The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Iran and the United States was signed with the stated aim of permanently ending the war across all fronts, including Lebanon. Despite Lebanon receiving special emphasis in the MoU, there is no indication that hostilities there are actually winding down. Israel has shown no willingness to comply with the MoU’s provisions. On the contrary, by continuing its airstrikes and maintaining its forces in southern Lebanon, Israel is effectively trampling on what was signed. This pattern is a familiar one. During the administration of Joe Biden, a ceasefire was similarly established in Lebanon, only for Israel to violate it repeatedly before escalating into an all-out war with Hezbollah following the outbreak of its more recent conflict with Iran. The same scenario played out in Gaza. Both Biden and Trump brokered ceasefires in that strip, yet Israel honored neither, pressing forward with its offensive and seizing additional territory. Under the new MOU, if the war in Lebanon does not halt and Israel continues its operations, that would constitute a clear and fundamental breach of the MOU’s primary clause. The Islamic Republic would then find itself at a painful crossroads: if it responds militarily, the MOU collapses, and Tehran bears the blame for its collapse; if it stays silent and overlooks Israel’s violations, it sends a message of weakness and passivity to its allies across the region.
In practical terms, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, given the security framework defined by Tel Aviv and the fierce domestic opposition to any pullback without full security along its northern borders, appears unlikely if not altogether impossible. This means Lebanon, far from being the endpoint of the war, has become the first and most fragile test of the MoU. Whatever the outcome of that test, whether Iran responds or stays silent, it could consign the new MoU to the same fate as previous negotiations and ceasefires, and once again demonstrate that peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved simply by signing a document or by the withdrawal or non-withdrawal of tanks and military equipment from a given area.
Beyond the Lebanon question, another reality must not be overlooked: the MoU does not necessarily mean the end of the war against Iran itself. Israel has not committed to the MoU’s provisions and regards it as the product of negotiations conducted without its participation, a point that has been amplified in Israeli media in recent days. Israel, therefore, continues to seek a pretext for renewed strikes against Iranian interests, with one key difference: this time it could act without direct American involvement, leaving Washington as a bystander. The cost of such a war for the United States and the world would be comparatively low. The conflict would not escalate into a regional war, American-aligned Arab states would not be targeted, the Strait of Hormuz would not be closed, oil markets would remain under control, and, crucially, Iran would find no justification for striking American interests in the region given the absence of direct US military participation. The real threat to the Iran-US MOU, therefore, lies not in its nuclear and missile provisions or in sanctions, but in the existence of a third actor, one capable of unraveling months of diplomacy with a single surprise operation in the blink of an eye.
Even if the MoU manages to preserve a cessation of hostilities for several months, converting it into a comprehensive and durable agreement would be an enormously difficult undertaking, given the inherent complexities of nuclear, sanctions, and regional negotiations. Unlike the MoU, which is limited strictly to “stopping the war,” a comprehensive agreement would require determining enrichment levels, the number of centrifuges, the timeline for safeguards inspections, a mechanism for lifting sanctions, and a future dispute resolution framework. Each of these issues alone demands months of intense and intricate bargaining, and both sides would naturally be pushed toward raising their demands. Iran, pointing to the fact that it was not defeated on the battlefield and that the MoU demonstrates its capacity to hold firm, will likely not retreat from its initial positions on preserving its nuclear infrastructure. The United States, for its part, may move beyond the MoU’s framework and introduce new conditions, such as the “complete dismantlement of the nuclear and missile program” or the “full cessation of support for proxy forces,” positions that Tehran would find wholly unacceptable. In the meantime, Israel’s persistent acts of sabotage through targeted assassinations, cyber operations, or the leaking of classified intelligence could deepen mutual distrust to the point where both sides, rather than drawing closer, retreat into defensive postures and escalating demands.
Optimism about reaching a comprehensive agreement, therefore, appears poorly founded, not only given the history of previous agreements, negotiations, and ceasefires, but also given the inherently conflicting interests of the parties and the destructive role of the third actor. What has been presented as a “60-day horizon” looks less like a path toward lasting peace and more like a tactical breathing space for both sides, after which each can pursue its goals through continued dialogue, or, should talks fail, prepare for the next phase of confrontation. The most likely scenario, then, is that the MoU will not become the foundation of a grand comprehensive agreement but will instead become a limited, temporary, and yet protracted arrangement, under which the war appears to be on hold but genuine peace is never established, and both parties remain in a condition of “neither war nor peace.”
Of course, both the United States and Iran can take pride in what they have signed, at least for a while. For the United States, reopening the Strait of Hormuz and easing pressure on global energy supply chains was the paramount objective, and that appears to have been achieved. For the Islamic Republic, lifting the naval blockade and unfreezing blocked assets was the key goal, aimed at reducing domestic discontent fueled by deteriorating living conditions. On that basis, both sides can, for now, present the MoU to their domestic audiences as a “win.”
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
یادداشت تفاهم ایران و امریکا؛ فرصتی برای تنفس یا پایان دایمی جنگ؟
