Donald Trump, President of the United States of America, is neither seeking authorization for a broad military attack on Iran in this trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping, President of China, and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, nor does he want to push the war to a stage where its costs spiral out of control. His main goal is to win the cooperation of these two powers in containing the Iran crisis, a cooperation that would compel Tehran to accept nuclear limitations and reduce tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. This cooperation does not necessarily mean open support for military action. Rather, it takes the form of coordinated diplomatic and economic pressure so that Tehran sits at the negotiating table from a weaker position.
China has a clear priority in this equation. Beijing is above all concerned about the security of shipping and the steady flow of oil. The Strait of Hormuz is vital to China’s economy, and any prolonged disruption there would upset the energy supply chain and maritime trade. Therefore, after the summit, China will increase its pressure for a return of calm to the waters of the region. Even if this pressure means pushing Tehran toward greater flexibility, Beijing is willing to accept it.
China’s economic interests here take precedence over any “ideological commitment” or “strategic alliance” with Iran. Xi knows that continued tension could drive up energy prices and affect China’s economic growth. He is therefore inclined to steer Tehran toward solutions that guarantee the security of maritime routes.
Russia will also accept a mediating role, but not at the price of bearing the high costs of confrontation with America. Moscow is preoccupied with its own problems in Ukraine and with Western sanctions, and it does not want to spend its limited resources on fully backing Iran’s position. Putin may outwardly defend Iran’s rights and stress the need to respect the sovereignty of states, but in practice he is not prepared to shoulder the economic or political costs of confrontation with Washington. Russia can play the role of facilitator in the negotiations, but this role ultimately leads to a narrowing of Tehran’s options. Moscow prefers that the crisis be managed at a level that does not harm its own interests, while it can also extract concessions from its position as mediator.
America, in this equation, maintains economic and naval pressure. The presence of aircraft carriers in the region and the continuation of sanctions are tools Washington uses to keep Tehran under pressure. The aim is for Iran to enter any possible talks from a weaker position. Trump knows that a full-scale military attack carries unpredictable risks and could push the region into wider instability. His strategy is therefore a combination of sustained pressure and controlled diplomacy.
In Shenzhen, no final and comprehensive agreement on Iran will be signed. Expecting such an outcome is not realistic. However, the political ground is being prepared for a deal whose main purpose is to limit Tehran’s bargaining power. In the coming months, this could lead to proposals for limited negotiations, negotiations in which Iran will face narrower options. For Iran, the main danger is not only a military attack. The greater danger is that it gradually finds itself in a position of economic and diplomatic isolation. When China and Russia put their own interests ahead of unconditional support for Tehran, Iran’s room for maneuver shrinks. Tehran may be forced to accept conditions that it would never have accepted under normal circumstances and with a freer hand. These conditions could include further restrictions on the nuclear program, a reduction in regional activities, or acceptance of stricter monitoring mechanisms.
A real security guarantee and the complete lifting of sanctions remain the main sticking point, but Iran’s bargaining power to obtain these demands has diminished. The bitter lesson Iran will take from this summit is clear: friendship with great powers is not the same as a guarantee of national interests. China, Russia and America all ultimately decide based on their own interests. Iran, too, must accept this logic and act accordingly. A country that possesses military and geopolitical power but cannot convert it into the welfare of its people, lasting security, and genuine independence in decision-making may appear powerful on the battlefield but lose at the negotiating table. Power that is not turned into an effective political and economic instrument becomes a weakness in the long run.
This situation is rooted in the mistaken, or at least incomplete, calculations of past years. Excessive reliance on relations with the East, without creating a real balance in the international environment, has placed Tehran in a position where, when the interests of the great powers overlap, Iran is pushed to the margins. Shenzhen shows that even apparent allies are unwilling to pay high costs to support Iran’s position if those costs conflict with their own national interests. China needs cheap oil and safe routes, Russia needs sanctions management and a focus on other fronts, and America needs to show control over regional crises without being drawn into a war of attrition.
In such an atmosphere, Iran must look at the scene more realistically. Reliance on ideological slogans or the expectation of unlimited support from other powers no longer works. Real power lies in the ability to convert military and regional capacities into tangible economic and diplomatic gains. If this conversion does not take place, Iran may be forced to accept unfavorable conditions at the negotiating table even at the peak of its power on the ground. The Shenzhen summit highlights this reality. A final agreement will not be signed there, but the political path that forms afterward moves toward limiting Tehran’s options.
This process is gradual. Economic pressure continues, shipping security becomes China’s priority, Russia plays the role of a cautious mediator, and America, while keeping its tools of pressure in place, prepares the ground for negotiations in which Iran appears in a weaker position. The outcome may be a ceasefire or a limited agreement that reduces tension but imposes structural restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and regional activities. Meanwhile, the people of Iran will continue to face the economic and social consequences of these calculations.
The main lesson is that in the international system, national interest is the absolute priority, and no power is willing to sacrifice its interests for another. If Iran wants to escape this vicious circle, it must redefine its power in a way that both creates lasting security and guarantees welfare and independence in decision-making. Otherwise, it may end up the loser at the negotiating table. Shenzhen displays this reality in a bitter but clear way.
You can read the Persian version of this article here:





