Following the shift in Afghanistan’s political landscape, Pakistan, acting in alignment with extra-regional directives, is seeking to reshape the situation in ways that not only correspond to its domestic needs but also enhance its capacity to counter emerging national-security threats. Islamabad’s convergence with extra-regional powers has yielded economic, security, and political dividends, and amid today’s climate of volatility, this alignment has acquired added significance as a platform for influence and leverage. Pakistan’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, the United States, and the United Kingdom has produced a new, carefully calibrated bloc in relation to Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, India is attempting, within its available means, to take advantage of the new environment. New Delhi seeks to exploit the current opening and, through maximum pressure, reclaim its lost strategic position in Afghanistan. But India faces two major rivals: Pakistan and China, both of which can impose significant friction on India’s ambitions. Although India’s approach is broadly aligned with Washington’s policy, it remains partially acceptable to Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing as well, since in the short term it restrains the unilateral dominance of the opposing bloc and remains digestible within the logic of regional power competition.
This configuration activates a new puzzle of complex and dangerous proxy rivalries, competitions in which support for terrorism, the engineering of armed groups, and the instrumental use of power vacuums have become operational tools for the actors involved. Today, the entire region and the extra-regional powers are seated at the same table, each seeking to extract maximum advantage from Afghanistan’s situation within a dominance-driven framework.
The United States is now entering the second phase of its strategic game by altering the operational environment, and Pakistan’s role in this phase becomes particularly prominent. It is a country that has repeatedly demonstrated its destructive capacity and its formidable networked influence, securing for itself a pivotal position in the Taliban project and the shaping of the new order. At this juncture, Pakistan is deploying the full spectrum of its military, intelligence, security, and diplomatic instruments to keep the management of the Afghan situation firmly under its control. From the bombing of Kabul and other regions of Afghanistan, to attempts at establishing contact with anti-Taliban opposition and resistance fronts; from a string of security and diplomatic visits to neighboring states, including Tajikistan, to a multi-stop European tour by the foreign minister and meetings with NATO officials, all reflect the sophistication of Pakistan’s statecraft and its multilayered capabilities in coordination with the ISI.
Pakistan’s foreign minister, during his European tour, has succeeded in shifting European officials’ positions on the Taliban, convincing them that the group does not hold the moral high ground against Pakistan and must ultimately comply with Islamabad’s demands. This diplomatic capability and persuasive power demonstrate Pakistan’s growing bargaining capacity and influence in the international diplomatic arena.
At the military and security level, Pakistan’s coordinated efforts to form a front capable of exerting heavy pressure on the Taliban continue. All anti-Taliban forces in exile, as well as active military fronts, have been invited by Pakistan to rely on Islamabad’s support in their struggle against the group. This security and intelligence-oriented approach indicates that the United States and extra-regional powers are providing serious backing to this dangerous strategic game. Now that the Taliban have distanced themselves from Pakistan and expressed interest in a regional alignment with Russia, China, and Iran, they have lost their appeal to Washington. The Taliban were once useful to the West insofar as they could generate calibrated instability to create leverage and bargaining space. But today, the group has fragmented into multiple factions with diverging agendas, expanding opportunities for the West’s rivals to increase their influence. For Washington and Islamabad, it is unacceptable to lose exclusive control over this project; thus, reshaping obstructive elements within the Taliban has become part of the new agenda.
At the regional and international levels, Pakistan’s efforts remain extensive and highly consequential. Islamabad’s diplomacy, armed with fluency in English and bolstered by long-standing intelligence and military experience, has equipped Pakistan with the ability to enter into wide-ranging political and security deals in pursuit of its strategic interests. At the same time, the dual pressure generated by threats emanating from both the Taliban and India, coupled with stalled Chinese projects in Afghanistan, has pushed Pakistan toward accepting another major bargain with the West.
Alongside these efforts, Pakistan continues to maintain significant security and intelligence assets across the region. From tactical coordination with Tehran during the twelve-day conflict, to the creation of communication channels with Türkiye, to outreach in Central Asia and diplomatic missions across Europe and the United States, all are noteworthy. Pakistan has also retained hard-power options, including the potential deployment of reserve security forces in the form of terrorist organizations such as ISIS, as tools of pressure against the Taliban.
Today, even extra-regional powers appear convinced by Pakistan’s rationale for altering Afghanistan’s trajectory, and international media have also highlighted this dynamic. Islamabad’s push to maintain the current situation ensures that the Eastern bloc and India remain sidelined from directing Taliban affairs. There are even reports that Pakistan is seeking to establish potential proxy groups to exert maximum pressure on the Taliban.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
