Throughout the history of Afghanistan, not all forms of power entered the field through the sword, the rifle, and the army. Some forms of power were built through the khanqah, the mosque, the madrasa, discipleship, religious vows, endowments, connections to the royal court, and the exploitation of popular beliefs. The Mujaddadi family, known as the Hazrat-e Shor Bazar, is one of the prominent examples of this type of power; a family whose intellectual and spiritual roots trace back to the Indian Subcontinent, which established its center in Kabul, then spread through religious, familial, and social branches across various parts of Afghanistan, and played an influential role in many of the country’s political decisions.
The Mujaddadis trace themselves to the Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi order and to Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, known as Mujaddid Alf-e Thani, a figure whose religious and spiritual center was located in the Indian Subcontinent, in present-day Punjab. Branches of this family later came to Afghanistan and built khanqahs and madrasas in Kabul, particularly in Shor Bazar. For them, Shor Bazar was not merely a place of residence but also a center for generating influence, connections, disciples, legitimacy, and social power. Sibghatullah Mujaddadi is also identified in contemporary sources as a member of this same well-known Naqshbandi Sufi family, a family known in Afghanistan by the title “Hazrat Sahib.”
The Mujaddadis did not enter Afghanistan as a large ethnic group; they arrived as a religious-spiritual family and later spread through the society using calculated methods. Their main center was in Shor Bazar in Kabul, but their influence did not remain confined there. In Herat, they were known as the Hazrat-e Gazargah, in Jalalabad as the Hazrat-e Charbagh, in Parwan as the Hazrat-e Laghmaniyan, and in Kapisa, Ghazni, and other regions, they established a presence through khanqahs, madrasas, land, disciples, and connections with tribes. Noor-ul-Madares Andar in Ghazni is also considered one of the important centers affiliated with this network.
This spread was not accidental; rather, the Mujaddadi structure operated based on a hereditary and religious network: at the center stood the family and the khanqah, and around it were khalifas, mullahs, disciples, landowners, local elders, and connections to the royal court. Each branch took on a local name in its respective region, but spiritually and politically remained connected to the same familial center. For this reason, despite not being a large group in terms of population, the Mujaddadis gained national influence that exceeded their demographic weight.
Their source of income and power was not religion alone; land, endowments, religious vows, contributions from disciples, madrasas, khanqahs, government privileges, official positions, connections to the royal court, and ties with tribes all played a role in building this family’s power. Ordinary people generated social and economic capital through religious respect, vows, allegiance, and obedience, but the main benefit of this capital largely remained in the hands of the same family network. Here, religion moved beyond individual faith and became a tool of social and political influence.
Politically, the Mujaddadis cannot be simply described as “anti-colonial” or “nationalist.” Their position toward power was more situational and interest-driven. Wherever opposition to foreign power or a dependent government could strengthen the position of clerics and traditional networks, the language of jihad and resistance was employed; but when Amanullah Khan’s national government pursued social reforms, modern education, restrictions on clerical influence, and modern legislation, these same networks stood against him. In an environment where foreign powers, governments, tribes, warlords, and clerics all engaged in bargaining, concessions, and competition with one another, no influential religious network can be considered outside the political arena. The Mujaddadis also grew within such an environment, one in which religion, politics, money, influence, and legitimacy were all intertwined.
This pattern continued later during the jihad era as well. Relying on his religious name and the status of “Hazrat,” Sibghatullah Mujaddadi established the National Liberation Front, and despite being militarily weaker than many other factions, he used his religious capital to secure a share of political power. Following the fall of Najibullah’s government in 1992, he briefly headed the Islamic State and later also played an important role in post-Taliban structures, including the Constitutional Loya Jirga.
This same role continued after the Bonn Conference. Karzai relied on the Mujaddadi family’s religious and jihadist standing to create balance among Western-oriented figures, jihadist factions, and religious conservatives, and Mujaddadi, in turn, used this closeness to preserve his own role within the power structure. His chairmanship of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, his stance toward critics, and later his role in the debate over Afghanistan’s security agreement with the United States all showed that this network operated more according to the logic of preserving influence than any fixed national principle. The Consultative Loya Jirga in 2013, chaired by Mujaddadi, approved the security agreement with the United States, while Karzai hesitated over signing it promptly.
The recent return of Ismatullah Mujaddadi, son of Sibghatullah Mujaddadi and a former advisor to the National Security Council, to Afghanistan under Taliban rule can also be understood within this same framework. Reports indicate that after several years of residence in Turkey, he returned to Kabul through the Taliban’s commission for contact with Afghan figures and expressed satisfaction with the welcome he received. This return is not merely an individual act; it carries symbolic value for the Taliban, since the Mujaddadi name can be used in their political propaganda as a sign of “the return of prominent figures” and a form of social endorsement.
From a social and psychological perspective, the Mujaddadis’ influence rested on several foundations: people’s fear of opposing the “Hazrat,” hope for the blessing of the spiritual guide, the dependency of the “disciple” on the “mentor,” traditional respect for religious families, and general public unawareness of the relationship between religion and power. In such an environment, people drew close to this network not only out of belief but also under social pressure. Anyone who opposed the spiritual guide or the Hazrat was not seen merely as opposing an individual; in the eyes of society, they might also be portrayed as opposing religion, tradition, blessing, and social order.
Here one can speak of a closed religious-political power network, a network that operated by relying on religious standing, family relationships, influence at the royal court, religious beliefs, the dependency of disciples, and economic interests. This network presented itself as a servant of religion, but in practice, it used religious capital to preserve political influence, family standing, and engagement with successive governments. The power of this closed, complex network rested on three elements: first, a monopoly on religious legitimacy, meaning the ability to label one policy as “Islamic” and another as “anti-Islamic.” Second, the network of disciples, meaning the ability to mobilize people, tribes, and various regions in times of crisis. Third, bargaining with power, meaning aligning with governments as long as privileges and influence were preserved, and opposing those same governments when family interests were threatened.
Therefore, the Mujaddadis should not be viewed simply as a religious family; they were a hereditary religious-political network that came to Afghanistan from India, established its center in Shor Bazar in Kabul, then spread under various names and bases across the country, and used religion, traditions, discipleship, land, endowments, and power connections to preserve family influence. Their role in Afghanistan’s history shows that, at many points, religion was employed not as a moral truth but as a tool of power, wealth, and social control.
Criticism of this structure is not criticism of religion; it is criticism of the abuse of religion. Throughout their history, the people of Afghanistan repeatedly entrusted their faith, respect, and trust to religious families, but some of these families converted that same trust into political and economic capital. The Mujaddadis are an important example of this phenomenon: a family that built power from people’s beliefs, drew influence from society’s traditions, and whenever its interests were threatened, set politics in motion using the language of religion.
Sources
[1] Thomas Ruttig, “From Sufi Sheikh to President: Historic Mujahedin Leader Mujaddedi Passes Away,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2019.
This source was used to introduce Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, the family’s Sufi-Naqshbandi roots, his role in the jihad, the interim government of 1992, his relationship with Karzai, and his role in the Constitutional Loya Jirga.
[2] Ahmad Wali Alemi, “The Role of Shur Bazar Mujaddids in the History of Afghanistan Between the Years 1919 AD to 1929,” International Journal of Social Science Research and Review, 2024.
This source was used for the role of the Shor Bazar Mujaddadis, their spread into Herat, Jalalabad, Parwan, Kapisa, and Ghazni, and the discussion of land, disciples, and religious influence.
[3] Senzil Nawid, “The State, the Clergy and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan During the 19th and Early 20th Centuries,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
This source was used for the framework of the relationship between the state, the clergy, British imperial policy, and the role of the ulama in Afghan politics.
[4] Martine van Bijlert, “A Yes, a Maybe and a Threat of Migration: The BSA Loya Jirga’s Last Day,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2013.
This source was used for Sibghatullah Mujaddadi’s role in the Consultative Loya Jirga on the Afghanistan-United States security agreement.
[5] Ehtebar, “Former National Security Council Advisor Ismatullah Mujaddedi Returns to Afghanistan from Turkey,” 2026.
A report by the Deed news agency on the announcement by the Taliban’s contact commission. This source was used for Ismatullah Mujaddadi’s return from Turkey to Afghanistan and the role of the Taliban’s commission for contact with Afghan figures.
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مجددیها؛ از «سرِ هند» تا شبکه قدرت مذهبی ـ سیاسی در افغانستان
