For years, analysts have divided the Taliban into moderates and hardliners, indulging in comforting analyses. Yet, what remains is mere speculation, perhaps never to materialize: that moderates would mitigate the damage caused by hardliners and steer the country on the right path. Some even speak of the possibility of a moderate Taliban coup against the hardliners, while Mullah Hibatullah continues to emphasize his hardline approach, disregarding the demands of moderate Taliban. Acknowledging the inherent unpredictability of politics, one cannot entirely dismiss the prospect of a coup against Mullah Hibatullah, albeit weak and less plausible. This exaggerated speculation, prevalent both during the Taliban’s first rule and now, exaggerates the power and resources of those labeled as moderates.
However, these so-called moderates failed to emerge as a significant rival to the hardliners during the Taliban’s first rule. The hardliners, holding all political power and resources within the Taliban group, ultimately did what pleased them, not what the moderate Taliban desired. Even in the current regime, after more than two and half years, the ability and resources to exert any pressure on Mullah Hibatullah and other hardline Taliban, who hold the main power, are lacking. Do these moderates possess the power and resources to challenge the hardline Taliban? If the answer is positive, it prompts another question: Why, after more than two years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, where hardliners have shown the least regard for the desires of the international community – most of which prefer a moderate Taliban – have those who are deemed moderate and supportive of engagement with the world done the least and merely opted for silence after a few not-so-serious statements, or again resorted to praising their Amir al-Mu’minin?
If so, why haven’t they demonstrated it yet? How many more years must pass before the moderates showcase the power they purportedly hold and rescue their favored emirate from Mullah Hibatullah’s grip, who is destructively pursuing his hardline approach?
One might argue, echoing Michael Semple, that if the hardline Taliban pose a serious threat to their regime, the moderate Taliban would act against Mullah Hibatullah. Now that the Taliban regime’s existence is not under serious threat, the moderates also remain inactive. Alternatively, some may believe that if the Taliban were to attempt a coup against their hardline leader, they might establish a precedent that could eventually endanger themselves, akin to what happened to the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Therefore, moderates have opted for strategic patience and refrain from action.
If a coup or military action against Mullah Hibatullah is not feasible, what other effective and prudent strategies can moderates pursue? Can resorting to American drones or the ISIS Khorasan (IS-K) be considered one of the options to remove the Taliban supreme leader? If the answer is negative, then what ailments can strategic patience alone cure?
If we accept Michael Semple’s statement, we are still confronted with questions similar to those raised above: Does the current Taliban regime have any hope for long-term survival with its current approach? When the Taliban supreme leader pays minimal attention to any of the world’s demands regarding counterterrorism, women’s rights, establishing an all-inclusive government, etc., and continues to emphasize his hardline approach, the world will never recognize the Taliban regime. This means that the current de facto regime has a short lifespan. Either it must accept UN conditions, or it is condemned to collapse sooner or later. Therefore, Mullah Hibatullah has already posed a significant threat to the existence of the Taliban regime. Why should the moderates remain passive?
These questions all indicate a kind of impasse, deadlock, and theoretical failure in dealing with the Taliban. This crisis is as real and devastating as the Taliban themselves. The emergence of this group has not brought about this crisis, it has a much longer history than the Taliban. Whenever a radical and ideological movement enters the political arena, there is a prevalent inclination to categorize and distinguish between hardline and moderate forces within it. Hardliners are those with whom interaction is difficult due to their high ideological bias. However, those labeled as moderates are individuals who, although adhere to their ideological values like the hardline faction, are easier to engage with. The moderate faction in ideological political movements has always been a minority and sometimes not taken seriously. Nonetheless, some believe that the only solution to counteract radical tendencies is to emphasize the moderate faction excessively, suggesting that there is still an opportunity to exploit internal conflicts within ideological political movements and perhaps subdue or at least make their staunch enemies more compliant at a lower cost. However, these analyses are mostly wishful thinking and, instead of being beneficial, drain a significant portion of the energy and capacity of freedom-seeking forces, depriving them of the opportunity to change their approach to political crises fundamentally. They become entangled in old and reactionary dialectical games that have become so mundane and superficial that one can easily predict the outcome of the game. Ultimately, freedom-seeking forces, that have participated in this game, are left out completely.
During the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, some leftist organizations (Maoists) were deluded into thinking that by standing alongside moderate Islamists, they could sideline the hardline Islamists from the political scene. But in practice, this did not happen, and a simple look at the political situation of that time reveals that such a view was profoundly simplistic. Because it was evident that relying on moderate Islamists did not lead them anywhere, those labeled as moderates were always on the sidelines and lacked significant decision-making power in the political arena. Neither did international supporters of moderate Islamists attach much importance to them, nor did they have much influence among fundamentalist groups. Maoist organizations, instead of building an independent front for themselves, seemed to trust the moderate jihadist formations more than the leftists and wanted to fight alongside them against the Soviets rather than joining forces with another Maoist organization to strengthen the leftist front, which ultimately resulted in nothing but complete failure for these organizations. Today, they have little to no remaining influence and are merely functioning as groups that maintain financial and familial ties, barely active.
Looking at the game theory surrounding the Taliban, the failed and instructive experience of leftist organizations becomes apparent to me. By labeling a part of a terrorist group as moderate, we not only fail to fight against the group as an inseparable ideological entity but also contribute to its political survival to a greater extent. A group that should have been consigned to history as a regressive and primitive movement has now seized control of the country due to the strategic mistakes of progressive and freedom-seeking forces and intends to regress society to an era of religious tribalism. This is not a sign of our wisdom but rather our failure as we attempt to divide the Taliban into moderates and hardliners and then support one against the other. It means that we have accepted our defeat against the Taliban and have no choice but to fight to preserve the moderate Taliban against the hardline Taliban. Now, suppose the moderates were to win this battle. What will become of us? The Taliban with a veneer of moderation is far more dangerous than the nomadic and primitive Taliban. Furthermore, what guarantee is there that the moderate Taliban, once in power, won’t transform into entities far more dangerous than the hardline Taliban?
By supporting the moderate Taliban, we are essentially playing into the hands of Islamists, and this only serves to strengthen terrorism. We must fully settle the score with the Taliban, rather than becoming the reason for their prolonged survival. Therefore, the division of the Taliban into hardliners and moderates is a sign of the failure and crisis of freedom-seeking forces, not their realism and intelligence. Genuine realism has ceased to exist only on the surface of things and goes deeper into the realities to achieve truth.