Even now, the prevailing narrative holds that the Taliban have seized control of Afghanistan through military strength, and that opposition forces are simply unable to confront this so-called “military giant.” Yet realities on the ground tell a different story. Consider, for instance, the case of Jomakhan Fateh’s insubordination. The way the Taliban handled his case reveals more about the group’s weaknesses than its strengths. When the Taliban had to gather forces from the country’s most distant provinces and organize a massive mobilization just to suppress one discontented commander in Badakhshan, this reflected panic rather than power.
Jomakhan Fateh was never a particularly powerful rebel. He had no aircraft, no artillery or tanks, no thousands of regular fighters, and no foreign support. He was simply a discontented local commander who staged an act of defiance in a mountainous area with a few hundred loyal fighters, and even that defiance was far from clear-cut. The Taliban could easily have contained the crisis using forces already stationed in Badakhshan or neighboring provinces, without mobilizing troops from the east, south, and north. Had the Taliban truly been a cohesive and powerful force, a local uprising of this limited scale would have been extinguished within days at minimal cost. Instead, they were forced to draw fighters from the farthest corners of the country. This points not only to military weakness but to the group’s deep distrust of non-Pashtun regions.
The scale of this weakness becomes clearer when compared with the previous Republic. Despite its shortcomings, geographic constraints, and security threats, the Republic never resorted to nationwide mobilization to contain a single local commander or rural strongman. Under Presidents Hamid Karzai and Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, the central government typically relied on security forces already stationed in the affected province or neighboring provinces to deal with local challenges. This approach was less costly, less likely to provoke tension, and generally more effective, since local forces knew the terrain. It held even though the Republic controlled far less territory than the Taliban do today, with many districts outside government control and provincial centers under constant threat, and even though it never enjoyed strong popular support. Still, the government avoided mobilizing forces from distant provinces to handle local crises, aware that such a costly, showy measure would offer little military benefit while signaling weakness to the public. Yet today, despite controlling the entire country, facing no serious military rival, and possessing abundant weapons and equipment, the Taliban still find themselves dispatching forces from across Afghanistan and organizing a nationwide mobilization just to contain one discontented commander.
Such an enormous mobilization to address a local challenge suggests genuine fear of internal collapse, a recognition that even the smallest spark could ignite an uncontrollable blaze beyond the group’s ability to manage. This is precisely the vulnerability that opponents of the Taliban need to understand and exploit. Yet they remain so mired in their own weaknesses that they cannot see this opportunity, let alone capitalize on it. The Taliban are also deeply unpopular in the north, and for that reason fear any unrest there, deeming it necessary to mobilize forces from across the country to contain it. The group appears to understand that hard military power alone cannot sustain its rule indefinitely, and that if current conditions persist, widespread popular protest will eventually erupt, however delayed, and prove difficult to contain.
If the Taliban are this weak and vulnerable, why have they not fallen, and why do they remain in power? The answer lies not in the group’s own strength but in the compounded weakness of its opponents. Despite mounting signs of Taliban vulnerability, including the panicked mobilization to Badakhshan, internal disputes over the plunder of mining resources, persistent fear of popular protest, and the absence of international recognition, the Taliban’s opponents have been unable to convert these opportunities into real gains.
In other words, the Taliban have serious weaknesses, but their opponents lack the capacity to exploit them. The Taliban fear every internal uprising, yet their opponents cannot transform these uprisings into a coordinated national movement. The Taliban are unpopular in the north, yet their opponents have failed to convert that discontent into lasting popular support for themselves. Contrary to the prevailing narrative that portrays the Taliban as powerful and their opponents as incapable of confronting them, the reality is that the Taliban are not strong. Rather, their opponents are tragically weak, and it is this weakness among the opposition, not any inherent strength of the Taliban, that has allowed the group to survive.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
