The Taliban are an ideological and fundamentalist group that came to power with the support of Pakistan, aiming to dismantle the Mujahideen factions. Before the Taliban, various groups under the banner of Mujahideen, supported by Pakistan, fought in Afghanistan. As the Mujahideen leaders gained power, internal divisions among them reached a peak, leading to civil wars. These divisions were primarily due to the lack of a proper governance plan. However, beyond that, the Mujahideen leaders were directly dependent on Pakistan and Iran. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these leaders lost their relevance to their supporters and increasingly sought to keep Pakistan and Iran on their side. In this context, they resorted to internal conflicts and exacerbated the war in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban managed to overthrow the Mujahideen leaders, establishing themselves as the uncontested rulers in most of Afghanistan, except for a few regions that resisted. But following the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States, the Mujahideen leaders had another opportunity to regain power. During the twenty years of the Republic, these leaders continuously sought to advance their party, ethnic, and group interests, never shying away from any actions to achieve this. While in power, they accumulated wealth, and when outside the government, they worked to undermine the system. They were also involved in widespread administrative corruption and large-scale economic projects. Another significant aspect of their rule was the ethnicization of values such as democracy, human rights, and social justice—acts that these Mujahideen leaders have been responsible for over the past two decades. However, with the Taliban’s return to power, they sought refuge in other countries, continuing their business ventures and lives alongside their families.
Now, nearly four years into the Taliban’s rule, occasional physical and virtual meetings on Afghan affairs are held. Alongside these, alliances and forums have emerged, composed primarily of Mujahideen leaders, former government officials, and individuals who directly intervened in Afghanistan’s politics over the past twenty years. Much like in the past, these alliances lack stability and often fracture after a short period. The most recent example of such a split can be seen in the break between the Resistance Front and the Jamiat-i-Islami Party from the National Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan. According to their statements, this separation was a disagreement with the National Council’s plans for Afghanistan’s salvation. However, the underlying reality might be rooted in conflicts over vested interests.
Still, Can the Mujahideen Leaders Offer an Alternative to the Taliban?
1
Given the approach of the Mujahideen leaders over the past two decades, they lack the necessary capacity for governance. The Mujahideen factions are largely personality-driven and view politics and power through the narrow lens of ethnic and group interests. Their instrumental use of elections and democracy, and their ethnicization of democratic processes, have been hallmark traits of their political behavior. If the Taliban were removed from power tomorrow and an opportunity were extended to the Mujahideen leadership, Afghanistan would likely descend once again into the quagmire of civil war—unless a major power like the United States were to intervene, as it did in 2001, and bring all sides to the negotiating table.
2
Intra-group rivalries have long plagued the Mujahideen factions, representing one of their most persistent problems over the past four decades. Despite adopting the appearance of democratic leadership and amassing substantial wealth, their political thinking and behavior remain heavily influenced by religious values and sectarian ideologies. A clear sense of ethnic and religious superiority can be observed among them, and they lack any coherent strategy for confronting the Taliban or shaping a post-Taliban political order.
3
They fundamentally lack belief in organizational approaches. Each Mujahideen leader sees himself as the sole representative of a major population segment and resists contributing to a unified organizational structure governed by a shared program. Their belief in parties, alliances, and councils is rooted in opportunism. Under the guise of ethnic representation, they have consistently sought to accumulate more wealth. Today, they are engaged in the ethnicization of strategic regions of Afghanistan in hopes of attracting the support of major international powers.
4
Sectarian divides are another key obstacle to the cohesion of the Mujahideen leadership. During the Cold War, when the Mujahideen were directly supported by the West and Pakistan, they split into seven Sunni and eight Shia factions due to religious disagreements. Sunni Mujahideen leaders have often harbored a sense of superiority toward the Shia, and what they now share with the Taliban are a mutual disposition toward ethnic and sectarian supremacy.
5
Pakistan has been the common birthplace of both the Mujahideen and the Taliban leadership. In pursuit of its strategic goals in Afghanistan, Pakistan has created and utilized various groups at specific junctures. The Mujahideen came to power for one purpose, and now the Taliban for another. The Taliban’s rejection of power-sharing with the Mujahideen leaders is, in reality, the voice of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) being echoed through the Taliban. Furthermore, in 2017, the Mujahideen leaders, under Pakistan’s orders, met with the Taliban in Russia to exert pressure on the former Afghan government. On the day the Republic collapsed, many of these Mujahideen leaders lined up to meet Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. The statements of these leaders, which they present as opposition to the Taliban, are nothing but a façade and a lie. All these groups are mere proxies of Pakistan. Most recently, some Mujahideen leaders condemned India’s airstrikes on Pakistan, further demonstrating their dependency on Islamabad.
Given the points mentioned, the Mujahideen cannot serve as an alternative to the Taliban. However, this does not mean that there is no viable alternative to the Taliban. Currently, women in Afghanistan, through the formation of protest movements, have successfully challenged the Taliban’s rule within the country. Since the Taliban’s return to power, these women’s movements have openly begun protesting. The Taliban have detained and tortured members of these movements in an attempt to suppress their protests, but not only has the voice of women not been silenced, it has grown louder. Women are now shining at international forums, advocating for their rights. If they can form a coherent and unified agenda, and if the international community recognizes the importance of their cause, women will undoubtedly play a key role in overthrowing the Taliban regime. Alongside them, civil society groups, the diaspora, and educated young forces can serve as strong alternatives to the Taliban. All civil and political groups need to intensify their efforts to challenge the Taliban. Focusing on ethnic, sectarian, and historical differences will undoubtedly be detrimental to opposition groups. The Taliban are trying to exploit ethnic and linguistic issues to deepen divisions among their opponents and recruit from their ranks.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
