In the past month, Kabul has become a destination for senior security officials from three countries involved in Afghanistan’s affairs. First, Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), and Hamad bin Khamis al-Kubaisi, a senior official of Qatar’s National Security Council, traveled to Kabul and Kandahar and met with the highest-ranking Taliban officials. After his trip to Afghanistan, Kalin went to Pakistan and held talks with senior officials there as well. Now Sergey Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), has met and held talks in Kabul with Abdul Haq Wasiq, head of the Taliban’s intelligence. At the same time, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Russia’s Interior Minister, held meetings with senior security officials in Pakistan during a several-day visit to Islamabad.
Taken together, these visits by foreign officials paint a picture of increased diplomatic activity with a security character concerning Pakistan and Afghanistan. Of course, the simultaneity of the trips alone does not support the conclusion that all three countries had the same mission. However, at a time when tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan are at their peak, the comings and goings to Kabul and Islamabad cannot be considered separate from this crisis.
The trip by senior Turkish and Qatari officials to Kabul and Kandahar was apparently aimed at mediating between the Taliban and Pakistan. Not only did it fail to produce a result, but afterward Pakistan resumed and even intensified its attacks on Afghanistan. The reason is clear: the Taliban in Afghanistan refused to rein in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Taliban may not have given weight to the Turkish official’s message because Ankara is a member of the “Mecca Pact,” an agreement in which Pakistan is also a key member. The Taliban’s understanding is that Turkey can no longer mediate independently of Islamabad’s considerations and interests. In such circumstances, it is natural for the Taliban to view Turkey’s mediating role with caution, and perhaps with pessimism, and to find it difficult to place full trust in it.
This point gains importance in comparison with Russia. Moscow is neither a member of the Mecca Pact nor bound by a similar defense commitment toward Pakistan. As a result, it has more room for independent and impartial mediation. Naryshkin’s trip to Kabul, alongside Kolokoltsev’s presence in Pakistan, is the most significant part of the recent developments. The importance of these two trips lies in the fact that two key Russian security channels have been in contact with both sides of the conflict at almost the same time.
More importantly, Russia has recognized the Taliban regime. Rightly or wrongly, this decision by Moscow sets its standing with the Taliban apart from that of most countries, if not all of them, because for the Taliban the issue of recognition is like the water of life. At the same time, the ties between Pakistan and Russia are also strong, and the two sides respect each other’s commitments. Therefore, if Moscow enters the arena, it will most likely reduce the intensity of the tension at some point, though it will not necessarily be able to resolve the root of the hostility.
The failure of the recent “Moscow Format” meeting to reach a final “joint statement” may be one of the important reasons for Russia’s new activity regarding the tension between the Taliban and Pakistan. Instead of producing a shared position among the participants, the meeting exposed the deep disagreement between Kabul and Islamabad. The Taliban delegation’s opposition to the proposed text, particularly the way the issue of terrorism was framed and linked to Afghanistan, prevented the publication of a final statement.
For Moscow, this failure is not merely the unsuccessful end of a diplomatic meeting; it also reflects the limits of its ability to create understanding among regional actors. When a meeting held on Russia’s initiative and within the framework of its “regional diplomacy” fails even to produce a joint statement, the credibility and effectiveness of that initiative are inevitably called into question. From this perspective, the dispute between the Taliban and Pakistan is no longer just a conflict between two parties for Moscow; it has also become a test of Russia’s own regional standing and influence.
It appears that, in its effort to contain the tension between the Taliban and Pakistan, Moscow is pursuing three interconnected goals. First, strengthening its regional credibility and standing by helping end a crisis that the recent Moscow Format meeting also failed to manage. Second, preventing the spread of insecurity beyond Afghanistan’s borders, because the country becoming a center of instability and extremist group activity could endanger the security of the Central Asian republics and, as a result, Russia’s interests. And third, getting ahead in regional diplomacy so that Western-aligned countries or Western powers do not take the initiative in mediation and thereby expand their influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
From these three perspectives, Moscow’s effort is not merely a reaction to the escalation of tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban; it may also be part of a broader competition for regional influence and a role in determining Afghanistan’s security future.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
