Freedom does not come through the gates of foreign powers. It begins with the will of a people who no longer want their destiny to be the property of leaders and ethnic groups.
I wrote this article especially for those who still search for the key to Afghanistan’s freedom behind the gates of foreign powers, without asking themselves: how can a country be freed without winning national legitimacy, gaining the trust of the people, and building an independent political ideology? A freedom that draws its legitimacy from outsiders has been mortgaged to the interests of others before it ever reaches the people.
Before a new coalition, Afghanistan needs a new idea, one in which no ethnic group has to prove it is the majority to enjoy its rights, and no leader can become the owner of the future of generations in the name of an ethnic group. If we criticize Pashtunism for its monopolism, we must reject the same logic among ourselves too. The issue is not which ethnic group replaces another. The issue is that no ethnic group should ever again be able to take the place of the nation.
The question facing Afghanistan’s political forces is this: is our opposition to ethnic domination opposition to the principle of domination, or merely to the ruling ethnic group? Do we see justice as the end of deprivation, or as reaching a position from which we can impose the same deprivation on others? A society that dreams of swapping the ruler and the ruled has not moved beyond the logic of domination. It is merely waiting for its own turn. This is what I call the “spell of colonialism.”
One of the roots of the crisis is the perception of the state as a collection of ethnic privileges rather than a public institution serving citizens. From the presidency to the administration of provinces, we have mostly asked which ethnic group’s share a given post is, not who deserves it and how that person will be held accountable. In such a situation, justice is reduced to dividing positions among ethnic elites, and the people remain on the margins.
The contradiction becomes evident when critics of the concentration of power themselves demand that the same power be concentrated in the hands of their own group. In that case, the commander changes, but his relationship with the citizen remains untouched. Changing the language and lineage of the ruler, without changing the rules of governance, does not bring freedom. If ethnicity was the criterion of superiority yesterday and remains the deciding criterion tomorrow, only the names of the privileged will change.
Ethnic identity must be separated from the ideology of supremacism. The identities of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaqs, Baluch, and other groups are part of the culture of Afghanistan, and none of them is inherently discriminatory. The problem begins when one identity claims a special right to own the state, or when colonialism grants that ethnic group superiority. If Pashtunism is criticized in the sense of political monopoly, the answer is not Tajikism, Hazaraism, or another form of supremacism, because such an approach merely changes the claimants of discrimination.
The discussion about the Islamabad Declaration, in the presence of a group that calls itself opposed to the Taliban and the chosen representatives of the nation, and that claims Pashtuns make up 42 percent of Afghanistan’s population, revealed this same deadlock and the depth of these individuals’ political unawareness. The issue is not only the absence of a credible census to prove such a ratio. Why should the right to govern be derived from the population percentage of an ethnic group? Even if ethnic statistics were clarified, would the largest group acquire the right to own the state? Should the rights of the smallest group be measured by the number of its members? A number cannot replace political legitimacy.
The legitimacy of a government stems from the consent of the people, the law, and the peaceful transfer of power, not from the lineage of the rulers. An electoral majority can determine, for a period, the responsibility of running the government, but it has no right to revoke the fundamental rights of others. No group should invoke the size of its population or the historical glories of its ancestors to claim the right to education, security, or participation.
Citizenship equality does not mean denying cultural differences and past discrimination. Linguistic and religious rights, fair access to education and resources, and participation in local governance all require guarantees. But guaranteeing the rights of a community is different from handing its authority over to a few ethnic leaders. No politician can present himself as the representative of all people of a given identity merely because of his ethnicity.
This distinction is also necessary regarding the Taliban. The Taliban are a political and ideological movement, and they cannot be equated with the entire Pashtun community. The deprivation of women of education and the restriction of freedoms is not the problem of one ethnic group. A girl in Kandahar and a girl in Herat or Bamyan may face similar restrictions. Turning opposition to the Taliban into an ethnic confrontation conceals political responsibility and divides shared suffering along ethnic fault lines.
These divisions increase the danger of foreign intervention. Pakistan has supported armed groups in Afghanistan in the past and is in dispute with the Taliban, particularly over Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This situation makes Islamabad’s relations with the opponents of the Taliban a questionable matter. Nevertheless, holding a political meeting in Pakistan alone is not proof of the participants’ dependence. Assessment must rest on behavior, commitments, and clear evidence, not speculation.
States pursue their own interests, and today’s support may end tomorrow. Therefore, the opponents of the Taliban should not only ask which country is helping, but should make clear what independent program they bring to any cooperation. If the dispute between Pakistan and the Taliban eases, what will become of the movements that have built their credibility on that dispute? Political independence must be defined before any foreign agreement.
The greater danger is the link between regional rivalry and ethnic narratives. When each group presents the other as a natural enemy and regards external support as a means of compensating for lost rights, the ground for foreign exploitation expands. To understand this situation, one must go beyond slogans and raise specific questions: What are the movements’ sources of funding? What commitments do they have? What is their plan for the future government? Do they guarantee the rights of their rivals as they do the rights of their allies?
Figures from the era of the Republic must also be held accountable. Someone who was once in power cannot remove his past from public assessment by changing his slogans. The concentration of power, corruption, and weakness of institutions in that period also need examination. Criticism of the Taliban must not conceal the responsibility of former officials. A new idea earns credibility through accountability, not by turning justice into a tool against a rival.
What is the practical alternative? First, the state must move away from the notion of ethnic ownership. Second, power must be lawful, limited, accountable, and transferable. Third, people must play an effective role in local administration. Fourth, women’s rights, freedom of thought and expression, the independence of the judiciary, and equal opportunities must remain outside deals between leaders. Implementing these principles makes it necessary to create independent institutions that can withstand the powerful.
Law alone is not enough. Political culture must change as well. A society that waits for a savior takes power from one individual and hands it to another. A new idea must allow citizens to defend their language and culture without believing in ethnic superiority, to criticize a leader of their own ethnic group without being branded a traitor, and to support the rights of an individual of another identity without denying their own identity.
Academics, writers, the media, and civil society institutions can shift the debate from ethnic quota-seeking to the quality of governance. Before forming coalitions around individuals, agreement on shared principles is essential: no movement has the exclusive right to represent an ethnic group, no foreign backer should decide in place of the people, and no political victory is a license to eliminate opponents. Disagreement over the form of the system will remain, but the rules of competition must be the same for everyone.
Historical justice must not be forgotten either. Victims of discrimination, repression, and forced displacement have the right to demand truth-seeking and redress. But justice must determine the responsibility of individuals and institutions, rather than transferring guilt to later generations of an ethnic group. History must be used to recognize injustice and prevent its repetition, not to make enmity hereditary.
Perhaps the most difficult obstacle is our own political habit: we regard power as a privilege and accept justice only when it benefits our group. The test of the pursuit of justice is defending the rights of someone who does not agree with us. If an opponent of monopoly harbors a desire for monopoly within himself, a change of government will not guarantee freedom. The question still stands: do we want the end of domination, or our own turn at domination?
Afghanistan does not need a victorious ethnic group and defeated ethnic groups. It needs an order in which electoral defeat does not mean the loss of rights and the future of children does not depend on the lineage of the head of state. True victory is not when one ethnic group replaces another. It is when no ethnic group has to seize the state to enjoy security, dignity, and a bright future. Then politics will become the responsibility of running the country, and the nation will emerge from the shadow of those who claim to own it.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
