Pakistan has been a supporter of the Taliban since the group first emerged in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s reason for existing was to stand against the Jihadi factions that Pakistan itself once backed. After the Mujahideen came to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s, Pakistan consistently supported proxy groups to achieve its strategic objectives there. Because of its interest-driven approach toward Afghanistan, whenever Pakistan has seen the groups it backed as lacking the effectiveness and capability needed to achieve its goals, it has withdrawn its support for them. This approach resembles the period of the Cold War, when Pakistan effectively hosted and supported the Mujahideen groups, but after the fall of the communist government in Afghanistan, those groups were no longer at the center of Pakistan’s support.
In 1996, the Taliban dismantled the Mujahideen’s rule and took control of Afghanistan. At that time, Pakistan continually supported the Taliban to advance its strategic agenda in Afghanistan and the region. With the September 11, 2001 attacks, the approach of the major powers, particularly the United States, toward Afghanistan changed. The United States entered Afghanistan to combat terrorism and ended the Taliban’s rule. At that time, Pakistan was one of America’s important allies in the region. It provided American forces with military bases, supply routes, and a foundation for military operations against the Taliban.
Alongside this, Pakistan also provided a haven for Taliban leaders and hosted them for two decades. After several years of NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan once again equipped the Taliban so that they could resist the republic system and NATO forces. As in the previous four decades, Pakistan’s goal was to advance its strategic interests by creating and supporting proxy groups and influencing developments in Afghanistan. From the perspective of Pakistan’s security doctrine, a stable Afghanistan and the expansion of its regional engagement, particularly with India, could be seen as a potential threat to the country. Beyond its military rivalry with India, Pakistan is also concerned about India’s interference in its internal affairs, its support for Baloch separatist groups, and the possibility of Pakistan’s disintegration.
Given Pakistan’s multidimensional role and policies toward Afghanistan over the past four decades, the Taliban also know that Pakistan is seeking to secure its interests and expand its intelligence influence, and wants to play a central role in developments in Afghanistan, as it did during the first period of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001. Pakistan has always pursued a multilayered policy and, at every point in time, has prioritized its own interests over other considerations. Although this country’s approach toward Afghanistan has always been accompanied by particular considerations and objectives, from the standpoint of realism in international relations, such behavior is tied to Pakistan’s national interests and security doctrine. Nevertheless, the main victims and losers of these policies have been Afghanistan and its people.
After the Taliban’s return to power following the signing of the Doha Agreement with the United States, Pakistan has demanded the unconditional implementation of its strategy in Afghanistan. It has also tried to bring an end to the activities of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and to ensure that the Taliban in Afghanistan do not support the group. However, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the TTP, who once fought on the same front against American forces, still maintain close relations. The support and cooperation of the Taliban in Afghanistan with the TTP have heightened Pakistan’s concerns. Although the TTP and the Taliban in Afghanistan are not a single organization, and the TTP has an independent structure that has been fighting the Pakistani government for years, the two groups have close ideological and human ties with each other. Therefore, Pakistan’s conflict of interests with the Taliban in Afghanistan may push this country to use the Taliban’s opponents as a lever of pressure.
Pakistan provides political and diplomatic support to the Taliban’s opponents to force the group to accept its demands. This option is less costly compared with military and intelligence support. In addition, by maintaining contact with various groups, Pakistan may try to protect its influence and interests in the event of any change in Afghanistan’s situation or political system. Given the experience of the past four decades, if tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan increase, Islamabad’s support for some opposition leaders of the Taliban is likely to expand. At a later stage, Pakistan may put the exchange of information and equipment on its agenda and create the grounds for more organized activities by the Taliban’s opposition groups. Given the recent tensions and Pakistan’s attacks on Afghanistan’s territory, if the Taliban disregard Islamabad’s demands, Pakistan may expand its cooperation with the Taliban’s opponents and increase intelligence and logistical support for them.
Pakistan may also support several Jihadi factions and groups that have the capacity to challenge the Taliban’s rule, to force the group to accept its strategy. Although the Taliban do not have serious disagreements with Pakistan in some areas, the main issue is Islamabad’s demand that the Taliban end their support for the TTP and comply with Pakistan’s policies. These are demands that have so far not been fully met. If Pakistan can once again gain extensive influence over the Taliban, the proxy groups it supports may expand their activities in Afghanistan, a situation that could increase the risk of escalating conflicts and the spread of civil and sectarian war.
Ultimately, Afghanistan has once again entered a critical phase. The Taliban’s return to power has led regional countries, which have intense security and economic rivalries, to become more active than before in developments in Afghanistan. Over several decades, Pakistan has been one of the main actors in Afghanistan, but its relations with its proxy groups have always been marked by ups and downs. Given Pakistan’s security doctrine, its national and regional interests form the main axis of its policies in Afghanistan. It appears that Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban have changed in various areas, and the Taliban’s support for the TTP is regarded as one of the main factors behind this shift.
Pakistan’s possible support for the Taliban’s opponents could be used as a lever of pressure to force the group to accept Islamabad’s demands, particularly the cutting of support for the TTP. However, if relations between the Taliban and Pakistan improve once again, Pakistan’s intelligence activities are likely to continue, and the Taliban’s opponents may once again be pushed to the margins and play a less prominent role in Afghanistan’s political relations. These groups have diverse structures, operate in a scattered manner, and lack lasting cohesion, factors that could limit their ability to influence Afghanistan’s political developments.
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