In recent years, Afghanistan’s political discourse has been shaped more than ever around the axis of “rights”: women’s rights, freedom of expression, minority rights, and social justice. These demands are, without a doubt, among the fundamental priorities of social life. Yet amid all this emphasis on rights, a fundamental question is raised less often, a question that, if left unanswered, will render all these efforts fruitless: without national sovereignty, can these rights truly be sustainable and guaranteed?
Let us begin with a hypothetical, albeit impossible, scenario: if the Taliban were to announce tomorrow that girls may attend school, women may work, and social restrictions will be eased, would this mean the end of Afghanistan’s crisis? The answer is a resounding “no.” This is because Afghanistan’s crisis is not merely a crisis of “lack of rights”; the principal crisis is one of “political ownership.”
As long as the people of Afghanistan cannot determine who governs them, even the most comprehensive rights will rest on a fragile foundation. Such rights will stem not from the will of the people, but from the decision of an illegitimate and unaccountable power.
Would such changes render the Taliban legitimate? Once again, the answer is a firm “no.” Political legitimacy is a concept clearly defined in political theory and international law: legitimacy derives from the consent and will of the people, not from the degree of a government’s flexibility or the manner in which it treats its people. For this reason, even if a political system eases certain social or economic restrictions and accepts some freedoms, but has not emerged through the free and transparent will of the people, its legitimacy remains incomplete and contestable. Furthermore, governments cannot manufacture legitimacy for themselves; legitimacy is not bestowed from above but must be shaped from below, based on the vote and the representation of the people’s will.
Now consider another hypothetical scenario: if, in addition to Russia, more countries were to recognize the Taliban, would this confer legitimacy upon them? The answer, again, is negative. According to Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government.” Likewise, Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) emphasizes that “all peoples have the right of self-determination.” Therefore, recognizing an administration that has not arisen from the will of the people is not merely a political decision; it stands in conflict with the principles of international law and the fundamental values of human rights. Such an act, whether by Russia or any other country, in effect disregards the fundamental right of the people of Afghanistan to determine their own destiny based on the national will, and is therefore deemed unacceptable.
National Sovereignty: A Root That Must Not Be Overlooked
National sovereignty, in its simplest definition, means that the people decide. This principle encompasses the choice of the type of political system, the selection of executive officials at the national and local levels, the election of representatives for legislation, and oversight of public budgets. In other words, wherever a decision concerns the public’s fate, the people must have a role in it.
In the absence of the people’s right to choose and decide, laws do not reflect the public will; power does not become accountable, and rights lose their enforcement guarantee. Under such circumstances, rights turn into temporary privileges that can be stripped away at any moment.
Historical Experiences
In the French Revolution, the issue was not merely economic or social dissatisfaction; the core crisis was that the people had no role in political power. Absolute monarchy meant that law, taxation, and the fate of the country all stemmed from the will of the king. Thus, when the revolution began, the people did not seek merely “more rights,” but a change in the source of power.
With the fall of the old regime and the adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the fundamental principle was established that “sovereignty belongs to the nation, not to the king.” This transformation marked a turning point, for from then on, rights were no longer a “gift” from the ruler but were institutionalized in law as the inherent rights of citizens. In other words, rights became durable only when the people themselves became the source of power.
In the American Revolution as well, the main problem was not that the people had no rights at all, but that they lacked representation in political decision-making. The famous slogan “No taxation without representation” pointed precisely to this issue. With the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the principle was established that governmental power derives from the will of the people. Thereafter, a constitution and democratic institutions took shape that not only constrained power but also guaranteed rights within a legal framework. Once again, the path was clear: popular sovereignty is established first, and the consolidation of rights follows.
In India, too, the people’s struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi was not simply a reformist movement but an effort to end foreign domination and return political power to the people of India. Under colonial rule, even when certain reforms were undertaken, the final decision rested in the hands of a foreign power, not the people. Thus, the core issue was not “what rights are granted,” but “who decides.”
With India’s independence in 1947, this situation was transformed. The people were able to draft their own constitution, determine their political system, and institutionalize citizenship rights within a durable framework that nevertheless remained open to change based on their own will.
These experiences demonstrate that rights acquire genuine meaning and durability only when they emerge from a legitimate national sovereignty grounded in the will of the people.
Afghanistan’s Political Currents: Moving Along a Side Road
In Afghanistan today, and even among political currents operating outside the country, the prevailing discourse is advanced as though sustainable rights can be achieved without a change in the source of power. At first glance, this notion may seem appealing, since it is simpler and less costly to hope that the Taliban will settle for accepting some social, rather than political, rights for the people. Yet historical experiences show that this path is not only ineffective but dangerous. Why? Because when the people have no role in determining power, the following outcomes are inevitable:
- Rights remain fragile: Rights that do not stem from the will of the people, instead of being a “right,” become a “privilege.” A privilege is something granted from above that can be withdrawn at any time. Under such conditions, there is no guarantee that rights will not be violated. Even if rights are granted today, they can easily be revoked tomorrow, because their source, namely, law grounded in the will of the people, does not exist.
- Legitimacy does not take shape: Political legitimacy means that the people accept a government as their representative. Such acceptance arises when the people have a role in establishing or choosing it. Where this participation and right of choice are absent, the distance between the government and the people widens, trust is not formed, and the government, in order to survive, relies more on coercion than on the will and consent of the people. In such a situation, even superficial reforms cannot bridge this gap.
- The root of the crisis is not resolved: Afghanistan’s current crisis lies in the “source of power”; therefore, focusing on the “outcomes of power,” such as certain human and social rights, cannot resolve it. This is akin to treating only the symptoms of an illness rather than the disease itself. As a result, the crisis persists and resurfaces at the first opportunity. For this reason, in the absence of national sovereignty, any potential flexibility from the illegitimate and authoritarian rule of the Taliban will be temporary and unsustainable.
Our Challenge: Fragmentation
One of our fundamental challenges is the fragmentation of political currents and military fronts, as well as the lack of coherence in demands. Each front and current focuses on a set of political demands, including human rights for the citizens of Afghanistan, but the absence of a shared narrative for achieving common goals has weakened the collective power and effectiveness of all. Yet historical experiences demonstrate that change occurs when all the people, or at least their decisive majority, unite around a fundamental principle.
What is the Solution?
The first step is a return to a simple yet decisive truth: Afghanistan belongs to its people. If properly understood, this sentence can serve as the foundation for a deep and root-level transformation. But this principle is effective only when it moves beyond the level of a slogan and becomes a national narrative for articulating a political alternative.
The second step is national cohesion and unity. Unity does not mean eliminating differences; it means agreeing on a common principle. Under present conditions, this principle can be defined as follows: the restoration of national sovereignty to the people of Afghanistan. To realize this goal, intellectual and political agreements alone are not sufficient; structure, organization, and a practical program are also required.
A Government in Exile: A Practical and Political Option
Accordingly, as a third step, one option that merits serious consideration as a practical political program is the establishment of a government in exile. This concept has a history in world political experience and is usually raised in situations where the government inside the country lacks popular legitimacy and political forces cannot operate effectively within the country. In the current situation, both conditions apply.
The creation of such a structure could play a significant role in advancing the goal of national sovereignty. For example, a government in exile could serve as a common political framework, bringing together the scattered political and military forces within a single structure and preventing division. Such a structure could function as a political alternative to the Taliban and demonstrate, both to the people and to the world, that a practical and different option exists for Afghanistan’s future.
Likewise, a government in exile could undertake the necessary preparations for a transitional period and, from this moment, plan for the political and military management of the post-Taliban era in order to prevent a power vacuum. More importantly, the role of such a government could be to prevent domestic chaos on the day after the fall of the Taliban, by offering a clear and transparent path for political decision-making during the transition and averting the repetition of past bitter experiences.
Conclusion
A reality that cannot be ignored is that as long as national sovereignty is not returned to the people of Afghanistan, none of the political demands and social rights will be attainable. Even if, hypothetically, the Taliban were to display flexibility, these demands could not attain stability and permanence. Under such conditions, every right, rather than being guaranteed and lawful, turns into a temporary privilege that may be revoked at any moment.
It is natural that, in such a situation, every advance stands at risk of collapse due to the absence of a legitimate and accountable system, and every hope for the future will be accompanied by uncertainty, owing to the lack of genuine authority of the people over their own destiny. This forecast is not merely a theoretical analysis but an experience that Afghan society has lived through repeatedly.
By contrast, the realization of national sovereignty could mark a turning point from which all rights and freedoms take shape on a sustainable basis. Within such a framework, rights will no longer depend on the momentary will of those in power but will be institutionalized within the structure of law and the public will.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
