Given the border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the repeated closures of border crossings in recent years, the Taliban regime has been compelled to seek alternative transit routes. One such route is Iran’s Chabahar Port. A Taliban official recently stated that, to avoid losses for traders, they do not want to rely on a single country or route. According to him, Chabahar Port is now operational and should be utilized extensively. It is worth noting that the war in Ukraine has blocked Russia’s transit and trade routes to Europe, further complicating Afghanistan’s transit challenges.
Chabahar Port is one of Afghanistan’s closest access points to open waters and is geographically closer to Afghanistan’s border than Pakistan’s Karachi Port. It has the potential to become Afghanistan’s main transit route for goods. Additionally, Chabahar serves as the nearest transit access for the landlocked Central Asian countries to the open seas, which grants it strategic significance.
In May 2016, a trilateral transit agreement between Afghanistan, Iran, and India was signed, facilitating Afghanistan’s use of this port. Under this agreement, Afghanistan can export its goods to India and other countries and import essential commodities. The preamble of this agreement emphasizes strengthening cooperation and enhancing the economic relations of the three countries at both the regional and global levels. Moreover, Afghanistan’s access to open waters through Chabahar Port is guaranteed under international conventions, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This benefits Afghanistan, as the country is entitled to special rights and privileges as a landlocked state.
Chabahar Port, located in southeastern Iran, is the country’s only oceanic port along the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Around three decades ago, Iran designated Chabahar as a special economic zone, and in 2003, it reached an agreement with India for the development of the port. However, due to Western sanctions led by the United States and other complications, the port has not yet achieved its potential role in regional trade, and the trilateral agreement was signed with delays. Iran has sought to transform Chabahar into a commercial hub linking Central Asia with the Persian Gulf, South Asia, the Far East, and other parts of the world. On the other hand, activating the North–South International Transport Corridor through this port offers another transit route for Afghanistan, Central Asian nations, and India. For Afghanistan, whose dependence on Pakistani transit routes has long been problematic, Chabahar holds particular importance and helps alleviate this reliance.
Chabahar Port is approximately 700 kilometers closer to the center of Afghanistan compared to Karachi Port. This geographical advantage reduces transportation costs and could position Afghanistan as a transit corridor for Central Asian trade, potentially generating substantial revenue for the country.
India’s interest in Chabahar Port has recently increased. In May of last year, India signed a ten-year agreement with Iran to operate the port. Previously, India’s agreements had been short-term, which discouraged Indian investors and transport companies from committing resources. Under the new agreement, India has allocated $120 million for infrastructure and an additional $250 million in the form of a line of credit to Iran. As the world’s fifth-largest and fastest-growing economy, India needs new transit routes, particularly for trade with Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Despite these developments, numerous challenges persist. The primary obstacle is the U.S. sanctions against Iran and the country’s inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. This oversight body combats money laundering and terrorism financing. As a result of Iran’s blacklisting, the country has been cut off from the SWIFT international banking system, and sanctions have severely limited other nations’ economic and trade relations with Iran. Recently, Vedant Patel, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, stated that any individual or entity engaging in trade with Iran faces the risk of sanctions. Although India has lobbied for exemptions related to Chabahar, it has significantly reduced its trade with Iran. During the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. had granted specific exemptions for Chabahar from its sanctions. Additionally, the lack of suitable infrastructure for the North–South Transport Corridor and delays in completing key railway lines—Chabahar–Zahedan and Rasht–Astara, both essential for linking the port to the corridor—remain significant logistical obstacles.
The competition between Chabahar Port and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port also carries particular implications. Both ports are located in the Baloch-populated region and lie just 72 kilometers apart. Gwadar’s development is being driven by massive Chinese investment under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the port is equipped with modern loading facilities and electronic systems. China aims to access the Arabian Sea through Gwadar and to expand its Belt and Road Initiative. China plans to invest $62 billion in Gwadar, whereas India’s investment in Chabahar may not exceed $500 million. This 124-fold difference highlights the vast capacity of the China–Pakistan Corridor. Transit trade between Afghanistan and China through Gwadar has already begun.
Despite these challenges, Chabahar Port holds strategic importance for Afghanistan. Not only for Afghanistan, but also for the five landlocked Central Asian countries, Chabahar offers the shortest route to open waters. This is why Uzbekistan has recently joined the 2016 trilateral agreement. Although progress on Chabahar’s development projects has been slow, the port provides a viable alternative transit route for Afghanistan, helping to reduce its exclusive dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan has long used this dependency as a tool to exert pressure on Afghanistan and to escalate bilateral tensions. Although Iran–Afghanistan relations also face challenges, having an alternative route is highly valuable for Afghanistan.
You can read the Persian version of this article here:
