The collapse of the Republic government and the reinstatement of the Taliban did not cause significant concern for the Islamic Republic of Iran, contrary to expectations. Despite the turmoil in Kabul, Iran maintained an open embassy and continued to issue visas from its consulates in major Afghan cities. On November 15, 2021, an Iranian delegation led by Ambassador Hassan Kazemi Qomi visited Kabul and held meetings with Taliban officials. This marked the first official visit of an Iranian delegation to Afghanistan since the Taliban took power. In return, on January 8, 2022, Mullah Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban Acting Foreign Minister, led a delegation of 26 members to Tehran, where they met with Iranian officials. This meeting was followed by negotiations between the Taliban delegation and Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the National Resistance Front (NRF). On August 15, 2022, Qomi made a rare statement claiming that the United States was organizing a group called the “Resistance Front,” which he deemed to be a falsehood. He further stated that their intention was to create internal chaos under the guise of resistance. Qomi’s remarks received significant attention and prompted him to later clarify his statements.
Iran took a significant step towards establishing closer ties with the Taliban by handing over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to the group on February 26 of this year. On May 18, President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran issued a strong warning to the Taliban, urging them to respect the water rights of the people of Sistan and Baluchistan. He emphasized the importance of the Taliban taking his words seriously to avoid potential consequences in the future. In response, the Taliban stated that the Iranian authorities should first gather accurate information about the water of the Hirmand River before expressing their demands using appropriate language. Two days after the president’s warning, an Iranian delegation led by the deputy general staff of the country’s armed forces traveled to Kabul and held a meeting with the Taliban delegation.
Despite the regular exchanges between the officials of both nations, the border separating the two countries has experienced numerous instances of armed conflict. Reports indicate that there have been 12 clashes between Iranian border guards and the Taliban, resulting in casualties. The initial conflict took place on December 1, 2021, and the most recent conflict occurred one week after Ebrahim Raisi made a statement on May 27 of the present year.
Considering the above points, the question is whether confrontation between Iran and the Taliban is inevitable.
To answer the above question, it is important to pay attention to the following points:
- Public opinion in Iran does not support the appeasement of the Islamic Republic with the Taliban. Iranian citizens view this group as no different from Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations. However, they do not advocate for war with the Taliban either, as they do not see it as beneficial. Instead, they simply want the Iranian government to not be overly lenient towards the Taliban. The memory of Iranian diplomats being killed still weighs heavily on the minds of Iranian citizens. The Taliban’s anti-Persianism approach is also a sensitive issue for Iranians that cannot be ignored. The excessive support shown by the Iranian government towards the Taliban has led the citizens to perceive the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Taliban as one entity. The strict enforcement of compulsory hijab by the Iranian government in the past two years is seen by the citizens as imitating the Taliban. The increase in strictness regarding hijab in Iran after the Taliban’s return to power is a cause for concern. The association of the Iranian government with the Taliban is a burden for Iranian officials, as Iran sees itself as a country that engages with major Western powers.
With the exception of Iranian citizens, the political factions within the country, including the “Iranian Reformists,” do not view the policy of appeasing the Taliban as advantageous. Newspapers aligned with the Reformists frequently criticize the Islamic Republic’s stance towards the Taliban and highlight the group’s disregard for the Iranian government’s demands. The tweet by Ahmad Massoud, which states “Did I not tell you not to go there as am your acquaintance?”, continues to be featured in Reformist-affiliated newspapers and online platforms. If the Iranian Reformists are able to secure more seats in the Islamic Council during the upcoming parliamentary elections on March 1, 2024, there may be increased pressure on the executive branch to discontinue the policy of appeasement towards the Taliban.
- The warm relationship between Iran and the Taliban over the past two years was expected and unavoidable. The foreign policies of countries are influenced by both consistent and changing factors. In the case of Iran, there are certain fixed factors that require them to maintain relations with the Taliban, while variable factors do not have the same effect. The geographical and cultural aspects play a significant role in the relationship between Iran and the Taliban. Therefore, if a group affiliated with Israel were to gain control in Afghanistan, Iran would be compelled to establish a relationship with them due to the necessity of being neighbors. Additionally, the cultural similarities between Iran and the power in Kabul make it difficult to avoid interaction.
However, there are various factors that have distinct effects. One of these factors is the nature of the Taliban’s administration, which can cause the relationship between the Taliban and Iran to fluctuate between peace and war. For instance, the Iranian government is not satisfied with the way the Taliban administers Afghanistan and desires the establishment of an inclusive government. This changing factor has negatively impacted Iran’s relationship with the Taliban. Iran has not backed down from its demand, and the Taliban has not responded to this request. Recently, the tone of Iranian authorities in this matter has become more explicit. On May 25 of this year, the Iranian foreign minister stated, “We have clearly informed the current ruling body of Afghanistan that we do not recognize them, and we have clearly stated that the condition for recognition is the formation of an inclusive government that includes all ethnic groups in Afghanistan.”
- The assertion that the shared characteristic of “anti-Westernism” is the main similarity between Iran and the Taliban may not be entirely accurate. While the Iranian government’s anti-Western stance is evident, the Taliban’s position on this matter is unclear. It is true that the Taliban has previously fought against the United States and has received support from Iran, but it would be incorrect to solely attribute this conflict to the Taliban’s enmity towards the West, particularly the United States. The recent resurgence of the Taliban in power indicates that they are more aligned with America rather than being its adversary, and Iran has recognized this fact. Both Iran and the Taliban are criticized by the West for their violations of women’s and human rights, yet Iran faces consequences while the Taliban is rewarded. Consequently, the Iranian government is cautious about engaging with the Taliban, as they perceive the United States’ instructions to the Taliban as a directive to wage war against Iran. For instance, Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, stated during the Islamic Council on September 6, 2021, that “Our primary concern in Afghanistan is to ensure the security of the Islamic Republic. America’s intention is to instigate a conflict between Iran and the Sunni world.”
The assertion that there is a connection between Iran, the Taliban, and ISIS-K is based on weak and uncertain grounds. It is clear that Iran is hostile towards ISIS-K, as evidenced by the group’s main objective of destroying Shiite governments, including Iran. However, the rivalry between the Taliban and ISIS-K is a separate matter from the rivalry between ISIS and Iran. Despite their differences, the Taliban and ISIS-K share more similarities than disparities. Their desire for power and alignment with the interests of major powers have caused disagreements between the two groups. Nevertheless, they are fundamentally similar in many ways. The primary common factor between the Taliban and ISIS-K, in relation to Iran, is their opposition to Shiism.
The Taliban’s opposition towards Shia Muslims is comparable to that of ISIS-K. The primary doctrine of the Taliban promotes severe hostility towards Shia individuals. The Taliban expresses their disdain for Nowruz, Persian culture, and Shia beliefs, as they view them as integral components of Iranian identity.
As an illustration, on June 3rd, a high-ranking Iranian military official declared that Iran was prepared to provide training for Taliban border forces. However, the Taliban vehemently rejected this proposal, stating that Iran should concentrate on its own forces as their border guards were already trained. In contrast, the Taliban have embraced the training of their military forces and diplomats by India, which could potentially strain the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan.
Hence, it can be asserted that if ISIS-K maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan and seeks to instigate turmoil along Iran’s eastern borders, the Taliban will not impede them as it aligns with the Taliban’s underlying objectives, which are anti-Shia, anti-Persian, and anti-Iranian. Nevertheless, the Iranian government remains cautious regarding the notion of the Taliban’s hostility towards ISIS-K, yet appears to be at ease in this regard.
- In the past, there has been a deep-seated animosity between the Taliban and Iran. On August 8, 1998, after taking control of Balkh Province, the Taliban committed a heinous act by killing eight Iranian diplomats and one journalist at the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif city. This event has left a lasting impact on Iranians, as attacks on diplomatic premises and the loss of diplomats are rare occurrences. In response, Iran deployed 70,000 IRGC and 200,000 army troops to conduct a military maneuver along the border with Afghanistan. This incident prompted Iran to provide support to the anti-Taliban front to the best of its abilities.
Even though Iran considers the United States an adversary, the incident mentioned prompted Iran to join the Global Coalition against International Terrorism led by the United States. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, recently expressed in a tweet on the 25th anniversary of the incident that the Taliban attacked the Consulate General of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Mazar-e-Sharif and committed a crime. Additionally, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Foreign Minister of Iran, stated that the martyrdom of eight diplomats and one journalist on August 8, 1998, represents the Taliban’s hostility towards media and diplomacy, as well as their violence towards journalists and diplomats.
Similarly, the Taliban cannot overlook Iran’s backing of the Northern Alliance, officially referred to as the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. The Taliban views Iran as a longstanding supporter of the Northern Alliance, their perceived adversaries. Iran’s persistent calls for the Taliban to establish an inclusive government are intended to ensure the participation of their traditional allies in positions of power. The Taliban is cognizant of this fact. Despite ongoing disagreements and frequent clashes with Pakistan, the Taliban remains loyal to the country and complies with its requests. They understand that Pakistan will not support the anti-Taliban coalition, a stance that Iran readily adopts.
- The Taliban does not rely on establishing a relationship with Iran because they view Iran as being internationally isolated. The Taliban understands that being friends with Iran would result in hostility from the United States and its allies. This is primarily because without the financial aid provided by the United States in the past two years, the Taliban would have faced severe hunger and likely perished. Similarly, maintaining a strained relationship with Iran could potentially lead to a friendship with the United States. It is worth noting that Iran is interested in maintaining relations with the Taliban, but the Taliban does not display much enthusiasm. It can be said that Iran is compelled to have a relationship with the Taliban, while the Taliban is not obligated to reciprocate. In contrast, Pakistan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have a positive relationship with the Taliban.
The United States is satisfied when the Taliban maintains a positive relationship with certain countries, and dissatisfied when they have a hostile relationship with them. However, if the Taliban were to become hostile towards Iran, it is unlikely that any country, including Russia and China, would abandon their support for the Taliban. This is because currently, no major power has the ability to enforce the policies of the Islamic Republic.
The argument that the Taliban can maintain a partnership with Iran based on past support is not very convincing. While it is true that Iran ceased its support for the Taliban after the security agreement was signed between the former Afghan government and the United States in 2014, this does not necessarily imply a strategic alliance between the two parties. However, the emergence of ISIS-K in 2015 further complicated the situation. To illustrate, during the first Gulf War, Israel supported Iran while the United States supported Iraq because Israel perceived Saddam Hussein as a greater threat than Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Consequently, Israel even encouraged the United States to support Iran, resulting in the damaging “Iran-Contra” incident and tarnishing the reputation of Ronald Reagan’s administration in the United States. However, with the conclusion of the war, Israel’s support for Iran ceased, and hostilities between the two countries resumed.
- Iran and the Taliban represent two distinct ideologies, although not necessarily opposing ones. Shia and Sunni are two different interpretations of Islam, but the governments that claim to represent these interpretations have turned their differences into conflicts. The Taliban identifies itself as the representative of Sunni Islam, while Iran sees itself as the representative of Shia Islam. The Taliban’s emirate does not accommodate Shiites, just as the Iranian government does not include Sunnis, which is an important point for the Taliban. For instance, during a meeting at Ferdowsi University of Mashhad on May 18th of this year, attended by Iranian officials including Qomi and Bahadur Aminian, the former Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan, the Taliban representative present at the meeting stated: “Iran expects us to establish an inclusive government, yet Sunnis in Tehran are not granted the right to build a mosque.”
The imposition of restrictions by the Taliban on Muharram mourners clearly indicates their intolerance towards Shiites. The Taliban view the participation of Shiites in Muharram processions as a display of power, which they find unacceptable. In addition to these restrictions, the Taliban forces went further and used gunfire against the mourners, resulting in casualties. Furthermore, the Taliban have not made any symbolic gesture of appointing a Shiite representative as a minister or governor. This not only puts pressure on the Taliban, but also alters the global perception, particularly that of Iran, towards this group.
The closure of Imam Khomeini’s relief offices in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat provinces is a significant issue that harms the relationship between the parties involved. The Taliban, who shut down this office that seemingly provided humanitarian aid, has not yet provided a response to Iran’s inquiry regarding the motive behind this action. It seems that the Taliban’s concern regarding the activities of this office stems from ideological reasons.
The statement made by Mawlawi Abdolhamid Ismaeelzai, an Iranian Sunni Muslim cleric, regarding the return of the Taliban to power, has raised concerns in Iran. He was the first person to express support for the Taliban’s return and called on Islamic countries to recognize the Taliban’s Emirate. Even two days before the Taliban’s arrival in Kabul, he stated in his Friday sermon that the Taliban’s widespread and rapid advances in Afghanistan indicate that the movement has popular support and the backing of God. It is worth noting that Mawlawi Abdolhamid became more politically active and delivered speeches following the protests against the death of Mahsa Amini, but this cannot be seen as unrelated to the presence of the Sunni Taliban in Afghanistan.
- Another significant factor that could potentially result in a confrontation between Iran and the Taliban is the issue of water rights in the Hirmand River. Despite the warning issued by the Iranian president several months ago, the Taliban has not taken any action to address this matter in a way that would appease Iran. The water rights issue has now become a matter of great importance and pride for Iran. This is because if the Taliban fails to respond to the president’s warning, it would be seen as disregarding not only the Iranian government’s concerns but also those of the United States and Israel.
A while back, the Tasnim News Agency published a headline stating that the Taliban, as rulers of Afghanistan, have shown great disloyalty in respecting Iran’s water rights to the Hirmand River. Additionally, the Islamic Republic newspaper featured an intriguing headline on its front page, highlighting that 66 days have elapsed since the president’s warning to the Taliban. Not only did they fail to provide water, but they also insulted us.
Why does the Taliban group refuse to comply with Iran’s demand regarding water rights? There are several factors at play, with the most significant being that the Iranian government consistently asserts that the Taliban is only a part of Afghanistan’s reality, not the entirety. While this may be true, accepting this viewpoint poses a burden for the Taliban. For instance, Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister of Iran, stated in an interview with TOLOnews on December 21, 2020, that the Taliban cannot claim to determine Afghanistan’s future without acknowledging the events that have unfolded in the country over the past two decades. However, it is worth mentioning that Pakistan supports the Taliban, which presents a different perspective.
Rangin Dadfar Spanta, former Afghan National Security Advisor, in his memoirs, called ” The book “Afghanistan Politics: A Narrative from Within” provides an intriguing account of the joint meeting that took place on February 5, 2011 in Munich, Germany, between the Afghan government delegation led by former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the British and Pakistani delegations. During this meeting, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, expressed his view on the internal issues in Afghanistan, stating that there should be a balance. The author further explains that Kayani’s intention was clear – he believed that the actions of the Taliban were actually a rebellion of the Afghan Pashtuns against the Tajik government, and he believed that this injustice needed to be addressed. From Kayani’s perspective, the individuals present at the meeting, including Karzai, Zalmai Rasool, Karzai’s spokesperson, and others, were not Pashtuns.
Pakistan regards the Taliban as the legitimate authority in Afghanistan. Consequently, this organization remains unconcerned about Islamabad’s appeals, even when they pertain to discrediting the notion of Jihad. However, it disregards Iran’s gentle and diplomatic entreaties, as mentioned earlier, due to the lack of effective leverage possessed by the latter country.
Read this article in Farsi here.