Following the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, the country’s political and consular missions abroad have faced a leadership vacuum and a crisis of legitimacy. Currently, a significant number of these missions either cooperate with the Taliban or have gradually been closed. Recently, Japan shut down Afghanistan’s embassy on its soil, and the Afghan embassy in Australia announced that, under an agreement with the host government, it will close by the end of June 2026. Reports indicate that Afghanistan’s embassies and consulates in Canada will also be shut within the coming months. Previously, the United Kingdom and Norway had closed Afghan embassies in their territories, although Afghanistan’s embassy in Norway was later reopened with a Taliban representative present. This situation reflects a sorrowful period of rupture and isolation in Afghanistan’s diplomatic relations with the world, unprecedented in the country’s contemporary diplomatic history. This article begins with a legal overview of the legitimacy of political and consular missions and examines the consequences of the absence of a recognized government on Afghanistan’s missions abroad.
Under international customary law and the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, the heads and staff of resident missions (embassies and consulates) represent the sending state in host countries. Similarly, according to the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Relations with International Organizations, the heads and members of permanent missions to international organizations hold equivalent positions.
Here, the term “state” refers to the abstract concept of the nation-state, which consists of a population, territory, and government. Due to the abstract nature of the state, diplomatic and consular missions effectively represent the government, which in turn represents the nation-state. In other words, the legal chain of representation has three links: the state, its government, and its representatives abroad.
When a government changes through unconventional means, such as war or a coup, the issue of recognizing the new government arises. In some cases, previous governments that have lost control over the capital or the entire country continue to operate in part of the country or abroad as governments-in-exile, asserting the legitimate representation of the nation-state (for example, Yemen since 2015 and Myanmar since 2021).
In such situations, other states generally decide which party to recognize as the legitimate representative of the country based on their political interests. At the United Nations, the foremost global organization whose decisions are widely followed by other states and international organizations, such determinations regarding contested claims of representation are made by the nine-member Credentials Committee.
Afghanistan has faced a rupture in the legal-political link between the capital and its foreign diplomatic missions twice in its contemporary diplomatic history, due to the removal or collapse of legitimate governments by the Taliban. However, the two experiences differ significantly. In the first instance, between 1996 and 2000, despite Taliban control over Kabul and the majority of other Afghan provinces, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, with authority largely limited to the northern and northeastern regions, retained legitimacy with the United Nations and countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Afghanistan (except Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which recognized the Taliban). In contrast, the second experience, beginning in August 2021 and continuing to this day, lacks an alternative structure that could even abroad serve as a “government-in-exile” representing the legitimate nation-state of Afghanistan.
Although to date, only Russia has officially recognized the Taliban, a significant number of countries, mostly in the region, have placed Afghanistan’s political missions under Taliban diplomats or under former republican diplomats who now comply with the group’s directives. Western countries, while not formally handing over Afghan missions to the Taliban, have marginalized these missions or reduced their activities to the provision of consular services. The decision regarding Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations has been deferred by the UN Credentials Committee for five consecutive years, and the seat remains occupied by a diplomat from the previous government. However, Afghanistan lost its voting rights at the UN two years ago due to nonpayment of membership dues, and its place on the list of speakers at the General Assembly’s high-level meetings has been vacant for the past five years.
Although the Taliban’s lack of legitimacy has perpetuated this irregular situation in Afghanistan’s foreign missions, these missions have faced mounting difficulties. Without funding from a central government budget, they rely almost entirely on consular revenues and occasional assistance from host countries. In addition, most high-income missions have been unwilling to financially support lower-income missions, leaving embassies and consulates with smaller revenues on the brink of closure or operating only in name, with minimal effectiveness. Many mission heads have taken extralegal measures, dismissing diplomats while retaining only local administrative staff to handle essential functions.
In the absence of transparency and accountability mechanisms, allegations of financial misconduct have grown. Over the past four years, Afghan citizens have taken to social media to complain about excessive fees, multiple times higher than before, required for document processing or verification at Afghan embassies and consulates. Reports have also emerged of the misuse of mission facilities for personal purposes and the improper sale of vehicles. In the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations in New York, where the author served until after the fall of the republic, seven diplomats continued to work for months without salaries or diplomatic privileges after the mission’s bank account was frozen in October 2021 due to legal concerns from the host country. Although the account was later reopened, the mission’s acting head did not pay the outstanding salaries of former diplomats and refused to provide accountability. While these examples should not be generalized to all Afghan missions abroad, they present an unavoidable picture of the disorder resulting from the absence of a legitimate government in Afghanistan’s diplomatic apparatus.
Without a government-in-exile, the political missions that do not cooperate with the Taliban have, over the past four years, been unable to justify their continued operation to host countries beyond addressing the consular needs of Afghan citizens. This rationale has been further weakened by the Taliban’s invalidation of consular documents issued by fourteen domestic missions. Shortly after the fall of Kabul, several political and consular missions established the “Coordination Council of Diplomatic and Consular Missions of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” to coordinate positions and address challenges. However, this council was unable to resolve the missions’ financial and administrative problems, and its membership gradually declined as some missions surrendered to the Taliban. The council’s occasional statements generally criticize Taliban policies, but focusing on their actions rather than the group’s terrorist and coup-driven nature, and urging adherence to Afghanistan’s international obligations, has reduced the mission’s stance to that of observers akin to human rights organizations and civil society.
Similarly, statements issued on behalf of Afghanistan in various UN bodies are, in content and messaging, difficult to distinguish from those of other countries’ representatives, who typically call for human rights protection, action against foreign terrorists, and the formation of an inclusive Taliban government. Comparing these statements to the speeches of Myanmar’s ambassador at the UN, representing the country’s government-in-exile and calling for the fall of the military regime and a return to democracy, highlights the confusion and dysfunction of Afghanistan’s diplomatic apparatus in the absence of leadership.
Given these circumstances, establishing a government-in-exile to fill the legitimacy void and prevent further collapse of Afghanistan’s diplomatic apparatus is a fundamental necessity. This could have been done immediately after the fall of Kabul by consolidating elements of the former republican leadership into a structure that would continue the international legitimacy and recognition of the deposed republic. However, the collapse of republican leadership on one hand, and the refusal of some mission heads to follow former authorities to preserve their own operational independence on the other, prevented this. Although it may now be late to consolidate these elements, if Taliban opponents reach an agreement to establish a new structure that can serve as an alternative to the Taliban administration and gain international legitimacy, a legal and political framework for the continuation of Afghanistan’s political and consular missions will be created. This path is difficult and requires sustained effort, but is unavoidable. Without it, the closure of remaining missions and the gradual recognition of the Taliban under the guise of “technical consular engagement” is likely. Given the expanding record of human rights violations by the Taliban and the failure of political engagement with the group, establishing a government-in-exile now has a better chance than in previous years of achieving recognition from the international community. The responsibility lies with anti-Taliban political factions to set aside internal differences and act in a coordinated manner to achieve this critical goal.
