Pakistan carried out drone strikes on parts of Khost and Nangarhar provinces, reportedly killing and injuring several civilians. In response, the Taliban summoned Pakistan’s ambassador in Kabul and handed him a formal letter of protest. As of the time of writing, Pakistani officials have refrained from commenting; however, given the pattern of previous strikes, it is widely assumed that the targets were sanctuaries of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters.
The attack has once again exposed the limits of Chinese diplomacy. Beijing’s attempts to manage tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban, if not outright failures, have produced few tangible results. For over a year, China has positioned itself as a mediator seeking to end the rift between Islamabad and the Taliban. Both Kabul and Beijing have hosted several rounds of trilateral talks for this purpose. Yet, Pakistan has only joined such meetings once, in May 2023, a time when relations between Islamabad and the Taliban over the TTP were not as fraught, and China had not yet formally stepped in as a broker. Just days ago, Kabul hosted another trilateral session, and media coverage largely portrayed it as effective and promising.
The drone strike, however, shows that China’s efforts have not shifted the dynamics. With Beijing visibly involved, other regional and global powers may have an incentive to undermine Chinese mediation quietly. One effective strategy is to embolden the TTP while encouraging the Taliban to defy Pakistan. Both India and the United States, for instance, would not be displeased to see Chinese diplomacy falter, diminishing Beijing’s regional and global stature.
The Taliban, meanwhile, have grown stubborn in their support for the TTP and appear unlikely to relent anytime soon. Pakistan has already deployed multiple tools of pressure and persuasion, but with limited success. The Taliban are well aware they cannot withstand a confrontation with Pakistan; such a clash would cripple them. Inevitably, if forced to choose between Pakistan and the TTP, the Taliban will sacrifice the latter because, despite its resilience, the TTP does not pose an existential threat to the Pakistani state. Moreover, the Taliban seek survival and legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. Achieving that goal requires severing ties with militant networks that much of the world designates as terrorist organizations. That the Taliban have yet to provide meaningful assurances to Afghanistan’s neighbors on this front is striking, if not alarming. Their obstinacy calls to mind their uncompromising defense of Osama bin Laden, the late al-Qaeda leader, during the group’s previous rule.
A Possible Green Light from the Taliban
It cannot be ruled out that the Taliban may have given a tacit green light to Pakistan’s strike on the TTP. Their reaction suggests as much: merely handing Pakistan’s ambassador in Kabul a letter of protest. In the past, when Pakistan carried out similar attacks, Taliban officials responded with fiery rhetoric and threats of “severe retaliation.” This time, however, they carefully kept their response within diplomatic bounds.
Why raise the possibility of coordination? The most compelling factor is the postponed opposition conference in Islamabad, delayed by a month. That meeting generated such uproar that even Zalmay Khalilzad was unsettled. In his latest interview, Khalilzad said he had no objection to Taliban opponents gathering anywhere so long as they did not choose Pakistan as their venue. Such concern underscores Pakistan’s pivotal role in Afghanistan’s past, present, and future conflicts. If Khalilzad is this worried, one can only imagine how much more anxious the Taliban are.
Public opinion toward the proposed conference has been mixed, a blend of condemnation and cautious support. Critics argue that Pakistan bears responsibility for Afghanistan’s crises and therefore should not host Afghan opposition figures. Even if the meeting is eventually held in the coming weeks or months, participation will no longer be as straightforward as before. Detractors will point out that Pakistan has attacked Afghan soil, while opposition groups seek assistance from that same country. This dynamic makes it far harder to convene the gathering or ensure strong attendance. In this sense, the Taliban’s tacit approval of the strike amounts to sabotaging the opposition meeting altogether. Even if no direct coordination took place, the strike itself has already complicated the opposition’s plans.
One should not forget that preventing such a gathering is of immense importance to the Taliban, far more so than to Pakistan. Previous reports indicated that Taliban demands raised during the trilateral talks in Kabul were a key factor behind the postponement of the Islamabad meeting.
Adding further weight to this possibility, the Indian outlet CNN News18 also reported that the strike was carried out with Taliban consent. Given India’s deep rivalry with Pakistan, it is striking that an Indian media source would report such a claim. Normally, New Delhi would benefit from portraying Taliban-Pakistan relations as strained. Instead, its acknowledgment of Taliban approval lends credence to the possibility of coordination.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
حمله پهپادی پاکستان بر افغانستان؛ وقتی «دیپلماسی چینی» زمینگیر میشود
