Mawlawi Mahdi Mujahid was a devoted foot soldier of the Taliban. He was also non-Pashtun and an outsider within the group’s regime. Unlike many others, he was not an unquestioning follower of the Taliban Supreme Leader’s decisions, and in some instances he acted as a rights-seeker, making decisions regarding the territory under his authority that diverged somewhat from Kandahar’s will. In the end, he was ruthlessly suppressed and disappeared. The story of Juma Khan Fateh is much the same as that of Mahdi Mujahid, with the difference that the former has not yet been eliminated, at least so far, though his throne and crown have fallen. From these two similar, yet newsworthy and controversial stories, cautionary lessons can be drawn.
1) Over the past five years and several days, it has become clear that in the Taliban’s view, “ethnicity” takes precedence over everything else, even over “religiosity.” This means that even if you are more extreme than the Taliban in religious devotion and practice, if you do not share ethnicity with this group, you deserve humiliation rather than honor and respect. Given this, it is clear that non-Pashtun Taliban members cannot attain a worthy status within the group’s regime, even if they sacrifice their lives repeatedly. The few who have been appointed to positions mostly hold duties rather than authority, and they harbor no doubt in their absolute obedience to Kandahar. Look at the fate of Mahdi and Fateh, who were more “Talib” than Pashtun Taliban themselves; that is, they conquered trenches for the Taliban and plowed lands; they inflicted oppression on the people of Balkhab and Darzab; they put numerous soldiers to the sword; they opened the gates of many districts and provinces to the Taliban and performed many similar services. Of course, it was not only Mahdi and Fateh; others among Tajiks and Uzbeks have done the same, but their reward has been removal from the scene or forced relocation to provinces where, as Juma Khan put it, neither do local people understand their language nor do they understand the language of the locals. In other words, both those relocated and the residents suffer. It would be more accurate to say that this is not an appointment to service but a sentence of “exile.”
Right now, the Taliban’s internal crisis in Badakhshan has an available solution: entrusting affairs to local Taliban members, something the regime does not want and finds distressing. On the contrary, this option is attractive and would seem effective for local Taliban, and likewise for most residents. Here, the Taliban sacrifice “competence” for “loyalty,” meaning that no matter how qualified locals may be, since they are not considered loyal (in the regime’s view), they are pushed to the margins. Conversely, non-locals (mostly known as Southern Taliban) are valued and elevated no matter how incompetent they may be, because they are not already under suspicion and the regime feels assured they will not betray it. This approach has caused other underlying causes of conflict (plundering underground resources, unauthorized use of military equipment, secretive contracts with foreign companies, and lack of accountability to the people) to be pushed aside, while only the overreach of the Southern Taliban into the lives of Badakhshan residents remains in focus, with the dichotomy of “Badakhshani Talib” versus “Southern Talib” dominating media headlines.
2) The Taliban have shown that the principle of “obedience” forms the central pillar of the group’s regime, such that all other pillars of the regime are defined and given meaning under this one. For this reason, Taliban officials and the group’s propaganda apparatus promote, day and night, the importance of upholding the principle of obedience within their envisioned Islamic system, and encourage public opinion to adhere to it. This excessive emphasis on the principle of obedience has caused the Taliban regime to rest on the judgment of a single individual, and worse, for that judgment to acquire a sacred status, with opposition to it warranting severe punishment. On this basis, Taliban members, non-Taliban, and Taliban opponents alike are compelled to comply unconditionally; otherwise they will meet the same fate as Mahdi and Fateh.
Adherence to the principle of obedience is so important to the Taliban that it even transcends ethnic boundaries, meaning that even a Pashtun Talib who does not submit to this principle is regarded as defiant and condemned to removal from the scene, with the removal of Abbas Stanikzai from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as a clear and telling example. This is even though the Taliban are well aware that by removing Fateh from the field, they will be accused of ethnic bias. The same applies when they disappear Mahdi and suppress and imprison Khorasani. They also know that the continuation of this approach will cause other non-Pashtun commanders to lose faith in the regime and secretly search for alternative forces. Nevertheless, upholding the principle of obedience takes precedence over the potential consequences of injustice toward non-Pashtun Taliban, and concerns on this matter remain unanswered.
3) The Taliban’s handling of Mahdi and Fateh carries a clear message for the group’s opponents as well: that the Taliban are still capable of containing internal insubordination, and that as long as this group remains in power, an inclusive government will not be formed. Yes, this is indeed the reality. When the Taliban remove from the scene people who gave their lives and took the lives of others in the group’s cause, how could they possibly allow those they consider enemies to share in power? This may seem hard to believe on the surface. If the Taliban were truly committed to negotiation, they logically would not have turned Balkhab and Darzab into battlegrounds, since neither the Islamic State nor the Taliban’s military or political opponents were present in these two regions. Perhaps, through suppressing internal dissenters, the Taliban intend to send a message to external dissenters that if they have the courage, they should come to the battlefield; otherwise, pleading for negotiations aimed at creating a new political order will lead nowhere and will result in nothing but the prolongation of the current dire situation.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
