Abstract
The Qosh Tepa Canal, as one of the largest irrigation projects in the history of Afghanistan, has the capacity to convert more than 550,000 hectares of rain-fed and uncultivable land into irrigated land and to create hundreds of thousands of jobs. Taking an agricultural economics approach, this article shows that the successful implementation of the project can secure the country’s food security, increase agricultural exports, and turn northern Afghanistan into the region’s food basket. However, if the project is reduced to a policy of ethnic resettlement and the division of land into small subsistence plots, not only will the country be deprived of economies of scale and commercial agriculture, but the project will also become a source of ethnic division, a waste of vast resources, and an intensifier of regional social tensions. Drawing on the principles of economies of scale, the Lewis model, and international experience, the article offers concrete policy recommendations for transparent national management based on large commercial farms. The success or failure of the Qosh Tepa Canal is a historic test of the ruling authority’s choice between national self-sufficiency and ethnic division.
Introduction
Before turning to the political dimensions and the policy considerations surrounding this major national project, it is essential to shed light on its importance to the country’s economy. The Qosh Tepa irrigation canal is one of the largest infrastructure undertakings in Afghanistan’s modern history. By connecting to the Amu Darya, it can secure a fairer share of this vast river for the people of Afghanistan, a river that in recent years has brought more damage than benefit.
The Amu Darya, which originates in the Pamir Mountains, forms roughly 1,126 kilometers of Afghanistan’s northern border. Its basin produces approximately 70 to 79 billion cubic meters of water annually. Afghanistan has the capacity to use 20 to 25 percent of the basin’s surface water, but its historical share has been very limited and has been confined mainly to flood damage in provinces such as Balkh (Kaldar and Shortepa Districts) and Kunduz (Imam Sahib District). The Soviet-era Protocol 566 set Afghanistan’s withdrawal at only 2.1 billion cubic meters per year, while downstream countries have used billions of cubic meters.
Technical Specifications and the Project’s Economic and Agricultural Capacity
The Qosh Tepa Canal, 285 to 287 kilometers long, with an average width of 100 meters (up to 152 meters) and a depth of about 8.5 meters, begins in the Kaldar district of Balkh province and, after passing through Balkh, Jawzjan, and Faryab, reaches Andkhoy district. With a design capacity of about 650 to 668 cubic meters per second, the canal can convey and store 6.37 to 13.02 billion cubic meters of water per year, and, in some estimates, up to 20.5 billion cubic meters. It can convert more than 550,000 hectares of land, equivalent to about 1.2 million jeribs or a 30 percent increase in the country’s cultivable area, into irrigated land. Its initial cost has been estimated at 684 million to 1.5 billion dollars, and the project’s design also includes modern irrigation systems and small dams for electricity generation.
Imagine hundreds of thousands of hectares of dry, rain-fed, and uncultivable land in northern Afghanistan transformed into areas under irrigated cultivation of wheat, rice, fodder, modern orchards, and high-value export crops. This is not a dream but a real capacity grounded in the principles of agricultural economics. In the 1970s, Afghanistan had about 3.5 million hectares of irrigated land under cultivation, but wars and instability led to the abandonment of more than 1.5 million hectares. Reviving these lands, together with adding hundreds of thousands of new hectares through Qosh Tepa, could bring about a profound transformation.
When this project is viewed through the lens of agricultural economics, its benefits are multilayered and striking, because vast and contiguous land makes the establishment of large commercial farms possible.
Commercial agriculture, unlike traditional and subsistence farming, is based on large, mechanized farms, improved seeds, modern irrigation, and access to national and international markets. In developing countries, commercial agriculture is the main engine of economic growth because it generates capital accumulation, transfers surplus labor to the industrial sector, earns foreign currency through exports, supplies the raw materials needed by processing industries, and creates a strong domestic market for industrial goods.
But in subsistence farming, where land plots are small, a farmer’s annual income is typically very low and often barely sufficient for the family’s survival. By contrast, on large commercial farms that benefit from economies of scale, income per hectare can be three to eight times higher. For example, wheat production in the traditional system is about two to three tons per hectare, while on modern commercial farms with precision irrigation and high-quality inputs, this figure reaches six to eight tons per hectare. This difference raises gross income from subsistence level to high profitability and makes reinvestment, job creation, and economic growth possible.
By creating vast and contiguous land, the Qosh Tepa Canal project provides a unique opportunity to establish commercial farms. Based on the principle of Economies of Scale, fixed costs such as advanced machinery, new irrigation systems, and improved seeds drop sharply per unit of area, and as a result, income and market competitiveness rise.
Studies show that large irrigation projects can double or triple land productivity and significantly increase labor productivity. This accelerates the transition from traditional and subsistence agriculture, which has spread through inheritance-based land divisions, to commercial agriculture, and, in line with the Lewis Dual Sector Model, channels surplus labor into the industrial sector and enables capital accumulation.
Therefore, without the creation of large farms, this project will reproduce the existing pattern of small, scattered plots, a pattern that has made the mechanization of agriculture impossible and would waste a large share of the project’s economic potential.
In addition, the project creates thousands of direct jobs during construction, and if fully operational, it will bring about 200,000 to 250,000 direct jobs and hundreds of thousands of indirect employment opportunities in processing industries, transportation, services, and marketing.
In development economics, every dollar invested in irrigated agriculture can generate two to three dollars in Multiplier Effects through higher incomes for farmers, increased demand for inputs, and the expansion of food industries. Given that severe food insecurity affects about 25 percent of the country’s population, this project can secure food for millions of people, reduce dependence on imports of wheat, rice, and oil, and turn Afghanistan into a major exporter of agricultural products in the region.
The capacity to generate hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue exists, including through the export of wheat, rice, and horticultural products. If implemented to standard, Afghanistan’s agriculture sector can play a more pivotal role in the national economy, and northern Afghanistan can become the food basket of both the country and the region.
The importance of this project can be compared with the achievements of the Green Revolution in India and China’s successful experiences with large irrigation projects. But the major challenge facing this national project is how it will be managed and kept free of political distortion, a challenge that may determine the project’s success or failure.
How a misguided policy can turn this national project into an ethnic crisis and a waste of resources is what I address next.
The Taliban intends to transfer management of this major national project from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Administrative Office, and based on available evidence, a large portion of the land around the Qosh Tepa Canal is to be distributed among returning migrants from neighboring countries under the heading of resettlement. With land divided into small plots, this national project will completely lose its economic character. As noted earlier, despite the project’s brilliant potential, the main risk lies in its management approach. If the project, under the Taliban’s Administrative Office, becomes a tool for ethnic resettlement and the division of land into small household and subsistence plots, not only will the opportunity for self-sufficiency be lost, but the country’s vast resources will also be wasted, and the project will turn into a major ethnic and social challenge.
In agricultural economics, small landholdings are a fundamental obstacle to mechanization, private sector investment, and productivity gains. Instead of developing and increasing production, farmers remain trapped in a cycle of subsistence poverty, expending their energy on survival and on sustaining ethnic enmities. Historical examples in Africa, such as land reforms in Zimbabwe or forced relocations in Ethiopia, show that such policies have reduced agricultural productivity, intensified ethnic tensions, and in some cases led to armed conflict. In Afghanistan as well, the large-scale relocation of ethnic groups without national consensus and scientific planning deepens feelings of marginalization in local northern communities, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Turkmens, and creates the conditions for resistance, reverse migration, ethnic disputes, and conflict over land ownership.
From a social standpoint, this approach undermines national cohesion and erodes public trust. The Afghanistan of today is not the Afghanistan of a hundred years ago. The experience of ethnic conflict over the past four decades has shown that such policies shatter the dream of a unified Afghanistan and will harm all communities, especially the noble Pashtun people. Given that Pashtuns make up more than 90 percent of the Taliban government’s structure, many non-Pashtun communities interpret any ethnically driven government policy as a sign that the Pashtun majority supports the implementation of such projects.
Moreover, hurried construction, the absence of proper liners, weak technical management, and disregard for environmental considerations have driven up water losses and intensified regional tensions with neighbors. A 15 to 30 percent reduction in water flow to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could affect Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the employment of hundreds of thousands of people in those countries. As a result, a project that could have been a symbol of national unity and prosperity will, in practice, become a source of division, the waste of billions of cubic meters of water, and the squandering of financial resources.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The Qosh Tepa Canal is a historic test for the Taliban administration. If the group can complete the project with professional management and in line with national interests, it will demonstrate its ability to secure the country’s economic independence and self-sufficiency under critical conditions. But the record of the past more than four years shows that group and ethnic interests have often been prioritized over national interests. The success of this project can move Afghanistan toward self-sufficiency and national cohesion, but its failure will turn it into a source of division and a waste of resources.
The success of this project requires a scientific, inclusive, and national approach. To make the most of this national project, the current administration must consider the following:
- Establish an independent project management board with the participation of domestic specialists, international experts, and representatives of all local communities.
- Prioritize modern economic models, including large farms, cooperative farms, and complete value chains, and prevent the small-scale and ethnically based division of land.
- Develop a comprehensive agricultural policy based on market needs, focusing on strategic crops such as wheat, oilseeds, rice, and fodder, as well as high-value export crops.
- Invest in the full value chain, including production, processing, packaging, and marketing.
- Pursue widespread mechanization and introduce new irrigation technologies, along with training for farmers.
- Conduct active water diplomacy with Central Asian countries for joint management of the Amu Darya basin.
- Ensure full transparency in land distribution based on technical merit and investment capacity, not ethnic considerations, with an emphasis on national convergence.
- Establish a Qosh Tepa Agricultural Development Fund to support domestic and foreign private investment.
If this project is managed according to the principles of agricultural economics and sustainable development, it will lead Afghanistan toward food self-sufficiency, inclusive economic growth, and social cohesion. Otherwise, this historic opportunity will be lost, and the project will become a new source of ethnic, economic, and regional crises. The future of northern Afghanistan, and ultimately of the entire country, depends on the wise and nationally minded decisions made today.
References
- Ahamad, M., & Wasiq, M. (2003). Water Resource Development in Northern Afghanistan and Its Implications for the Amu Darya Basin. World Bank Working Paper.
- AACS Consulting & BETS Consulting Services. (2019). Kush Tepa Irrigation Scheme and Power Generation (KTISPG) Feasibility and Economic and Financial Analysis Report. Commissioned by USAID under the Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management (SWIM) Program.
- Dillon, A. (2010). Do Differences in the Scale of Irrigation Projects Generate Different Impacts?
- Faqiryar, J. N. (2024). Food-Climate Nexus in the North: A Case Study of the Qush Tepa National Irrigation Canal. SSOAR.
- Klemn, W., & Shobiar, S. S. (2010). The Afghan Part of the Amu Darya Basin: Impact of Irrigation in Northern Afghanistan on Water Use in the Amu Darya Basin. FAO Report.
- Kuchines, A. C. (2024). Afghanistan’s Qoshtepa Canal and Water Security in Central Asia. CFTNI.
- Overland, I., et al. (2024). Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Irrigation Project: Implications for Central Asia. IOP Science.
- World Bank. (2018). Unlocking the Potential of Agriculture for Afghanistan’s Growth.
- (2020–2025). Various reports on Afghanistan’s agriculture, food security, and water resources.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
کانال قوشتپه؛ فرصتی برای خودکفایی ملی یا بستری برای نفاق قومی و ضیاع منابع؟
