As tensions persist between the Taliban and Pakistan, there is growing concern that this conflict may take on more complex dimensions, to the detriment of both the Taliban and Pakistan. Currently, the closure of the Torkham border crossing for cargo trucks, coupled with reports indicating unsuccessful talks between the Taliban and the Pakistani government to reopen this crossing, raises serious apprehension about the escalation of tensions. Particularly worrisome is the potential threat by the Taliban to permanently close the Torkham crossing. In such a scenario, the worsening of relations between the Taliban and the Pakistani government could disproportionately affect the people of Afghanistan.
While it is true that Pakistan is currently facing economic and political challenges, this crisis will eventually come to an end. What remains is our shortsightedness in pursuing Pakistan-hostile policies, leading to detrimental consequences. Afghanistan, currently under Taliban control, is far more vulnerable politically, security-wise, and economically compared to Pakistan. If tensions between the two countries escalate to the point where the Taliban and Pakistan resort to military confrontation or important gateways like Torkham and Spin Boldak are durably closed due to increased tensions, Afghanistan will face catastrophic political and economic consequences.
Economically, Afghanistan relies heavily on imports and is dependent on foreign aid. The majority of its trade goods are imported through Pakistan. Despite efforts by Afghanistan to reduce its economic dependence on Pakistan, these endeavors have not yielded satisfactory results, and the country remains reliant on gateways like Torkham and Spin Boldak. Neither the port of Chabahar nor the air corridors established by the Ashraf Ghani government have been efficient or cost-effective alternatives to these gateways.
Following the resurgence of the Taliban, it was assumed that Pakistan had achieved what it wanted in Afghanistan, now having complete control over the country in every aspect. The government officials of Pakistan did not hide their satisfaction with the return of the Taliban and appeared content that they had successfully achieved their strategic goals in Afghanistan. However, amidst this sense of military triumph, a bitter taste of victory emerged for Pakistani authorities: the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). This group, supported by the Afghan Taliban, drew inspiration from the ideological victory of its counterparts and intensified terrorist attacks within Pakistan. The Pakistani government’s efforts to convince the Afghan Taliban to suppress the TTP have so far yielded no positive results.
The Pakistani government, currently reluctant to engage with the Taliban directly, has attempted various approaches, such as exerting pressure on Afghan migrants and imposing restrictions on the transit of trade goods through different means, to compel cooperation in the fight against the TTP. However, these efforts have proven ineffective, and the Taliban continues to resist pressures from Islamabad. Even though the continued closure of the Torkham border crossing inflicts damage on both Afghanistan and Pakistan, placing Afghanistan in a severely disadvantaged position, especially when there is no accessible alternative to make us less dependent on Pakistan. We need this country even more than the extent to which Pakistan needs us.
In addition to economic needs, Afghanistan is highly vulnerable politically and security-wise due to its enmity with Pakistan, and Kabul has never been able to minimize this vulnerability. The Pakistani military has consistently played a significant and influential role in Afghan politics, often switching between supporting jihadist factions in the Afghan war and at times aligning with the Taliban. It remains uncertain which proxy forces will be introduced into the Afghan crisis in the future. If the Pakistani military chooses, it can easily manipulate this situation.
The Pakistani military’s proficiency in managing Islamic extremist groups is not hidden from anyone. Pakistanis have significant experience in this regard and possess more resources compared to the Taliban. If the Taliban supports the TTP, the country’s military also can support the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) against the Taliban. ISKP is not a monolithic Arab group; it is a multi-ethnic terrorist organization striving to establish a global Islamic caliphate and does not recognize the current geographical borders of countries. ISKP in Khorasan comprises former Afghan and Pakistani Taliban along with foreign insurgents, highlighting Pakistan’s influence within these groups. Considering Pakistan’s crucial role in managing Islamic extremist groups, ISKP in Afghanistan cannot survive without the support of the Islamabad government.
The reality is that Afghanistan cannot emerge victorious in economic competition with Pakistan through the imposition of trade sanctions – a proposal that was not given much attention by the previous government. Nor can Afghanistan currently bring Pakistan to its knees through a military approach. Afghanistan lacks stability and permanence in all aspects, while Pakistan is recognized, at least in the political-military arena, as a prominent regional power, a fact that cannot be denied. Politics cannot be drawn from illusions and neglecting realities. In politics, one must be realistic and forward-thinking.
