For decades, the American presence in the Middle East was a fixed part of the region’s security equation. Washington’s allies relied on American military power, and its rivals had no choice but to factor that reality into their calculations. But the recent confrontation with Iran revealed a gap that may prove more consequential than the battlefield itself: the gap between America’s military capability and the political trust placed in it. Washington not only failed to achieve its previously stated objectives, but also demonstrated that in critical moments, the interests of its regional partners do not necessarily matter much to it. For the Arab countries along the Persian Gulf, the question is now more pressing than before: if the United States is not present to bear the full cost of defending its allies during a real crisis, why should they tie their security to Washington’s guarantees? Perhaps the most important consequence of this confrontation lies not in the number of missiles and drones fired, but in the new calculations now taking shape in Middle Eastern capitals. The issue today is not America’s level of capability, but the doubt surrounding trust in it.
Military Defeat or Crisis of Credibility
What happened to Washington in its confrontation with Iran is not simply an operational failure or a shortfall in achieving some of its declared objectives. The more important issue is its political and strategic consequence. For decades, the United States tried to present itself as a power whose military presence in the Middle East could guarantee the security of its allies and the stability of the region. But the conflict with Iran revealed a different picture of Washington’s intentions: that while America can strike Iran directly, Iran is also capable of raising the cost of confrontation for the United States and its allies by targeting American interests in the Middle East.
For Middle Eastern countries, this issue carries particular significance. If the United States enters a military crisis but proves unable to effectively protect its partners from the resulting consequences, the question arises as to how credible Washington’s security guarantees actually are for its regional partners. In such a situation, the calculations of countries in the region could shift. America’s allies may still need its military power, weapons, and defense technologies, but at the same time they are increasingly concluding that they should not rely solely on Washington for their security. However, what is eroding is not necessarily America’s military strength, but rather confidence in the durability, predictability, and effectiveness of its security commitments. Even if the United States continues its strikes and maintains considerable military superiority, doubts about the durability and predictability of its commitments could gradually erode its security credibility.
The Rift Between Washington and Tel Aviv
This shift in calculations is not limited to Arab countries. Israel, America’s closest strategic partner, also faced constraints during this crisis. The disagreement between the two sides stems from several factors: differing definitions of strategic objectives, differing assessments of economic and security costs, and differing timelines for the war. Israel views itself as facing an “existential threat” and shows greater willingness to continue the war, while the United States seeks a faster resolution and wants to prevent escalation. There are also differences in how objectives are defined: destroying Iran’s nuclear program and removing the country’s leader was the primary goal of the American strike, whereas Israel seeks to dismantle the governing structure of the Islamic Republic and the forces affiliated with it across the region. The issue, therefore, is not merely a tactical disagreement between two allies, but a difference in how victory is defined, what level of cost is acceptable, and how much time is needed to achieve results. In a prolonged war, this difference could more clearly expose the limits of American support for its closest regional ally.
The disagreement over striking Iran’s oil infrastructure is a clear example of this rift. When Israel struck fuel-related facilities without coordinating with the United States, Washington openly expressed its displeasure and warned of the risk of triggering an energy crisis. For the United States, preventing the expansion of an energy crisis and its economic consequences is of particular importance, while Israel may be prepared, in its own calculations, to accept greater economic costs to achieve its objectives. As a result, there is a lack of alignment even between the strategic goals of the United States and its closest ally. This same issue heightens Washington’s concern over the continuation of Israeli operations even after the United States and Iran reach an agreement. If Israel continues the war until its objectives are fully realized while the United States wants to end the crisis, the rift between the two allies could deepen further.
The Kurdish Experience and the Question of Trust in Washington
Washington’s unsuccessful use of the Kurds to destabilize Iran carries a cautionary message for America’s allies. When Washington uses a local actor to advance its objectives and then changes course, it reinforces the perception that some regional partners may only matter in America’s calculations for as long as they remain useful for a specific goal. Washington’s decision to retreat from the “Kurdish project” in Syria, alongside the Iran experience, intensifies concerns that American support for certain partners is not necessarily a stable, long-term commitment, and can instead be a function of Washington’s short-term needs and calculations. For countries in the region, this experience serves as a “warning sign.” If Washington’s calculations and priorities shift, partners who were previously important for advancing American policy may find themselves facing reduced support or a change in position. For America’s allies, therefore, the issue is not simply the extent of American military power, but the degree of confidence in the durability of U.S. support and the predictability of its decisions. This concern is pushing them toward diversifying their foreign relations and reducing their dependence on a single power.
The Cost of War and Its Consequences for America’s Partners
The consequence of the war is not purely political; it also carries a heavy military and financial cost. According to Western media reports, the cost of the war with Iran has been estimated at around 50 billion dollars, a figure twice the public estimate presented by the Pentagon to Congress. A significant part of this discrepancy relates to equipment destroyed during the conflict. The United States, for instance, lost 24 MQ-9 Reaper drones, each valued at approximately 30 million dollars or more. Some high-value targets, including radar and aviation systems, were also struck by Iranian drones, even though the cost of producing these drones is not comparable to the value of the destroyed equipment, or even to the cost of the interceptor missiles used against them. This situation exposes another vulnerability: that expensive equipment and advanced technology are not necessarily safe from cheaper, asymmetric tools.
For the Persian Gulf countries, this issue carries even greater weight. On one hand, these countries have witnessed the limits of America’s ability to fully protect its regional partners, and on the other hand, they must protect their critical infrastructure against the threat of Iranian drones and missiles. Under these circumstances, the Arab Gulf states are increasingly concluding that they cannot base their security solely on Washington’s promises and guarantees. As a result, they will likely move toward diversifying their foreign relations, strengthening regional cooperation, and expanding ties with other centers of power, rather than relying exclusively on the United States. Purchasing weapons and defense systems from America, within this framework, is not necessarily a sign of restored trust, but could instead be part of a pragmatic calculation to meet urgent defense needs. In other words, countries in the region may continue to make use of American military power and technology, while simultaneously working to develop other options so that they are not left without support should Washington’s position shift or its commitments diminish. This trend could gradually reduce the region’s security dependence on a single power and pave the way for the formation of more diverse and multilateral security arrangements.
From Blitz War to Political Bargaining
Donald Trump’s decision-making style also played a role in shaping this situation. The American president relied on the assumption that he could achieve a quick outcome through firm statements, threats, and shows of force, but he miscalculated Iran’s response and capacity. As a result, Washington was forced to deviate from its original plan and expend considerable resources to correct its political and military course in response to the crisis. An operation that was meant to be swift turned into a prolonged crisis, imposing political and reputational costs on the United States in addition to military ones. Trump’s shift in tone during the crisis was also notable. Initially, his rhetoric was built on firmness, threats, and declarations of complete success, but as events unfolded, the end of the operation became increasingly tied to Iran’s acceptance of certain conditions and the achievement of a political agreement. In this way, Washington’s tone shifted from a show of force toward bargaining to secure the gains it had already made.
The Cost of Delay: A Price That Will Surface Later
Perhaps the most important issue is that the real cost of this crisis for the United States will not end with the conclusion of the operation. Washington’s failure to achieve its declared objectives constitutes a political and military setback, but its delayed consequences could prove even heavier for America. First, negotiating with Middle Eastern countries to maintain or expand its military presence will become more difficult, meaning that Arab countries and Israel will likely demand broader security guarantees and clearer commitments in any new agreements. Second, America’s practical failure could create room for stronger formal cooperation among countries in the region, as well as the formation of informal, behind-the-scenes agreements among them without coordination with Washington. The actions taken by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain at the United Nations to propose initiatives on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, without coordinating with the American government, are one example of this shifting approach. If such a trend continues, it could expand into more areas and gradually weaken Washington’s authority in the Middle East. Third, the Iran experience could make it harder for the American government to justify new military operations and an expanded U.S. military presence in the Middle East to its own voters. Reducing the level of American armed forces involvement in foreign conflicts could become an election slogan, and Trump’s rivals in the Democratic Party will also use this issue to mount political attacks against his administration. At the same time, this setback carries not only an external cost for Washington, but could also have domestic political consequences within the United States, as Democrats use it as a point of weakness against the Trump administration.
A Costly Partner: When Trust Gives Way to Calculation
What is eroding is not necessarily America’s military power, but the credibility of its commitments. The United States still possesses vast military and economic capability, along with a network of regional partners. But power only translates into lasting influence when the other side trusts the commitments of the power holding it. The experience of the confrontation with Iran has reinforced the perception among some of Washington’s partners that, in times of crisis, the United States prioritizes its own interests over those of its regional partners. Under these circumstances, America shifts from being a natural guarantor of security to a partner whose every commitment must come with guarantees, negotiation, and careful calculation. From this perspective, the term “costly partner” points less to the end of American relations with countries in the region and more to a change in the quality of those relations, a relationship in which trust has diminished while caution, demands for guarantees, and the search for alternative options have increased.
The End of American Influence or the Beginning of Regional Realignment?
Middle Eastern countries are unlikely to seek a complete replacement of the United States with another power. The more probable path is a diversification of foreign relations, an expansion of regional cooperation, and simultaneous engagement with several centers of power. These countries will work to reduce the risk of dependence on a single power to become less vulnerable to sudden shifts in American policy. The most important consequence of the confrontation with Iran, then, should be sought in the changing mindset of America’s allies and partners. The United States may well remain one of the most powerful military actors in the Middle East, but if its allies no longer view its presence as a permanent guarantee of their security, the architecture of American influence in the region will gradually erode from within. Perhaps this is the real outcome of this crisis: the United States will not necessarily lose the Middle East, but it will no longer hold the unquestioned dominance over the region’s security calculations that it once did.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
