As Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) grows more capable and assertive, one question becomes increasingly pressing: Is Pakistan ultimately compelled to negotiate with the group? So far, the current Pakistani government has maintained a firm position, continuing the war and rejecting negotiations. Yet the question of whether talks are necessary remains unresolved. Tahir Andarabi, spokesperson for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reiterated just recently that his country will “never negotiate with any terrorist group.” The reality, however, is that whenever Pakistan weighs the prospects of war or negotiation with the TTP, the experiences of two countries loom large in the minds of its policymakers: Afghanistan and Syria. Viewed through the lens of these two cases, both war and dialogue present Pakistan with opportunities as well as significant risks.
Lessons from Afghanistan and Syria: Opportunities and Risks for Pakistan
1) In Afghanistan, a legitimate government backed by the international community survived for twenty years. Yet the Taliban, much like the TTP in both nature and ideology, gradually re-emerged from 2005 onward, eventually becoming a force with which both the world and the U.S.-backed Afghan Republic found negotiations unavoidable. The outcome of those talks enabled the Taliban to return to power and eliminate their rivals. For Pakistan, the Afghan experience is a clear warning: it does not want to grant the TTP an easy opportunity for negotiation, especially a militant group so closely aligned with the Afghan Taliban and sheltered on territory under their control.
2) Pakistan also remembers the consequences of refusing to negotiate. The Taliban’s exclusion from the Bonn Conference, widely considered one of the major mistakes of that historic process, contributed to the long-term failure to resolve the conflict. Many organizers later argued that inviting the defeated Taliban at that moment could have helped end the crisis. That exclusion, combined with other critical factors, contributed to the Taliban’s resurgence, two decades of destructive war, and their eventual return to exclusive power. The memory of that event reminds Pakistan of the potential costs of completely ignoring the TTP or other armed opposition groups.
3) Syria offers another sobering example. Bashar al-Assad, the country’s president, refused to engage meaningfully with his opponents, relying instead on brutal repression after 2011. He pushed opposition forces back to Idlib and other areas, grew overconfident, and assumed his rule was secure, making dialogue unnecessary. Even Iran’s foreign minister later acknowledged that Assad had repeatedly been advised by allies to show restraint, but he dismissed the recommendations. This refusal, along with other major factors, contributed to the regime’s near-collapse and the rapid unraveling of the state. That experience now weighs heavily on countries like Pakistan that face powerful armed opposition movements.
4) Pakistan believes that the former Afghan Republic failed to wage an effective deterrent war against the Taliban, allowing the group to gain territory and momentum. For this reason, Islamabad sees itself as obliged to sustain a decisive and deterrent war against the TTP so the group, even if not destroyed, remains weakened to the point where negotiations are unnecessary. At the same time, Pakistan remembers the opposite lesson as well: not only the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, but also the United States, a superpower, and NATO fought the Taliban for years, and the outcome of that war is now plain to see. This forces Islamabad to question the effectiveness of relying solely on military operations against the TTP, especially given the group’s social base on both sides of the border and its tribal and ideological ties to the Afghan Taliban.
5) The very collapse of governments (regardless of causes and contributing factors) in Syria and Afghanistan offers a lesson for Pakistan, especially when it considers the U.S. support for Afghanistan and the Russian–Iranian backing of Syria. In both countries, the governments fell in the blink of an eye, and the world did not so much as raise an eyebrow. What is particularly instructive for Pakistan is that groups now ruling Kabul and Damascus are, in essence, not very different from the TTP. Therefore, Pakistan’s leaders fear that if the TTP is left unchecked, their country could share the fate of Afghanistan and Syria. In reality, if one day the TTP were to seize power in Pakistan, it should not be surprising, considering what happened in Afghanistan and Syria. The Taliban, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the TTP are, if not identical, extremely similar in nature, with the difference that the first two have polished their public image and learned the language of international politics, while the latter still fights from deserts and caves. When Ahmad al-Shara, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Syria’s interim president, with his controversial record, becomes a guest at the White House, or when Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban regime’s deputy prime minister for economic affairs, with a record very similar to al-Sharaa’s holds a phone conversation with Donald Trump, the president of the United States, it is not inconceivable that one day such an opportunity may also be extended to Noor Wali Mehsud, the TTP leader. Witnessing such scenes is disturbing for Pakistan, which is determined not to become the “next spectacle.”
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Syria: A Brief Look at Structural Differences
Although the war in Pakistan shares many aspects with the war in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, with Syria, it also contains notable differences, summarized below:
1) In Pakistan’s current government (both civilian and military), there is a single, clear definition of the TTP: a terrorist organization. More importantly, the complete elimination of this terrorist group is considered an urgent and vital necessity for Islamabad.
In contrast, both Karzai and Ghani referred to the Taliban as “disgruntled brothers” and “political opposition,” and the former even considered it legitimate for them to control parts of Afghanistan.
In Syria, although there was consensus regarding the definition of the opposition, public dissatisfaction with the Damascus regime was high, draining the state’s will to fight. Pakistan, however, has democracy and social satisfaction, two advantages that help the state during crises.
2) Governments in Afghanistan and Syria leaned excessively on foreign backers; without them, they collapsed, as indeed they did. Assad’s government was heavily dependent on Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, and when they hesitated to assist, his regime rapidly lost ground. Ghani’s government relied on the U.S., and once American forces withdrew, it surrendered the field to the Taliban. Pakistan, by contrast, is not dependent to such a degree, especially in defense, where it has reached near self-sufficiency and can defend itself even without foreign support, including against rising powers like India.
3) The TTP holds a very different status in global perception compared to the opponents of Ghani or Assad.
The Afghan and Syrian opposition groups were strong, well-supported, and hosted by sympathetic countries. The international community had tacitly recognized them, pressuring Ghani and Assad to negotiate.
By contrast, the TTP is alien to most countries, and no state has recommended that Pakistan negotiate with it, except the Taliban in Afghanistan, who, due to tribal affinity, do not wish to see their allies across the border killed.
4) India still poses an existential threat to Pakistan, and vice versa. Highlighting this threat overshadows the TTP threat, while also strengthening the military and bolstering national unity, especially when the narrative suggests that the TTP and Baloch separatists are supported by India.
Up to this point, Pakistan views negotiations with the TTP as conferring legitimacy on the group, while also fearing the potential ineffectiveness of military campaigns. On the other hand, the TTP has not yet become an uncontrollable force, which gives Islamabad an opportunity, provided the Afghan Taliban cooperate in restraining the TTP. For these reasons, Pakistan’s rulers currently still consider war the most prudent course of action.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
پاکستان در دوراهی جنگ و مذاکره با تیتیپی؛ درسهایی از افغانستان و سوریه
