On July 10th, fighters from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacked a military base in Zhob district, near the city of Quetta, resulting in the deaths of nine individuals. Four days later, General Asim Munir, the Chief of Staff of the country’s army, visited the wounded at a hospital and criticized the Taliban-controlled government of Afghanistan, setting out some expectations for the current rulers of Afghanistan. A few hours later, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the Minister of Defense, took a similar stance on Twitter, attributing such attacks to the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. He accused the Afghan Taliban of disregarding their neighbors and claimed that Pakistani Taliban were operating freely in Afghanistan. In another tweet, four hours later, he criticized the government of Imran Khan for allegedly supporting the transfer of TTP from Afghanistan to Pakistan and provided further clarification on the matter.
The current government of Afghanistan is under the control of the Taliban, which has relied on the unwavering support of the Pakistani government and its military for nearly three decades of political, military, and war-related activities. There have been allegations that the Taliban group was even established by the Pakistani army, particularly its intelligence department. The presence and activities of the group’s leaders in Pakistan since the early days of the establishment of Tehreek-e-Taliban are well-documented and acknowledged by both Pakistan and the Taliban. When the Taliban were defeated in Afghanistan, they sought refuge in Pakistan and used it as a base for training and re-equipping. The Pakistani army even established three councils for the group to fight against the government of the Republic of Afghanistan in an organized manner. The Taliban are widely regarded as being closely associated with the Pakistani army, and upon their return to power, they were welcomed by the Pakistani government and religious schools in the country. The Haqqani School in Pakistan even boasted that its students had achieved sovereignty over Afghanistan. Therefore, the relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is bilateral, open, and enduring.
On the other hand, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) identifies itself as a branch of the Afghan Taliban and has even pledged loyalty to the current supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. The Afghan Taliban have provided support to TTP leaders, fighters, and their families, placing them in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in coordination with the Pakistani government and at the expense of Islamabad, they transfer Pakistani terrorists from the southern and eastern regions to the north and northeast of Afghanistan. During its fight against the Afghan government, the TTP received support from the Pakistani army and other terrorist and fundamentalist groups in the country, including the Afghan Taliban. This bilateral relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is enduring and open, leading to a cycle of violence in which the Pakistani government and army support the Afghan Taliban, who in turn, support the Pakistani Taliban, who then attack the people and government of Pakistan. This situation is reminiscent of Hafez’s poem, which states that one’s reward is based on their deeds. In another poem, Hafez says, “I remembered my planting during the harvest.” Therefore, now is an opportune time for the Pakistani government and army to reflect on their actions over the last three decades if they are genuinely committed to combating the TTP and other terrorist and fundamentalist groups.
How serious are the positions of Pakistan’s army and the Ministry of Defense?
The government of Shahbaz Sharif in Pakistan is nearing its conclusion. Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif has recently pledged to step down from his position at the end of the legal deadline and facilitate the transition to the next government. Consequently, Sharif’s government will end on August 13th, and within 60 days following that, the country’s elections must take place, leading to the formation of a new government. This election stands out as particularly sensitive, and one of the reasons for its sensitivity is the ongoing conflict between Imran Khan Niazi’s Tehreek-e-Insaf party, the ousted Prime Minister of Pakistan, and the army as well as the current administration.
The current government, led by the Nawaz faction of the Muslim League, is in a precarious coalition with powerful parties such as the People’s Party led by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and the Jamaat Ulema Islam led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman. This coalition was not formed based on the parties’ political beliefs’ similarity, but rather due to the shared adversary of the Tehreek-e-Insaf. The People’s Party, which champions the secularization of Pakistan, and the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam Party, which opposes secularization, cannot be aligned without this shared opposition.
Despite facing intense pressure from the army and the current government, Imran Khan remains popular among the masses of Pakistan, and could be the main opponent of the parties in the current coalition government. There are speculations that the government and the army are attempting to find a way to prevent Tehreek-e-Insaf from participating in the upcoming elections. However, if these efforts fail, there is a possibility that Tehreek-e-Insaf may come to power once again. Therefore, this election is of great importance for individuals such as Khawaja Mohammad Asif, who became Minister of Defense after gaining membership in parliament, and General Asim Munir, who currently leads the Pakistan Army and may be seen as a potential adversary of Tehreek-e-Insaf. If Imran Khan and his party regain power, their conflict with generals who they believe plotted against them and filed cases against their leaders will likely resume. Although he attempted to address these issues during his previous rule and failed, he may take up the fight once again if he is successful in the upcoming election. Therefore, the recent statements made by Khawaja Mohammad Asif and General Munir, following the TTP attack on the Zhob military center, may be part of an unofficial and preliminary election campaign.
The recurring cycle of violence continues to inflict harm upon the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban is responsible for attacks in Afghanistan, while another branch of the group, the TTP, carries out violent acts in Pakistan. As Pakistan approaches a critical election, the people of the country are left wounded, angry, and saddened by the actions of these fundamentalist groups. In this situation, managing public opinion requires that the Pakistani government and army take concrete measures to combat terrorism. However, the government officials and army leaders’ statements on the matter do not appear to be taken seriously by the public due to the origin of the Taliban terrorists in Rawalpindi.
If the Pakistani government and army are genuinely committed to fighting terrorism, they must cease their political lobbying for the Afghan Taliban. However, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the foreign minister and a significant stakeholder in the current coalition government, continues to act as the Afghan Taliban’s owner and sometimes speaks on behalf of the group as a foreign minister. It is unacceptable for the government and army to support the Afghan Taliban, also known as the mother Taliban, while considering the child Taliban to be enemies, labeling them as terrorists and using them as a means to fight. Both Taliban groups share similar beliefs and fighting methods, seeking to establish a completely Islamic government and fight against “proxy” governments. The Pakistani version of the Taliban is essentially a duplicate of the Afghan version, and if one group is deemed similar, terrorist, and dangerous, the same should apply to the other. However, the Pakistani government and army do not extend such a judgment to the Afghan Taliban and instead support them as proxies in Kabul and Kandahar. These policies are primarily aimed at managing public opinion within the country, and the Pakistani army and Ministry of Defense’s rigid stance against the TTP and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is for electoral use.
The Ministry of Defense and army of Pakistan have urged the Afghan Taliban to comply with the Doha Agreement and prevent the use of Afghan soil for terrorism against other countries. However, these two Pakistani organizations possess more knowledge about the Afghan Taliban than the group itself. They are aware that the Taliban’s followers are not bound to any commitments and have a history of reneging on promises. The Pakistani government and army witnessed the Taliban’s pledge to negotiate with the Afghan government, which they later abandoned in favor of using force. The Taliban also promised to form a coalition government in Doha, yet they failed to do so. Similarly, the group has repeatedly pledged to reopen schools and universities for girls, but they have consistently failed to follow through on those commitments. Therefore, expecting the Taliban to fulfill their commitments in the Doha Agreement or be a responsible neighbor is unrealistic and futile.
If the Pakistani government and army truly regard the TTP as an enemy of their country and people, they cannot combat this group by relocating them from southern Afghanistan to the north. Instead, they must target the group’s access to Pakistani territory through Badakhshan in northeastern Afghanistan. To seriously combat terrorism and fundamentalism, the Pakistani government and army must first address their policies that support terrorism and then take concrete action against terrorist religious schools within Pakistan. Only after effectively and decisively fighting against such terrorist policies and institutions within Pakistan can they turn their attention to combatting the TTP in Afghanistan through the Afghan Taliban. However, this scenario appears unlikely due to Pakistan’s continued support for the Afghan Taliban, and vice versa. Therefore, the cycle of violence will continue to victimize the people of both countries, with public sentiments being managed through occasional statements and operations that ultimately bring no significant change.
