China, a dominant regional power, has long maintained strong ties with Pakistan while simultaneously navigating deep geopolitical tensions with India. Some analysts have likened the China–Pakistan relationship to that of the United States and Israel—strategic, enduring, and multi-layered. The two countries collaborate closely on economic ventures and infrastructure projects. India, locked in ongoing geopolitical friction with both, has witnessed periodic clashes along its borders, but these tensions have not remained confined to disputed frontiers—they have also spilled over into neighboring countries, particularly Afghanistan. Afghanistan has historically served as a battleground for influence between India and Pakistan. Successive regimes in Kabul have alternated between alignment with Islamabad and New Delhi. The current Taliban regime, closely aligned with Pakistan, has sharply curtailed India’s influence in Afghan affairs. Nevertheless, India has pursued an active diplomatic strategy to re-engage with the Taliban. A key example of this was the meeting between Vikram Misri, India’s Deputy Foreign Minister, and Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, held in Dubai last year (2024). This engagement raised concerns in Beijing and Islamabad, both wary of Kabul drifting closer to New Delhi. China, which has maintained high-level diplomatic relations with the Taliban since their return to power in August 2021, currently has an ambassador stationed in Kabul and has officially received the Taliban’s ambassador in Beijing. The withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces has provided China with greater opportunity to deepen its economic footprint in Afghanistan. Beijing is actively working to strengthen ties with the Taliban, motivated not only by economic interests but also by pressing security concerns—particularly the threat posed by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group that seeks independence for Xinjiang and the Uyghur people from Chinese rule.
Following the U.S. military withdrawal, Western capitals have expressed serious concern that China may exploit the resulting power vacuum to secure control over Afghanistan’s untapped mineral wealth, particularly lithium. According to an August 2024 report by the Wilson Center, the value of Afghanistan’s mineral resources is estimated to exceed $1 trillion. Moreover, the China–Pakistan axis plays a central role in shaping Asia’s geopolitical landscape—from the rise of India, to Afghanistan’s post-American trajectory, from the specter of nuclear terrorism to new strategic maps of mining, ports, and pipelines. China stands as Pakistan’s most significant economic partner and its most reliable military ally in the region. Pakistan, in turn, is central to China’s geo-strategic ambitions. China’s emergence as a global power—whether through its naval expansion or initiatives such as the New Silk Road, which links Middle Eastern energy sources and European markets to East Asia—has elevated Afghanistan’s importance. Due to its strategic transit location and its potential role in countering ISIS, Afghanistan has become a crucial node in the evolving China–Pakistan–Taliban dynamic.
China’s primary objectives in Afghanistan are twofold: exploiting the country’s vast natural resources and securing its volatile border regions. Pakistan, a strategic ally of both China and the Taliban, has played a pivotal role in facilitating ties between Beijing and Kabul’s new rulers. One of the key factors behind the warming of Taliban–China relations has been Pakistan’s mediation. For the Taliban, who ascended to power with Islamabad’s backing, any engagement with a foreign power is seen as a step toward international recognition. However, the reality remains that regional actors view the Taliban largely through a pragmatic, interest-based lens. Recently, as tensions between India and Pakistan eased, a trilateral summit involving China, Pakistan, and the Taliban was held in China. While the content of the meeting remains undisclosed, it likely revolved around several critical themes:
First, the initiative for the summit originated with Pakistan and China. Islamabad aimed to send a clear message to New Delhi: despite India’s diplomatic overtures toward the Taliban, the group’s strategic alignment lies more closely with Chinese and Pakistani interests. Pakistan is also deeply concerned about covert ties between certain Taliban figures and India. Recent visits by Pakistani officials to Afghanistan may reflect those anxieties.
Second, China, with long-term strategic and economic ambitions, seeks to expand its investments in Afghanistan’s resource sector. Beijing recognizes that building a strong rapport with the Taliban would be challenging without Pakistan’s mediation. As such, its hosting of the summit appears more economically driven than purely political.
Third, in exchange for China’s support, particularly amid recent India-Pakistan frictions, Pakistan is leveraging its influence over the Taliban to facilitate Chinese access. By doing so, Islamabad aims to reinforce the notion that the China–Pakistan strategic alliance remains intact and that the Taliban act in concert with their mutual interests.
Fourth, China’s role as host signaled an implicit reaffirmation of the Taliban’s commitment to a shared strategic framework with China and Pakistan. Both countries are keen to remind the Taliban that India has historically opposed them, and that only China and Pakistan have consistently extended them support. While Iran and Russia are also actively engaging with the Taliban, regional competition for influence over the group is intensifying. The Taliban, lacking both domestic legitimacy and formal international recognition, are eager for any opportunity to engage. Regional powers, fully aware of this vulnerability, are intent on extracting economic and strategic gains, particularly through mining deals that offer the Taliban minimal stakes yet deliver substantial returns to foreign investors. The Taliban, in turn, see these interactions as a means of prolonging their grip on power.
Amid these developments, the United States remains largely absent. It has cut off engagement with the Taliban, is locked in trade tensions with China, and has imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia. In this context, Washington’s strategic options in the region are limited. The disastrous 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan severely undermined U.S. credibility, opening space for China and others to fill the vacuum.
In the final analysis, the China–Pakistan–Taliban triangle represents a political maneuver aimed at India and other regional players, particularly those aligned against Beijing and Islamabad. For China, cultivating ties with the Taliban serves a broader agenda in Afghanistan and beyond. Claims of deteriorating Taliban–Pakistan relations and China’s role as a mediator do not hold up under scrutiny. The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan is not competitive, nor is it one of equals. In reality, the Taliban have never stood on equal footing with Pakistan to challenge or rival it.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
