Turkmenistan shares a 744 km border with Afghanistan, making it the second neighboring country after Pakistan. It has shown a keen interest in maintaining relations with the Taliban, even though it does not have a significant role in regional and global politics. Despite this, its close ties with the Taliban have gone largely unnoticed. Prior to the fall of the previous government, there was communication between the Taliban and Turkmenistan. On February 5, 2021, Turkmenistan hosted a delegation from the Taliban, led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who is currently the group’s deputy prime minister. Similarly, on July 12, 2021, Ashgabat once again hosted a Taliban delegation headed by Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, who is currently the political deputy of the Taliban Foreign Ministry. Turkmenistan warmly welcomed the Taliban officials, even when there was a legitimate government in Afghanistan. On November 4, 2020, a delegation of Turkmen officials, led by the country’s deputy foreign minister, held discussions with representatives of the Taliban in Qatar. Turkmenistan has expressed interest in hosting peace talks between the previous government and the Taliban, as declared by Turkmenistan’s second president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Turkmenistan’s warm relationship with the Taliban stems from two factors:
Following the collapse of the previous government, Turkmenistan was one of the first countries to engage with Taliban officials, expressing a degree of acceptance of their return. On August 17, 2021, the Consul General of Turkmenistan met with Qudratullah Hamza, the Governor of the Taliban, in Balkh. Two days later, the Consul General of Turkmenistan in Herat met with representatives of the Taliban in that province. On October 30, 2021, Rasit Meredow, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, led a delegation to Kabul and met with top Taliban officials. Similarly, on January 14, 2022, Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Taliban, visited Ashgabat. The Embassy of Turkmenistan in Kabul remains open, and on March 17, 2022, the Embassy of Afghanistan in Ashgabat was handed over to the Taliban. Notably, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan was present during the introduction of the Taliban representative as the ambassador. On January 3, 2022, there was a clash between Turkmen and Taliban border guards at the Khamab border point of Jawzjan following the killing of an Afghan citizen by Turkmen forces. In the latest development, Ashgabat hosted a two-day meeting on May 24-25, 2023, between representatives of the European Union and Central Asian Republics, which included Thomas Niklasson, the EU’s special representative for Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan’s close relationship with the Taliban can be attributed to two main factors:
- Positive Neutrality
One of the reasons behind Turkmenistan’s decision to maintain relations with the Taliban is its adherence to the principle of “positive neutrality” in its foreign policy. This concept was first introduced by Saparmurad Niyazov, the country’s first president, and was presented to the United Nations General Assembly, which approved it in December 1995. Since then, Ashgabat has sought to uphold the principle of “positive neutrality” or “permanent neutrality” in the international arena. This principle has remained a cornerstone of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy to this day. After Niyazov, when Berdimuhamedow assumed power in December 2006, he brought about extensive changes in many areas, but upheld the principle of “positive neutrality” in foreign policy, which remained immune to the sweeping changes implemented in other areas.
The principle of “positive neutrality” obliges Turkmenistan to steer clear of war and military-security alliances, as evident by its non-membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) led by Russia. While the other Central Asian republics are members of this treaty, Turkmenistan has chosen not to join. Uzbekistan was once a member but later withdrew. The principle of “positive neutrality” advocates refraining from war and military-security agreements, but does not entail adopting a passive stance or shirking regional and global responsibilities.
Turkmenistan has agreed to engage with the Taliban in accordance with the principle of “positive neutrality.” This principle has encouraged Turkmenistan to adopt a pragmatic approach towards the Taliban in its foreign policy and to refrain from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, which coincides with the Taliban’s own desires. Establishing relations with the government in Kabul, regardless of its nature or form, poses a challenge for Ashgabat. Given its Soviet Communist legacy, reconciling with a deeply religious Taliban is no easy task. Turkmenistan enjoyed a warm relationship with the Taliban between 1996 and 2001.
- Trade and Economy
The second factor driving Ashgabat to maintain relations with the Taliban is its economy. Among the Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been more active in the field of economy and trade than others. Turkmenistan has undertaken significant projects in Afghanistan, which require cooperation with the government in Kabul to complete. One such project is the TAPI pipeline, which connects Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, with Afghanistan serving as a transit route. The project’s success hinges on Afghanistan’s participation, and without it, the project is likely to fail. The TAPI pipeline will transport Turkmen gas from the Dauletabad region through the provinces of Herat, Farah, Helmand, and Kandahar in Afghanistan, before reaching Quetta in Pakistan and eventually Fazilka in India. The idea for this project was first proposed in the 1990s. To complete the project, Turkmenistan sought to engage with the Taliban, but progress was impeded by factors such as insecurity and competition among global and regional powers. At that time, two prominent international companies, Unocal Aviation of the United States and Bridas Corporation of Argentina, vied for the contract, but their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.
After the Taliban’s ousting and the establishment of a new government, efforts to resume the TAPI project began. In 2010, an agreement for the construction of the project was signed among the four participating countries. The project, which commenced in Herat in 2016, was scheduled to be completed by 2019, with a total estimated cost of nearly 9 billion dollars. The completion of this project offers considerable benefits to Afghanistan, including access to 500 million cubic meters of gas and transit rights worth 400 million dollars annually. The project also creates job opportunities, among other advantages.
The Taliban are making efforts to resume work on the TAPI project. To this end, they have held several meetings and discussions with officials in Ashgabat, including a visit by a Taliban delegation led by Wahidullah Halimi, the Deputy Minister of Mines, to Turkmenistan on October 10 of last year. Obstacles to completing the project include insecurity, the lack of a legitimate government in Afghanistan, and limited financial resources. For instance, the Asian Development Bank, which was one of the financial backers of the project, suspended its involvement following the Taliban’s return to power due to the fact that no country recognized the Taliban’s administration.
Another project that Turkmenistan has undertaken in Afghanistan is the TAP, which aims to transmit Turkmenistan’s electricity from Torghundi-Herat and Chaman-Kandahar to Quetta, Pakistan. The project’s total cost is estimated to exceed 1.6 billion dollars, and an agreement for its implementation was signed among the three countries in December 2015 in Ashgabat. A Turkish company had been selected to carry out the project, but like many others, its work has been halted. The project offers significant benefits to Afghanistan, including access to electricity, job creation, and annual transit rights worth 100 million dollars. Although both the Taliban and Turkmenistan are keen to start the project, several factors have prevented its commencement. A delegation from Turkmenistan visited Kabul on January 25, 2022, and held discussions with Taliban officials, with starting the project being one of the main topics of discussion.
Furthermore, on June 24 of this year, the Taliban approved a plan to transport Turkmenistan’s gas and petroleum products through Afghanistan to Pakistan, in exchange for transit rights payments. It is worth noting that the primary objective of these projects is to serve Pakistan’s interests. As such, the role of Islamabad in facilitating Ashgabat’s cordial engagement with the Taliban cannot be ignored. Ashgabat’s hosting of Taliban officials prior to mid-August 2021 can be viewed as a product of Islamabad’s attempt to secure the group’s consent to move forward with the aforementioned projects.
