Earlier, Vedant Patel, the Principal Deputy Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, declared during a press conference that Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Representative for Afghanistan’s Reconciliation, now holds the status of an ordinary American citizen. He emphasized that Khalilzad’s opinions do not align with the official policies of the U.S. Department of State. Nevertheless, Khalilzad’s historical records compel Afghan media and political activists to take heed of his statements and scrutinize his every utterance. Despite concluding his tenure within the U.S. government, Khalilzad continues to surface in the media, intermittently making contentious statements. Presently, he engages in interviews across various media outlets, predominantly centering on the normalization of the situation in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, while downplaying the occurrences of crimes, discrimination, and injustices within this domain. In a recent interview, Khalilzad implored exiled Afghan politicians to return to their homeland and negotiate with the Taliban, seeking consensus on the establishment of an all-encompassing government. He espoused the idea of a general amnesty by the Taliban, assuring that returning political leaders would not face harm or death, referring to Abdullah, the former Chairperson of the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR), and the former Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, both currently residing in Kabul, unharmed. In an effort to erode the morale of the Taliban’s opponents, he asserted that the United States would refrain from re-attacking Afghanistan, while underscoring that the leaders of the Taliban opposition should determine their own solutions.
Within the spheres of overseas-dwelling politicians, the approach of negotiating with the Taliban remains viable, with some harboring an inclination to pursue their political objectives through dialogue with this group. Through subtle alignment with the Taliban’s positions, these leaders endeavor to establish communication with them. Predicaments arise due to the Taliban’s persistent unwillingness to engage with opposition figures. In response to foreign nations’ appeals for an all-inclusive government, the Taliban dismissively uphold their government’s comprehensiveness, refusing to entertain the notion of reform. Negotiations with their political adversaries do not feature within the Taliban’s inclinations. Their representatives have frequently iterated that they permit opposition leaders to lead customary lives within the country.
Khalilzad cites Karzai and Abdullah, aiming to encourage foreign adversaries of the Taliban to repatriate. However, the reality diverges from Khalilzad’s portrayal. In the latter part of his tenure, Karzai adopted a lenient stance toward the Taliban, criticizing foreign forces’ suppression of the group. He facilitated the release of numerous Taliban prisoners, allowing their reentry into the battlefield, effectively granting the group a form of absolution. Given this context, the Taliban should theoretically hold Karzai in high regard, yet their actions contradict this assumption. They exercise extensive control over his interactions with domestic and foreign media, restricting his movement and whereabouts. He has been subjected to recurrent travel bans. Abdullah’s situation under Taliban rule is even more precarious. Despite passively supporting Khalilzad and the Americans, which inadvertently contributed to the Taliban’s resurgence, he now resides in isolation, with his engagements mostly revolving around monotonous meetings with Karzai and Fazel Hadi Muslimyar, the former Chairperson of the House of Elders. He has spent approximately two months outside the country. On a recent occasion, when Abdullah sought to depart Afghanistan, the Taliban subjected him to extended delays and hindrances at Kabul airport. Numerous prior attempts at his foreign travel had also been thwarted. In essence, Karzai’s and Abdullah’s predicaments within Taliban-controlled territory serve as cautionary lessons for fellow politicians, rather than models to emulate.
Khalilzad’s two-decade record in Afghan politics illustrates his unwavering commitment to his personal affiliations, even during his tenure as a representative of the American government. His presence in Afghanistan consistently aims at bolstering his preferred faction over others. Ever since his tenure as a senior staff member in the U.S. National Security Council during the George W. Bush era, he has sought to supplant the Taliban with groups unaffiliated with the “Northern Coalition.” He unequivocally articulated this stance in his book “Envoy,” leaving no room for ambiguity. He consistently pursued this policy, unhesitatingly suppressing political forces that did not align with his agenda. Instances such as the suppression of former Afghan Minister of Energy and Water, Ismail Khan, in Herat, the weakening of former Afghan Vice President Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim in Kabul, and the intimidation of Abdullah during the 2019 elections, exemplify his intervention in Afghanistan’s affairs for the benefit of select groups. Some of these interventions may not necessarily reflect the policy of his respective government, yet they substantially contributed to fostering skepticism and mistrust among diverse political factions. Evidently, even at present, Khalilzad seeks to advocate for the Taliban, employing media campaigns to normalize the situation under Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
In a recent interview with a Lebanese journalist, Khalilzad wholeheartedly defended the Taliban’s stance. Responding to Hoda al-Hussaini’s inquiry about strategies to persuade the Taliban to allow girls to pursue education at schools and universities, Khalilzad disregarded existing evidence and claimed that the Taliban’s perspectives on this matter are divided. He further contended that a significant proportion of Taliban leaders endorse girls’ attendance at educational institutions, especially given their explicit commitment during the Doha negotiations to uphold women’s rights to education and employment. Nonetheless, an extremist faction within the Taliban opposes women’s education. The Taliban’s decision to curtail girls’ education remains unjustifiable, even within the larger context of the Taliban leadership.
Khalilzad, in this context, reiterates an established notion, dividing the Taliban into an extremist minority and a more moderate majority, attributing the prevailing stringent policies in Afghanistan to the extremist minority. Nevertheless, this perception cannot endure in the long run. Decision-making power within the Taliban organization predominantly resides with its leadership in Kandahar, with others lacking the authority to challenge it. Leaders situated in Kabul possess limited influence over significant decision-making processes, and their opposition holds minimal sway. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Taliban officials, both in Kabul and Kandahar, have consistently justified the prohibition of girls’ education in their public statements. Where then, does this majority referenced by Khalilzad manifest?
When the aforementioned journalist inquired about Khalilzad’s assessment of the severity and danger posed by the presence of Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) in Afghanistan, he seized the opportunity to commend the Taliban’s efforts in quelling ISIS-K. Citing a United Nations report that predicts diminished ISIS-K activity in Afghanistan over the next one or two years, Khalilzad reaffirmed the Taliban’s commitment, as outlined in the Doha agreement, to combat terrorism. He highlighted that the United States and the Taliban share a common adversary in ISIS-K, suggesting that the suppression of this group by the Taliban could potentially foster expanded security cooperation between the United States and the Taliban in the future.
Here, Khalilzad implicitly acknowledges the security collaboration between the United States and the Taliban in their effort to suppress ISIS-K. Nevertheless, multiple reports indicate that the presence of fighters from this group in Afghanistan has not only failed to diminish, but has indeed escalated significantly since the Taliban assumed power. The recent report by Daily Hasht-E-Subh underscores this very concern. It appears that the Taliban lack the necessary strength to exert control over the entirety of Afghanistan, serving as a foundation for the persistence of terrorist elements within the country. Another notable aspect to consider is that the widely accepted definitions of terrorism also categorize the Taliban among terrorist groups, attributing to them a role in indiscriminate killings and conducting indiscriminate operations against civilians to a degree greater than most other groups. In light of such circumstances, how can the battle against terrorism be entrusted to an entity that is itself classified as a terrorist organization?
During this interview, Khalilzad, while highlighting the perceived merits of the Taliban-led government, discussed their purported efforts to curtail drug cultivation and trafficking, as well as their purported success in significantly reducing the number of drug addicts within Afghanistan. He also mentioned substantial declines in administrative corruption within the country, along with the revitalization and regularization of urban areas under Taliban governance. While many of these assertions may trigger debate due to their contentious nature, Khalilzad’s attempt to portray the Taliban in a positive light serves to blur the lines and feed into media narratives. For instance, when independent media operating within Taliban-held territory is subject to heavy censorship, and the Taliban tightly controls the content disseminated by these media outlets, how can claims of corruption reduction within the country hold water?
As per accounts from insiders within the Taliban government, pervasive corruption plagues the ranks of this group’s offices; however, the stifling environment prevents the exposure of such corruption through the media. Ambiguities and uncertainties loom over assertions about the reduction of drug cultivation and trafficking. Recent incidents have showcased Afghanistan’s capacity to export illicit narcotics on an industrial scale, with clandestine drug labs operating openly in southern provinces. Concurrently, Iranian authorities have frequently raised concerns about the unabated production of narcotics in Afghanistan and the continued flow of these substances across the border into Iran. Given these ongoing challenges, can one confidently claim a definitive reduction in drug-related activities?
During this interview, Khalilzad expressed his aspiration to one day host the Taliban at the White House. “Historically, they were invited to the White House by President Reagan, but they would need to institute substantial changes in their governance to warrant such an invitation,” he remarked. To correct Khalilzad’s assertion, it should be clarified that it was the Afghan Mujahideen leaders who were invited to the White House during the Cold War, not the Taliban. The Taliban movement indeed emerged as an opposition force to the former Mujahideen, with its foundation rooted in animosity toward that very faction. Is Khalilzad experiencing a lapse in memory, or does he perceive the contemporary role of the Taliban in U.S. strategy as analogous to the role played by the former Mujahideen during the Cold War in Afghanistan?
The manner in which Khalilzad portrays the Taliban in his interviews, casting them as an indispensable source of security, effective suppressors of ISIS-K, and catalysts for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, evokes memories of Leila Holmes. In the 1990s, Holmes lobbied for the Taliban in the United States, facilitating communication channels and attempting to soften the negative reputation associated with the group. During that era, she repeatedly asserted, “It troubles me when the Taliban are capable of providing nationwide security, engendering peace and stability, while the international community raises concerns about human rights, women’s liberties, and religious freedoms.” Analogous to Khalilzad’s stance, Leila Holmes advocated for a moderate perception of the Taliban and sought to establish a rapport between the Taliban and the U.S. government. She rationalized infringements on women’s rights in Afghanistan as stemming from cultural disparities, regarding them as normative. Holmes strongly disputed the classification of the Taliban as a terrorist organization. The language and narrative employed by Khalilzad to exonerate and absolve the Taliban bears a striking resemblance to the discourse championed by Leila Holmes in the 1990s.