Recently, a seemingly serious dispute has arisen between Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, the Defense Minister of this country, regarding the management of Gaza after the war. On Wednesday, May 15th, Gallant, in a live-covered press conference, criticized Netanyahu’s lack of attention to a clear plan regarding how to manage Gaza, stating, “I am opposed to political management and the establishment of a military government by Israel in this strip.” He added that his demand for establishing a governmental entity to replace Hamas has not received a clear response from the Prime Minister. Gallant stated that his country must find a non-military replacement for Hamas in Gaza, provided it does not pose a threat to Israelis.
It wasn’t long before Netanyahu responded to his minister explicitly, stating, “I am not willing to replace Fatahistan with Hamasistan.” Netanyahu added that the destruction of Hamas is the primary condition, and until this goal is achieved, discussing how to manage Gaza is meaningless. Netanyahu’s goal with “Fatahistan” is the Fatah movement led by Mahmoud Abbas, which governs the West Bank. He said that Fatah did not condemn the October 7th attack and that 80 percent of the residents of the West Bank welcomed it. Without naming Gallant, he also said, “This retired general makes excuses after eight months of inability to defeat Hamas.” A difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister had emerged some time ago. After Netanyahu claimed in early April that the timing of the attack on Rafah had been determined, Gallant rejected his claim in contact with Lloyd Austin, the US Secretary of Defense.
Regarding the dispute between the Prime Minister and the Minister, several important points merit attention:
1- Netanyahu’s objective, along with his allied right-wing parties, was to turn Gaza into an uninhabitable area, but this goal was not achieved. For this reason, there was insistence on relocating the residents of this strip to the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. Although Gaza has been sufficiently destroyed, and its reconstruction will take years, at least its inhabitants did not go elsewhere and still hope for a sustainable life in this strip. Now that the aforementioned goal has not been achieved, Gallant, as the Minister of War, has realized the necessity of how Gaza should be managed by a force other than Hamas and Israel. Gallant knows that the long-term presence of Israeli military personnel in Gaza is troublesome and therefore emphasizes that both military and non-military management of this strip by his country would incur heavy economic costs. For example, in 1978, Israel occupied the southern part of Lebanon with an attack. Later, in 1982, it advanced to the heart of Beirut. However, it retreated from Beirut but stayed in southern Lebanon until it was forced to withdraw. The result of that attack was the emergence of Hezbollah, street clashes, the erosion of war, and its consolidation in Lebanon. Gallant fears that the same scenario may repeat itself in the Gaza Strip.
2- As mentioned above, Netanyahu’s goal of turning Gaza into an uninhabitable area and dispersing its residents to the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt has not been achieved. The fact that he still does not entrust the management of Gaza to a non-Israeli force is due to two factors: firstly, he wants to once again render efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state futile. He has repeatedly stated that he will never consent to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Right-wing parties also strongly support his position. For example, Smotrich, Netanyahu’s right-wing Finance Minister, in response to Gallant’s request, said, “He declares support for the formation of a Palestinian state as a reward to Hamas with these statements.” Secondly, he wants the military capability of Hamas to be destroyed so that it is no longer a political and military force among Palestinians. According to Netanyahu, the prerequisite for achieving the aforementioned two goals is the retention of the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip. Of course, Israel was present in Gaza between 1967-2005, but Hamas did not have the current power. The reason Netanyahu does not trust self-governing bodies is explained in the introduction.
3- The option of dismissing Gallant could also be on Netanyahu’s table, but it’s not as simple as it seems. While Netanyahu’s United Right allies have called for Gallant’s dismissal or resignation, implementing it is challenging. Smotrich stated that Gallant must choose between resignation and the cabinet’s policies. Meanwhile, Itamar Ben-Gvir, the Minister of National Security of Israel, said that achieving the war’s objectives necessitates Gallant’s dismissal. However, Benny Gantz, a member of the war cabinet, defended Gallant, stating, “Gallant has spoken the truth, and the country’s leadership must take the right actions at any cost.” Perhaps in Gantz’s view, the goal of “taking the right action” is entrusting the management of Gaza to the Fatah movement, even at the risk of Hamas’ reconstruction. Gantz then announced his resignation from the war cabinet if the issue of how to manage Gaza is not addressed, during a press conference. However, Gallant, a prominent member of the Likud party and a well-known figure in Israeli politics, has his supporters. In the spring of the last year, when protests against Netanyahu’s judicial reform plan intensified, Gallant called for attention to the protesters’ demands and the cessation of that plan—a move that led to his dismissal from the Ministry of Defense in March of the same year. Gallant’s dismissal added to the volume of protests, and Netanyahu was forced to retain him. Now that Netanyahu’s government is in a more difficult situation than before, he will not accept the risk of dismissing Gallant.
4- Gallant’s desire aligns with that of the United States. White House officials have repeatedly reported their opposition to Israel’s reoccupation of Gaza. Just recently, Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, reiterated that his country opposes the reoccupation of Gaza. At the same time, he stated that they are not supporters of the Hamas government. Gallant was a guest at the White House for a few days in March of this year. He was likely persuaded there. The Biden administration may consent to create a rift in the Israeli war cabinet to restrain Netanyahu, as on the one hand, it may keep Rafah safe from the danger of a widespread ground attack, and on the other hand, it may lead to the adoption of a plan for managing Gaza. If this assumption is incorrect, it will be difficult for Gallant to build an opposition bloc against Netanyahu in conditions where his country is presumed to be at risk.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
