliated with factions such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-e-Dawa, the Haqqani network, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan chose to disassociate from the group. Despite this, ISIS managed to regroup and later conducted organized operations in Afghanistan. During this period, the key factor in the resurgence of ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) was the appointment of “Shahab al-Muhajir” as the new leader of the group. Shahab al-Muhajir was considered one of the main commanders of the organization and had previously worked as a military commander in the Haqqani network. With precise planning, he orchestrated major attacks in the heart of Kabul. Shahab al-Muhajir’s assumption of leadership revitalized the organization, reinvigorating its connections with various entities and regions in Pakistan and Central Asia.
While Pakistani sources on June 2023 have claimed that Shahab al-Muhajir was killed in Nangarhar province, it cannot be stated with certainty, especially considering the enigmatic nature of Shahab al-Muhajir, reportedly known as Sanaullah Ghafari, from Shakardara district of Kabul. While some Arabic-speaking media has claimed that Shahab al-Muhajir is of Iraqi origin and speaks both Arabic and Pashto. In the past, there have been claims about the killings of Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS leaders, but later it became evident that these claims were pure fabrications.
Various estimates and speculations have been made regarding the actual number of members of the Khorasan branch of ISIS present in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Once Zalmay Khalilzad stated that the number of members of this organization is estimated to be around 6,000. Recently, Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, also claimed that there are about 2,000 ISIS fighters stationed in northern Afghanistan. Whether these figures are accurate or at least close to reality, it must be acknowledged that both the Taliban and Afghanistan are grappling with a significant challenge. The victory of the Taliban in the war against the Americans and the Republic system in Afghanistan has emboldened jihadist groups worldwide, encouraging them to launch bloody wars to achieve their goals. The United Nations Security Council has recently declared that Afghanistan continues to pose a threat to global security and peace. According to the Security Council, Afghanistan under the Taliban’s control is a source of threat to the world. According to this council, terrorist groups and non-state actors are involved in the drug trade and the misuse of the country’s natural resources.
In summary, many of the current or former leaders of ISIS originally had affiliations with the Haqqani Network or the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and, as a result, possess prior knowledge and familiarity with TTP and Taliban commanders. Joining and breaking away from different groups within these three organizations and their affiliated smaller groups has been a common practice in the past. For example, some members of the Haqqani Network initially joined ISIS and later separated from it. Shihab al-Muhajir, originally a senior commander in the Haqqani Network, conducted some major attacks in Kabul under the banner of the Haqqani Network before joining ISIS. Therefore, there is a significant likelihood that dissatisfied Taliban members may join the ISIS organization.
The fact that the Taliban cannot decisively confront the TTP is influenced by various factors, including the understanding that a firm confrontation with the TTP would likely lead to an increase in the Taliban members joining ISIS, further solidifying ISIS’s cohesion. Another issue is that as dissatisfaction with the Taliban’s governance increases, ISIS seizes more opportunities to expand its influence among the people in Afghanistan.
Newly returned migrants from Pakistan, who have not yet acclimated to the new environment and are dissatisfied with their living conditions, may be susceptible to the ideological influence of ISIS. Individuals tasked with recruiting new members for ISIS can identify those who might be easily drawn towards their cause, potentially targeting the vulnerable migrant population. It is crucial to consider practical solutions to minimize the risks for migrants settled without encountering harm. International aid organizations should not leave a void for the Taliban to exploit, and by implementing suitable programs, they should swiftly assist hundreds of thousands of returning migrants from Pakistan. It is essential to remember that extremists always exploit vacuums, attracting dissatisfied or disoriented individuals to their ideologies. These groups prefer isolating individuals from society to easily manipulate and recruit them. Al-Qaeda’s camps during the war against the Red Army and in the years that followed were strategically located away from populated areas, and we have witnessed the lasting consequences of establishing such camps in the region.