Recently, a former government official announced the imminent creation of a new political movement. According to a post by this former security official on the social network X, the envisioned “foundation” will play a “central role in mobilizing individuals and formulating a remedy for Afghanistan’s future.” While this official has not provided many details about this forthcoming entity, limiting their remarks to typical platitudes and propaganda among Afghan political merchants, we can confidently assert, given this former government figure’s track record and political orientation, that they will not surprise us. The political movement to be constructed by them and their associates will likely consist of factions and currents that have emerged during the past two decades of exile. Their activities have mostly been limited to issuing statements and occasionally convening gatherings, failing to achieve much beyond these superficial actions.
It seems that the officials of the former government have realized they are gradually fading into obscurity and, as a result, have resorted to antics to demonstrate their continued relevance and their purported desire to contribute to Afghanistan. However, this appears more like a hollow spectacle and a deceptive display rather than a serious political engagement. It fails to demonstrate that the embattled and unsuccessful politicians have learned anything valuable from the bitter experience of the past two decades and are now formulating new and effective plans to improve the country’s tumultuous and critical situation. Indeed, such expectations from Afghan politicians are misplaced and foolish.
During the twenty-year presence of Western powers in Afghanistan, politics became so corrupt and instrumentalized that the public perception of politics itself transformed. People began to view politics as an immensely lucrative and profitable profession. Consequently, the party-building market suddenly flourished, with everyone attempting to establish their institutions and movements to claim a share of the political trade. Unfortunately, in this trade, only those who had strong foreign backers and cozy relationships with intelligence networks could amass wealth and power, not those who organically entered the political arena and lacked the means and opportunities to engage with ethnic leaders and other power brokers. Although the previous government has now joined the annals of history, and its Western supporters have little enthusiasm or interest in “nation-building” and democratizing the country, the shadow of the neo-colonial mindset and project-driven politics still looms large over Afghan politics.
It appears that the officials of the former government believe that the Taliban’s reign is not long-lived, and with this approach, they have adopted, sooner or later, they will vacate the field again to the benefit of their enemies. According to speculations, on the day the Taliban regime collapses, political merchants must have merchandise ready to market and demonstrate power to outdo their rivals in the rush for power. Or if a plan to combat the Taliban regime is initiated before its downfall, they should not be forgotten and should also receive a portion of Afghanistan’s spoils.
The main discussion revolves around the extent of achieving political power, not the observance of values such as democracy, social justice, freedom, ubiquitous governance, and whatnot. No government is all-inclusive, and all governments are in some way monopolistic and unipolar, merely bringing about the act of ubiquity. This act is solely because the only way to gain political popularity among the people of Afghanistan and the global community is by defending values that the Taliban do not consider important. If these values did not have a place in today’s acquisition of political power, no one would care about them. But is mere reliance on these values sufficient for political action? If the answer is yes, then why have multiple political movements, all of which claim to be staunch advocates of these values, still not been able to make headway against the Taliban?
Despite having an abundance of political parties and organizations, Afghanistan has yet to write its own “remedy” and still struggles to formulate it. This is one of the serious signs of the political crisis in our country. The main problem is not that we lack political parties; the problem is that we have an excess of political parties and organizations. However, in practice, we see no useful work from them. They are not established to solve problems but rather to complicate the equation and exacerbate the current country’s problems. Instead of resolving Afghanistan’s chronic crisis, political parties further deepen its complexity and breadth.
The officials of the former government, by favoring the creation of political movements and parties aligned with their interests, are merely seeking to buy credibility and political prestige for themselves—although success in this endeavor remains uncertain. Therefore, the continuation of the tradition of establishing political movements, rather than reflecting vitality, resilience, and resistance against Taliban brutality, signifies crisis, stagnation, and entrenchment. This is one of the numerous factors contributing to the perpetuation of the Taliban regime’s political survival. Over the past two decades, this regime has not remained stable due to an apparent high level of stability but rather persists in its existence because political parties as rivals lack the capacity and effectiveness to present a viable alternative against the Taliban.
At present, Afghanistan does not need a new political movement—in mere form and appearance—but rather requires an elevation in the quality of political work and activity that can serve as a real adversary to the Taliban in the actual fields of war and politics.
