The nexus between politics and religion in Afghanistan has been longstanding, drawing Mullahs into this arena, not only within Afghanistan but also in various other countries. Since the 1980s, certain Pakistani and Arab religious scholars have contributed to the flames ignited in Afghanistan. The intertwining of geopolitical interests in the Arab world and Pakistan, aligned with the strategies of international powers, has compelled political actors in these countries to utilize the potent lever of religion to mobilize the masses. To the eyes of the simple religious masses, charismatic preachers and renowned orators are acknowledged as spiritual leaders representing the faith. However, from the perspective of political and intelligence apparatuses, these ostensibly benign figures play the role of formidable generals, and without their involvement, advancing the emotions of the masses or, with difficulty, sustaining them is deemed impossible. This contrast becomes evident when comparing the current war in Ukraine to the past conflict of Afghan Mujahideen against the former Soviet Union. In that war, thousands of fighters from the Arabian Peninsula to the Indian subcontinent, and from the Middle East to North Africa, enthusiastically participated and overcame the Soviet Red Army. In the ongoing war in Ukraine, where billions more dollars are spent, signs of victory are scarce, and one reason for this is the absence of such warriors.
From this perspective, religious scholars who ostensibly preach religion also wield influence over major international wars distinctly. In this context, intelligence organizations and government agencies contend that platforms with a substantial audience should be controlled by those who share their strategic approach and contribute to achieving their goals.
Moreover, the frequency and intensity of the presence of Mullahs from other countries in Afghan affairs directly hinge on the policy orientation of those countries. In other words, if the policies of those countries dictate the involvement of their Mullahs in Afghanistan, be it in times of war or peace, and assign them a specific role, it aligns with the interests of the intelligence agencies of those countries. Conversely, if such policies are not in place, these clerics not only refrain from entering Afghanistan but also distance themselves from it, even when challenging conditions grip the people of this country, leading to the loss of thousands of innocent lives in the name of religion or subjecting them to torture and other difficulties.
In the 1980s, when supporting jihad against the Soviets was a component of the strategy of the Western bloc and its allies in the region, eminent figures such as Yusuf Qaradawi, Mohammad Qutb, Abdul Majid Zindani, Mahmoud Sawaaf, Hamed Abu Nasr, Abdullah Azzam, and others either maintained a permanent presence among immigrants and Afghan Mujahideen or made repeated visits, intertwining literature with fervent jihadist speeches. When affluent governments sought to foster unity among Mujahideen organizations, they assigned these individuals to that mission. However, in periods marked by escalating internal conflicts, especially between the Taliban and the Mujahideen government or between the Taliban and the Republic government, when there was an urgent need to halt the bloodshed and seek a path to reconciliation, these Mullahs were conspicuously absent from the scene and made no effort to curb the violence, aligning with the non-demanding policies of their respective countries.
Over the past two years, with the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, various groups of such Mullahs have journeyed to the country, at times from Indonesia and South Asia, and at other times from Arab or North African nations. While the majority of those who have visited Kabul thus far may be infamous and inconspicuous religious scholars, among them are prominent figures such as Taqi Usmani, Muhyiddin Qaradaghi, and Mohammad Hasan al-Dedou, who hold relatively high positions among Deobandis or the Muslim Brotherhood.
On the social media pages of Afghan users, there have been subtle complaints and criticisms regarding the presence of certain figures aligning with the Taliban. The criticisms question why these figures don’t make an effort to comprehend the realities of Afghan society and step outside the roles assigned to them by intelligence agencies. Instead of using their influence to shed light on the Taliban’s actions, they remain conspicuously silent. People’s expectations of religious scholars include an independent understanding of a society’s tangible conditions and not being entangled in political maneuvers orchestrated by intelligence agencies. However, these Mullahs seem oblivious to the affairs of Afghanistan, lacking even the awareness of ordinary people in the streets and markets.
When the Taliban delegation met Yusuf Qaradawi for negotiations in Qatar, the people of Afghanistan anticipated that he would criticize the unjust bloodshed and express objection to the extensive violence initiated by the Taliban over nearly three decades. According to religious standards, this violence is considered a grave sin after polytheism. The hope was for him to show his protest and admonish the group to reconsider its actions. Unfortunately, not only did this fail to materialize, but in those very days, the level of Taliban violence across the country escalated significantly. Despite the cessation of attacks on foreign forces, assaults on Afghan soldiers and government centers intensified to the point where determining the number of casualties became an impossible task. The indifference of these Mullahs to the violence and their apparent satisfaction with outright denial or even direct or indirect praise for the ruthless killings by the Taliban sparked speculation that these seemingly moderate Mullahs might be in solidarity with the group and endorse its violent actions.
The foreign Mullahs’ solidarity with the Taliban is more or less established, and there are ample reasons for it. However, due to their countries’ policies, which are unwilling to officially recognize this group, they also refrain from overtly taking positions in public that would explicitly favor the Taliban. This solidarity stems from various reasons, including their understanding of geopolitical realities being subject to the dictates of intelligence agencies. Additionally, for these political Mullahs, religion is an identity issue, not a spiritual one. Anyone who outwardly adopts such a title finds a common identity with them, and afterward, it doesn’t matter how far their hands are stained with blood and crime. They consider themselves as military commanders, viewing Taliban fighters as their field soldiers, and in this regard, there is no alienation among them.
To ensure fairness, we must distinguish between these political Mullahs and religious scholars engaged in purely scientific activities, away from politics. Unfortunately, scholars who only engage in scientific and research work, not political activities, do not gain much fame and recognition. Criticizing political Mullahs is important but not sufficient and has little impact. We should not expect these Mullahs to point out the flaws and wrongdoings of the Taliban, such as depriving Afghan girls of education, ignoring human rights, suppressing political groups, prohibiting civil activities, spreading tyranny, engaging in widespread financial corruption, supporting national and religious discrimination, and selling Afghanistan’s mines to foreign companies for political purposes during their meetings. Political Mullahs have nothing to say on these issues and in comparison to what Hafez said, “What the master of old said, I say the same.” They repeat what their intelligence guides say, playing the same role referred to in religious narratives as the “dumb Satan.” Anyone who witnesses the suppression of millions of people and does not speak up for their rights is the same dumb Satan. Expecting such dumb Satans to speak the truth and express the pains of the people should not be anticipated.