Yesterday (18th of March) was the National Day of Journalists in Afghanistan. Taliban spokespersons commemorated this day by issuing messages, marking it as they always do, with both recognition and intimidation towards journalists. On the date 5th of March 2019 in the Afghan calendar, during Mr. Ashraf Ghani’s government, the 18th of March was approved as the National Day of Journalists, a tradition upheld until the end of the republic. Mr. Ghani’s administration declared this day as a tribute to the sacrifices of journalists and to honor their courage in disseminating information. Two months before that, at the end of 2018, reports surfaced regarding the worsening security situation for journalists, with increasing threats including harassment and murder. According to those reports, the year 2018 until that point had been the bloodiest year for journalists in the country. The most significant threats against journalists and the atrocities committed were attributed mainly to terrorist groups such as ISIS and the Taliban. Now that the status of the Taliban has shifted from a terrorist/insurgent group to a (albeit illegitimate) governing entity, their spokespersons pay homage to Journalists’ Day, acknowledging those who have fallen victim to the violence perpetrated by this group.
The Taliban’s observance of National Journalists’ Day lacked a distinct fervor. Instead, it was summarized by the dissemination of a written message from Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesperson, and a video message from his deputy, Hamdullah Fetrat. Nevertheless, the fact that the Taliban acknowledged Journalists’ Day is noteworthy; during the republic, journalists were among the targets of the Taliban’s aggression. Beyond this issue, the relationship between the Taliban and the media is a highly significant matter, as their enmity towards the media has become part of their identity. Some segments of the Afghan population perceive the Taliban as an ideologically biased group unwilling to compromise on their ideology, considering hostility towards the media as part of their ideological policies. However, the reality differs. Where the Taliban can utilize the media for political and propaganda purposes, they set aside their ideology in favor of expediency.
The relationship between the Taliban and the media is defined by the interests of this group. During the Taliban’s first emirate, they shut down all visual, audio, and written media outlets, except for one or two Taliban-affiliated outlets like “Voice of Sharia,” to control public opinion. Even those who owned televisions and satellite dishes in their homes were forced to conceal them. In the area where we lived, during the initial period of Taliban rule, only one family, who provided the most lavish gifts and bribes to the governor and his personnel, was allowed to keep their satellite dish installed on their roof and watch television. The rest of the people had their televisions destroyed by the Taliban or had to hide them. Even in recent years, videos have been circulated showing Taliban fighters smashing radios and televisions. Some of their officials consider taking pictures and distributing them as forbidden and label photographers as sinners. However, in practice, this group benefits the most from the media in the country. All state-owned media outlets, whether visual, audio, or written, are under the control of the Taliban. After seizing power, they established several media outlets themselves, understanding the role of media in shaping public opinion and strengthening/weakening power. To reach a wider audience, Taliban media outlets such as Bakhtar News Agency, under the control of this group, are disseminated in Urdu, Arabic, English, and local languages. Additionally, Taliban officials, who theoretically consider photography a major sin, have flooded the media space and social networks with content from their group, including videos, images, texts, and infographics. Therefore, the Taliban’s relationship with the media is friendly as long as they promote the interests of this group, and sometimes they receive support. However, the media can become an enemy of the Taliban, and journalists may end up in prison for seeking the truth and portraying the true image of Afghanistan under Taliban rule, which is not what the Taliban want to be portrayed.
The Taliban’s use of media is not limited to state-owned media under their control. Some private media outlets operating within the country have also been forced to comply with the policies of this group and, by distorting facts, promote Taliban propaganda. Granting tributes to the Taliban and interviewing their officials with scripted questions by private media outlets is a form of extortion to continue their publications in a deal with the Taliban. Before writing this note, I visited media outlets operating within the country. At first glance, I came across an exclusive interview by Pajhwok News Agency with Abdul Baqi Hanafi, the head of the Taliban-controlled National Examinations Office. If we scrutinize this half-hour interview, we understand the difficult conditions under which journalists continue their work and how they are forced to extort the Taliban and promote this group’s interests.
In this interview, no questions challenging the Taliban’s policies or posing sub-questions are raised. The questions are crafted in a way that promotes what the Taliban perceive as their achievements. For instance, the host repeatedly asks about their accomplishments and how satisfied the people are with them. Hanafi, in response, asserts that he and his department have numerous achievements, and the people are pleased with this group. There’s no metric provided that would enable the host to challenge Hanafi. Undoubtedly, the host does not have such permission. This interview was aired yesterday, on the 18th of March (National Day of Journalists), and even on Journalists’ Day, in a half-hour interview, the host couldn’t inquire once about the exclusion of girls from entrance exams for civil service, university entrance exams, medical specialty exams, or final exams of medical faculties. The host is not allowed to ask why girls who have graduated from medical schools are not allowed to participate in the final exams of these faculties to obtain their diplomas.
Another report, also published yesterday, pertains to the private television channel Ariana. The chosen headline for this report is “Incredible Progress in the Heart of Kabul,” and it covers the reconstruction of a pedestrian walkway near the Omid-e Sabz residential area. Despite acknowledging that the walkway is narrow, the reporter describes it in such a way that the viewer imagines Taliban fighters with rifles behind the cameraman, signaling the reporter not to diminish the Taliban’s “achievement.” In such instances, when discussing Taliban accomplishments, the reporter is not allowed to mention the thousands of bridges and culverts the Taliban blew up in past years. He is not allowed to remind the audience that the Taliban used tractors to pave new roads and highways. He is compelled to solely advocate for the Taliban’s interests and present objective realities in a distorted manner to seize the opportunity to work and survive.
Such interviews and reports cannot be summarized in just one or two cases. The media landscape within the country has been saturated with such content. Alongside television and other media outlets, YouTubers have also aligned themselves with Taliban ideology by producing commissioned content to propagate Taliban thinking. However, it does not seem that these YouTubers are interested in or believe in Taliban ideology, rather, they feel coerced. Taliban officials, on occasion, line up certain YouTubers to keep the advertising market warm in favor of this group. YouTubers who are not allowed to produce critical or even non-critical content are forced to go from shop to shop and house to house following the Taliban. We see examples of this every day on social media. A Taliban member steps forward and, for instance, inspects a restaurant’s cleanliness, and the YouTuber asks challenging questions of the restaurant owner as if interrogating a suspect. Everyone knows that the Taliban don’t have a moderate approach to cleanliness. If a Taliban member named Price Control enters a shop, we see YouTubers queuing up and producing content.
The fact that some journalists and YouTubers work to promote Taliban ideology and advocate for this group highlights the coercion faced by this profession under Taliban rule. To understand the relationship between the Taliban and the media and journalists, it is sufficient to see a report from an active media outlet within the country; there is no need to understand the severity of the situation for journalists under Taliban rule from the list of imprisoned journalists.
Therefore, it appears that the Taliban extorts active media outlets within the country and journalists. Producing and disseminating content in favor of the Taliban and granting tributes to the officials of this group with scripted questions constitute a form of extortion. The list of imprisoned journalists and the state of information dissemination reflect the situation of journalists under Taliban rule.
