Many observers and analysts of Afghanistan’s conditions find Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban puzzling. It is widely acknowledged, both inside and outside Afghanistan, that Pakistan created and nurtured the Taliban for its strategic goals in the region, leading to their ascent to power with unconditional support. Moreover, the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan was seen as a significant regional achievement for Pakistan and a setback for India’s influence. However, verbal tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan, coupled with occasional expressions of anger, prompt important questions. Furthermore, the intricate relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban known as TTP, and the challenges posed by the latter group to Pakistani forces, raise additional inquiries. The Pakistani Taliban maintain irreconcilable hostility towards the Pakistani government, and their interaction with the country’s military, whether during ceasefire periods or times of conflict, has never resulted in a conclusive resolution.
The complex relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban has baffled Afghan political circles and yielded perplexing consequences for many individuals and groups. Some Afghan political activists, viewing Pakistan as the primary source of war and insecurity in their country over the past half-century, have been stirred by the critical stances of certain Taliban leaders toward Pakistan. They assert that despite their opposition to the Taliban, they endorse the group’s opposition to the Pakistani government and will support the Taliban in this regard. Others among the politicians opposing the Taliban, who regard Pakistan as the Taliban’s most crucial supporter, interpret any tension between the two as a positive sign and applaud the sharp and provocative statements of some Pakistani leaders against the Taliban. They perceive this as indicative of a shift in Pakistan’s policy and deduce that with the loss of its most crucial supporter, the Taliban are on a downward trajectory, and their decline is imminent.
The perplexities don’t end here. Some Afghan politicians believe that the Taliban distancing themselves from Pakistan could pave the way for other countries to influence the group, allowing Iran, Qatar, Turkey, and even Russia to redirect them. To prevent their regime’s collapse, the Taliban may seek reconciliation with other groups. Conversely, some express concerns that Pakistan’s tension with the Taliban could prompt the country to support other militant groups, including ISIS, leading Afghanistan into a new turmoil of widespread conflict and insecurity. On another front, among Afghanistan’s political and social activists, some hope that Pakistan’s tension with the Taliban will further weaken Pakistan, even leading to its collapse, and serve as retribution for its longstanding enmity towards Afghanistan.
While each of these analyses may harbor aspects of a multidimensional truth, it fails to paint a comprehensive picture, one that could lead us to a thorough understanding of the issue. We must distinguish between tactics and strategy to reduce confusion on this matter. For example, Pakistan has had no better ally than the Afghan militant groups for half a century. With their influence on both sides of the Durand line, these groups are Pakistan’s ideal guardians, directly serving its national security and being vital to its interests. Neither Pashtun nationalists inside Pakistan nor in Afghanistan, nor other political groups in the north, central, or southwestern regions of Afghanistan, can play such a role. Pakistan will by no means lose such a force and cannot replace it with the Taliban or any other force. Still, the Taliban can tactically engage with other countries, but no other country can be their strategic refuge like Pakistan, and in difficult times, none can rush to their aid as Pakistan can. Therefore, the Taliban will not replace Pakistan with any other country.
Perhaps it may be asked, if so, why are some Taliban leaders discontent with Pakistan? Why does the Pakistani Taliban, who are enemies of this government, receive support from the Afghan Taliban? Why do some Pakistani leaders praise groups opposed to the Afghan Taliban? These questions arise when common complexities in the political world are not considered. For instance, some Taliban leaders may not be pleased with Pakistan, but personal emotions differ from organizational strategic interests, and in politics, it’s the latter that prevails. Furthermore, Taliban leaders know that their excessive dependence on Pakistan impedes their national legitimacy, and to demonstrate their independence, they need controlled and limited tensions with Pakistan. This is understandable for Pakistan.
However, positive sentiments expressed by some political figures in Pakistan towards other political groups in Afghanistan do not carry significant weight within Pakistan’s deep state and are not indicative of strategic decision-making. It’s important to differentiate between emotionally charged statements made in the heat of the moment and long-term strategic plans. These statements may serve as a means of pressuring the Afghan Taliban to limit their support for the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan’s cordial relations with other political groups in Afghanistan are a tactical maneuver to exert control over the Afghan Taliban, rather than a shift in the country’s strategic stance. While Pakistan’s amicable ties with the Afghan Taliban are understandable and accepted within the country, the crucial factor is the extent to which these relations extend, which should not exceed certain limits. The Afghan Taliban strive to ensure that their relationship with Pakistan remains within boundaries that respect Pakistan’s core interests.
However, in the long term, supporting extremist groups like the Taliban, whether by Pakistan or other governments, harms the people of the region. It undermines the stability and sustainable development of these countries. It resembles a ticking time bomb that, with regional or global dynamic shifts, could lead to significant and devastating explosions. A sound policy prioritizes the interests of the people over those of individuals and political circles and refrains from sacrificing the nations of the region for the narrow agendas of individuals and groups — a pattern observed thus far. Just as accurately predicting global events is challenging, the future of relations between the Taliban and Pakistan also appears uncertain, and until there is a strategic shift in Pakistan’s policy, the instability in the relations between the two countries will persist.
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