The “New York Times” recently interviewed Sirajuddin Haqqani. This interview took place in March, approximately six months ago, and was published last Thursday. The interview was conducted by Christina Goldbaum, a reporter for the “New York Times” in Kabul. Christina has been in Kabul since a few weeks before the fall of the city and acknowledges that she has tried multiple times over the past three years to interview Haqqani, but this powerful Taliban figure continuously evaded her. Finally, he agreed, fulfilling the reporter’s three-year goal.
The conversation was published in the form of an analytical report with the headline: “Is Afghanistan’s Most-Wanted Militant Now Its Best Hope For Change?” A day after the interview was published, a follow-up piece titled: “What We Learned Talking to the Taliban’s Most Fearsome Leader” was also released. Both the interview and its follow-up contain points worthy of examination.
With a general review, one can conclude that the interview aligns with the effort to whitewash the Taliban and continues the narrative of the “good Taliban and bad Taliban,” portraying the Taliban as different from the 1990s, a narrative that had been discussed during the Doha negotiations. Such interviews by Western media are not unprecedented. If a country’s national interests and policies require it, they can turn the bloodiest figures into gentle personalities, or vice versa. Publicizing the photo of King Amanullah Khan with Queen Soraya to tarnish his image was also part of this tactic. Assigning bizarre titles to Hamid Karzai, such as the best president, and the most fashionable president, or introducing Ashraf Ghani as the second greatest thinker in the world and a specialist in rebuilding failed states, were all part of a Western media strategy to craft their images. During the April 1978 coup, a “New York Times” reporter wrote a report on Nur Mohammad Taraki, relying on statements from a few students. The report painted a highly distorted picture of Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, blaming Taraki for all the massacres of his era. Thus, the current interview with Haqqani can be viewed similarly. Western reporters, relying on their academic knowledge and library views, detached from the realities of Afghanistan or aligned with their national interests, conduct such interviews and craft such images.
Christina’s interview with Haqqani paints a broad picture of various phases of his life and even outlines his future trajectory. Such an approach to an individual’s record seems typical, especially when the aim is either to cleanse or destroy their past. In this approach, efforts are made to show the individual’s character in black and white, eventually leading to a judgment of them as either wholly bad or good.
In the case of Haqqani, the latter part of the interview, which discusses his travels to the United Arab Emirates, his talks with local leaders in northern and western Afghanistan to expand his influence from the eastern regions to other parts of the country, his efforts to establish relations with the West for long-term political connections, his willingness to be interviewed by a Western newspaper, and his purported efforts to lift restrictions on women, all aim to present him as a legitimate figure. Furthermore, he is quoted in the interview as saying that the restrictions on women will not be permanent, but for now, the Taliban needs internal cohesion. The message between the lines could be that once Haqqani’s efforts to expand his influence in western and northern areas succeed and he secures Western support, he will step in as a “savior” and suddenly transform the Taliban government from a misogynistic regime to one that upholds human rights and Western values.
In this interview, Haqqani is referred to during part of his life as a “rebel,” not as a commander of suicide battalions. The use of the term “insurgent” to describe Haqqani is noteworthy, as Haqqanis have never been rebels against the existing order. Instead, they have operated as a terrorist network and are known as serial killers responsible for the deaths of hundreds of civilians in the streets. Therefore, calling Haqqani an “insurgent” is a disservice to the word itself. The correct term would be to label Haqqani as a “contract killer,” “terrorist,” or “serial killer.” Interestingly, the writer does not stop at calling him a rebel but also suggests that Haqqani is a product of circumstances beyond his control. This argument is supported by a quote from Omar Daudzai, who said, “We made Haqqani what he is today,” referring to the decision of the Haqqanis to negotiate with the Republic and their rejection by the former Afghan government and the United States. The writer even goes so far as to justify Haqqani’s war against America by quoting an American diplomat, suggesting that the Haqqanis were not enemies of America but rather enemies of occupiers.
With the “rebellion” phase of Haqqani’s life concluded, another chapter of his career is mentioned in the interview. The interviewer notes that when asking Haqqani about this part of his life, it was clear that Haqqani had become more calculating. The fact that Haqqani paused more often and took longer to answer suggested to the reporter that Haqqani had entered a period of calculation and that his insurgency had ended. The reporter writes that when Haqqani spoke about his “jihad,” there was a nostalgic tone in his words, but when discussing the current situation, he proceeded cautiously and thoughtfully. In this part of the interview, all of the Taliban government’s shortcomings are attributed to Hibatullah Akhundzada, and efforts are made to portray Haqqani as dissatisfied with the current situation and as a supporter of “Taliban reform.” Haqqani’s reluctance to openly oppose Hibatullah is attributed to the “interests of the Taliban regime,” although the interviewer mentions Haqqani’s behind-the-scenes efforts to persuade Hibatullah to lift the restrictions on women.
Throughout the interview, the clear goal is to depict Haqqani as a pragmatic politician, positioning him as someone working to establish relationships with regional and Western countries.
Although the interviewer claims to have spoken with 70 people, including Taliban fighters, political figures, and diplomats before the interview with Haqqani, and to have reviewed hundreds of pages of documents, what remains absent from the entire interview are the perspectives of civil, political, and military movements opposed to the Taliban. The references made in the interview are to statements from individuals sympathetic to the Taliban, such as Munir Akram and Omar Daudzai.
This raises the specific question: why is the “hope for change” being sought within the Taliban? Why are the movements opposing the Taliban not seen as an alternative or a source of hope for changing Afghanistan’s fate? Political groups must ask themselves this question. The fact that a widely-read Western newspaper features an article on one of the most powerful figures in Afghanistan’s ruling group without including the perspectives of Taliban opponents, what does that signify?
As an individual, I would like to respond to these questions. Speaking from a technical standpoint, I would say that every nation-state is formed based on a set of codes, agreements, and principles that policymakers and think tanks in great powers use to make decisions and act upon. Tampering with one of these codes or agreements, wherever it may be, impacts others as well. Moreover, the rise and fall of leaders are also linked to these same rules and agreements.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:
تأملی بر مصاحبه نیویارکتایمز با حقانی؛ وقتی خلیفه انتحار سیاستمدار عملگرا میشود | روزنامه ۸صبح
