Abstract
This article examines the reasons behind the Taliban’s non-compliance with the positions of human rights organizations following the group’s return to power (2021). The central research question is why, despite international pressure, United Nations reports, and repeated condemnations by human rights institutions, the Taliban’s policies in the field of human rights, particularly regarding women’s rights and civil liberties, have remained unchanged. Using the theoretical framework of realism in international relations and focusing on the logic of power and survival, this article demonstrates that the Taliban’s primary priority is preserving political sovereignty. In addition, the research findings show that the ideological conflict between the Taliban’s conception of social order and international human rights norms is another important factor in the continuation of this situation. Furthermore, an examination of the limitations of the international system shows that tools of external pressure, including sanctions, human rights reports, and diplomatic isolation, have had limited effect due to the absence of global consensus and the scattered engagements of certain countries with the Taliban. This article concludes that the Taliban’s behavior toward human rights is the product of the interaction of three main factors: the logic of power and survival, ideological conflict, and the structural limitations of the international system in exerting effective pressure.
Keywords
Taliban, human rights, realism, international politics.
Introduction
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan (2021) has once again made the role of human rights in international politics, and the extent to which human rights institutions can influence societies, one of the central issues in international relations. Despite growing political pressure, United Nations reports, and widespread reactions from human rights institutions, the Taliban’s domestic policies on women’s rights, civil liberties, and political space have not undergone any fundamental change. This situation raises a fundamental question: why does the Taliban not comply with the positions and demands of human rights organizations? Answering this question is not possible through a superficial or purely moral analysis alone; rather, it requires a deep examination of the structure of power, ideology, and the limitations of the international system.
This article attempts to analyze Taliban behavior within the framework of the logic of power and survival. Alongside this, by examining documented evidence from United Nations reports, human rights institutions, and academic research, it shows how the interaction between the Taliban’s priorities and the weakness of international pressure tools has led to the continuation of this situation.
This article aims to provide a multilayered analysis of Taliban behavior that takes into account the dimension of political power, the ideological dimension, and the structural limitations of the international system.
Literature Review
Research related to the Taliban and the group’s behavior within the international system has been examined by several prominent scholars. Barnett R. Rubin[1] is a leading researcher in the field of Afghanistan studies who, in his work, emphasizes the role of domestic political structures and their interaction with the international system. He argues that the behavior of the Taliban and other Afghan actors is shaped primarily by the logic of power and survival rather than by acceptance of international norms. Antonio Giustozzi[2], in his research, describes the Taliban as complex political-military actors whose system has a multilayered structure and which typically displays tactical behavior in the face of external pressure, while at the strategic level its main goal remains the preservation of power and political control. Thomas Ruttig[3] of the Afghanistan Analysts Network[4] likewise analyzes the Taliban as an ideological-political movement that derives its legitimacy more from internal structures and a particular interpretation of sharia than from the international system.
Despite this body of research, an important gap remains in the existing literature. Most studies have focused either on the Taliban’s internal structure, on security and military dimensions, or solely on ideological analysis of the group. As a result, these analyses have often remained one-dimensional.
This article attempts to fill this gap, as it simultaneously combines three levels of analysis: Hans Morgenthau’s classical realist theory, the Taliban’s practical behavior in relation to human rights, and the structural limitations of the international system in exerting effective pressure. The innovation of this research lies in analyzing Taliban behavior not merely as a domestic phenomenon, but as the result of the interaction between the logic of power in international politics and the constraining structure of human rights pressure.
Theoretical Framework
In this article, the theoretical framework of Hans Morgenthau’s classical realism forms the basis of the discussion. Morgenthau is one of the most prominent theorists of international relations, arguing that international politics is shaped not by moral principles or global norms, but by power and interests. From Morgenthau’s perspective, the international system is inherently anarchic, and within such a structure, states and other political actors primarily seek survival, security, and the consolidation of power. Within this framework, moral principles such as human rights hold a secondary place and are accepted only when they do not conflict with the political and security interests of the actors involved. Otherwise, these principles can be disregarded or interpreted selectively. According to this view, human rights norms within the international system are not absolutely binding; rather, their degree of influence depends on how closely they align with the strategic interests of political actors. Whenever these norms are perceived as a threat to sovereignty, regime stability, or political authority, realist logic predicts that resistance to them will increase.
Taliban behavior can be analyzed within this same logic. As actors who hold de facto governing authority, the Taliban prioritize consolidating domestic power, maintaining political control, and building ideological cohesion. Pressure from human rights organizations is assessed not as binding global obligations, but as external factors that may conflict with the group’s power structure and political objectives. Therefore, within Morgenthau’s theoretical framework, the Taliban’s non-compliance with the positions of human rights organizations is a predictable outcome of the logic of international politics, in which power takes precedence over morality and political decisions are shaped by interests and survival.
Analysis and Discussion
1. Preserving Power and Political Survival: The Taliban’s Priority
From the perspective of Hans Morgenthau’s classical realism, the most important principles in politics are “power” and “survival.” Within this framework, political actors seek above all to preserve sovereignty and consolidate their own authority, and moral and human rights norms are accepted only when they do not conflict with this goal (Morgenthau, 1948). Taliban behavior since its return to power (2021) can be analyzed within this same framework. A Human Rights Watch report[5] (2025) shows that in 2024 the Taliban imposed extensive restrictions on women and girls, media freedom, and civil activities, and that Afghanistan remains the only country in the world where women and girls are barred from secondary and university education and face severe restrictions on work, movement, and freedom of expression. Likewise, a report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)[6] (quarterly reports, 2024 to 2025) has documented numerous cases of arbitrary detention, punishment, restrictions on fundamental freedoms, and intensifying pressure on civil society. These reports emphasize that, despite repeated demands from the international community, there has been no change in Taliban policies, and restrictions against women and civic space continue. In the same vein, a report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett (2025), emphasizes that an “institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, and the erasure of women from public life” has taken shape in Afghanistan, and that this situation continues structurally.
This evidence shows that Taliban policies are not merely a reactive response, but part of a persistent pattern aimed at preserving the domestic power structure. From the perspective of Morgenthau’s realism, such behavior is predictable, since when a political actor perceives that accepting external pressure could threaten its authority or survival, its primary priority will be to preserve power, even if doing so leads to increased international pressure or political isolation. As a result, the Taliban’s non-compliance with the positions of human rights organizations can, first and foremost, be attributed to the group’s prioritization of preserving power and survival.
2. Ideological Conflict Between the Taliban and International Human Rights Norms
One of the important factors in Taliban behavior is the conflict between the group’s ideological framework and international human rights norms. While the human rights system is built on concepts such as gender equality, individual freedom, and social participation, the Taliban defines and restricts these concepts within its own particular interpretation of Islamic sharia. This difference in underlying values has created a deep divide between the expectations of the international community and the group’s domestic policies. According to a Human Rights Watch report (2025), the policies applied by the Taliban in the areas of education, employment, and women’s freedom of movement reflect a systematic pattern of restriction that conflicts with international human rights standards. The report emphasizes that these restrictions are part of an ideological structure that has broadly removed women from public life (Human Rights Watch, 2025). Similarly, a UNAMA report (2024 to 2025) shows that many of the Taliban’s policies in the field of civil and political rights, including restrictions on media, gatherings, and social participation, have been implemented continuously and conflict with accepted international standards.
These reports emphasize that the gap between international human rights obligations and the Taliban’s internal interpretation of social order is one of the main obstacles to improving the human rights situation in Afghanistan.
Alongside this, the report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan likewise states that a structured system of restrictions against women and girls has been established in Afghanistan, rooted in a governing ideological outlook, and that this cannot simply be reduced to security conditions (2025). From a theoretical analytical perspective, this situation shows that the disagreement between the Taliban and human rights institutions is not merely the result of political disagreement, but is rooted in two different value systems: one based on the universality of human rights, and the other based on a particular ideological interpretation of social and religious order. This normative conflict means that, even in the face of widespread international pressure, the possibility of rapid convergence between the two sides remains limited. As a result, it can be said that, alongside the logic of power, the ideological factor also plays an important role in explaining the Taliban’s non-acceptance of the positions of human rights organizations.
3. Limitations of International Pressure on Changing Taliban Behavior
One of the important factors explaining the continuation of Taliban policies despite widespread international pressure is the practical limitations of pressure tools within the international system. Contemporary theories of international relations, particularly the work of institutionalists and analysts of global politics, emphasize that human rights and political pressure are effective only when accompanied by strong economic, diplomatic, and security leverage. Otherwise, their influence on the behavior of states or non-state actors remains limited. According to World Bank reports (2024), the Afghan economy has, since the developments of 2021, faced a sharp decline in domestic revenue, the freezing of foreign assets, and a reduction in international aid. Despite this widespread economic pressure, the Taliban has managed to maintain a minimal degree of administrative stability through a limited domestic economy, humanitarian assistance, and informal networks. This situation shows that economic pressure alone has been unable to produce any fundamental change in domestic policy behavior.
Likewise, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)[7] warns in its reports on Afghanistan (2024) that, although the humanitarian crisis and the widespread dependence of the population on international aid have created significant pressure, this pressure has affected civil society and ordinary people far more than it has affected the Taliban’s decision-making structure. This point shows that humanitarian aid, contrary to expectations, does not necessarily lead to a change in political behavior at the level of governance.
On the other hand, in its analysis of international relations and sanctions, Freedom House[8] (2025) emphasizes that the Taliban’s political isolation at the international level is not complete, and that some countries continue to maintain practical or informal engagement with the group. This situation has meant that international diplomatic pressure has not been unified, thereby reducing its overall effectiveness.
In addition, reports by the International Crisis Group[9] (2024) show that geopolitical rivalries in the region, particularly among regional and global powers, have prevented the formation of a unified approach toward the Taliban. Some countries emphasize gradual engagement, while others emphasize complete isolation. This divide in international policy has created greater room for maneuver for the Taliban. Taken together, this evidence shows that the tools of international pressure, due to the absence of global consensus, limited enforcement leverage, and the Taliban’s indirect dependence on the global economic structure, have been unable to bring about a fundamental change in the group’s behavior. As a result, from an analytical perspective, it can be said that even if human rights pressure increases, as long as it is not accompanied by coherent and coordinated economic and political mechanisms, its influence on Taliban behavior will remain limited.
Conclusion
This article has shown that the Taliban’s non-compliance with the positions of human rights organizations cannot be attributed solely to moral factors or a simple reactive response. This phenomenon is the product of the interaction of several structural, political, and ideological factors. First, the analysis shows that preserving power and survival has been one of the Taliban’s most important priorities since its return to power. Within this framework, any external pressure that conflicts with the logic of consolidating sovereignty and political control meets with resistance. Second, it was found that the disagreement between the Taliban and human rights institutions is not merely political, but is rooted in big normative and ideological differences. This group’s particular understanding of social and religious order conflicts, in many respects, with the universal principles of human rights, and this is precisely what obstructs convergence between the two sides.
An examination of the limitations of the international system showed that tools of external pressure, including sanctions, isolation, and human rights reports, have had a limited and indirect effect due to the absence of global consensus and the existence of scattered engagements by certain actors with the Taliban.
Overall, this article concludes that Taliban behavior toward human rights is the result of three main factors: the logic of power and survival, ideological conflict with international norms, and the structural limitations of the global system in exerting effective pressure. Therefore, understanding this behavior requires moving beyond one-dimensional analyses toward a multilayered and integrated approach in international relations.
References
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.74487
Human Rights Watch. (2024). World Report 2025: Afghanistan
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/afghanistan
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. (2024 to 2025). Afghanistan: Taliban Restrictions on Women’s Rights Intensify
https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/05/105883/afghanistan-taliban-restrictions-womens-rights-intensify
Richard Bennett. (2025). Afghanistan: Taliban Have Turned the Justice System into a Tool for Suppressing Women
https://apnews.com/article/un-afghanistan-taliban-women-rights-justice-law-6f355f5fe3c226bbd683e6d014cfa366
Human Rights Watch. (2024). World Report 2025: Afghanistan
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/afghanistan
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024). The Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
https://www.reddit.com/r/afghanistan/comments/1f98r94/the_human_rights_situation_in_afghanistan_report/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Richard Bennett, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan. (2025). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan
https://apnews.com/article/un-afghanistan-taliban-women-rights-justice-law-6f355f5fe3c226bbd683e6d014cfa366
World Bank. (2026). Afghanistan Development Update Report
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan
United Nations Development Programme. (2026). Afghanistan Reports: An Overview of Afghanistan’s Socioeconomic Situation
https://www.undp.org/afghanistan
International Crisis Group. (2024). Afghanistan Reports and Analysis
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan
[1]. Barnett R. Rubin
[2]. Antonio Giustozzi
[3]. Thomas Ruttig
[4]. Afghanistan Analysts Network
[5]. Human Rights Watch
[6]. UNAMA
[7]. UNDP
[8]. Freedom House
[9]. International Crisis Group
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
