In international politics, few countries can be found that fall entirely outside the calculations of the great powers, and Afghanistan is no exception to this rule. Despite more than four years having passed since the United States military withdrawal, this country continues to sit at the center of many political and security discussions. Every development in Kabul, every shift in the Taliban’s relations with regional countries, and every statement by American officials raises this question once again: has the United States truly left Afghanistan, or has it merely changed the form of its presence?
In Afghanistan, there are differing views regarding the future of relations between Washington and Kabul. Some consider the withdrawal of American forces to mark the end of this country’s presence, while others believe Afghanistan remains part of the strategic calculations of the United States, and that if regional conditions change, Washington will be compelled to reconsider its policy.
To answer this question, one must set emotional perspectives aside. What determines the behavior of great powers is not the memory of war or a particular view of the Taliban, but rather national interest. History has shown that whenever the United States has felt that its security, economic, or geopolitical interests were at risk, it has changed its policy, even if it had previously spoken of ending its presence.
A clear example of this is Iraq. The United States withdrew the bulk of its forces in 2011, but only three years later, with the rise of ISIS, it returned to the country once again and took the lead of the international coalition. Of course, the conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq are not identical, but this experience shows that military withdrawal does not necessarily mean the end of American attention to a region.
On the other hand, the world has also changed compared to 2001. If the fight against terrorism was Washington’s top priority at that time, today, competition with China and Russia has taken on a more significant role. As a result, Afghanistan is no longer important merely from the standpoint of countering extremism; its geographic position, bordering China, Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia, has turned this country into part of the competition among the great powers.
Following the American withdrawal, China has entered the field to expand economic cooperation and gain access to mineral resources, Russia has entered out of security concerns in Central Asia, and other regional actors have entered to increase their own influence. Under such circumstances, the question arises as to whether Washington will be willing to leave this field entirely to its rivals.
The answer is not certain, but American foreign policy is shaped based on cost-benefit calculations. If American decision makers conclude that developments in Afghanistan affect strategic competition with China and Russia, a reconsideration of Washington’s policy would not be unexpected. Therefore, perhaps the main question is not “will America return?” but rather, if it does return, what form that return will take.
Afghanistan: A Field of Competition, Not the First Priority
Afghanistan is no longer America’s priority, but it has still not been removed from Washington’s strategic calculations. Great powers may leave a geography, but they rarely abandon their interests; the form of presence changes, not its essence.
In recent years, Afghanistan has become a stage for competition among various actors. China has sought to expand its economic presence and benefit from Afghanistan’s mineral capacities. For Beijing, Afghanistan is important not only for its natural resources but also for the security of the Xinjiang region and regional projects.
Russia, too, views Afghanistan through a security lens and is concerned about the spread of extremist groups into Central Asia. For this reason, political and security contacts between Russia and the Taliban have increased.
At the same time, relations between the Taliban and Pakistan have entered a new phase. Disputes over the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), border clashes, and diminished trust have altered past equations and pushed the Taliban toward expanding relations with other actors, including India.
In such an environment, the question arises as to whether the United States will accept the expansion of Chinese and Russian influence without response.
On one hand, Washington is preoccupied with competition with China, the war in Ukraine, developments in the Middle East, and its own domestic issues, and Afghanistan no longer holds the position it held two decades ago. On the other hand, if Chinese or Russian influence in Afghanistan takes on a broader scale, there remains the possibility that America’s outlook could shift.
Even so, such a shift would not necessarily mean a military return. The experience of recent years has shown that Washington prefers to rely on tools such as intelligence cooperation, diplomatic pressure, targeted sanctions, and cooperation with regional partners.
Meanwhile, Bagram Airbase continues to serve, in part of the American political landscape, as a symbol of Afghanistan’s strategic importance. Statements by Donald Trump regarding this base show that Afghanistan has not yet been erased from the minds of American policymakers, but there remains a wide gap between strategic importance and a decision to return militarily.
Today, Afghanistan stands less on the threshold of an American return and more on the threshold of a new kind of competition taking shape among global powers, a competition whose primary tools are economics, technology, information, and diplomacy, not military campaigns and occupation.
If America Returns, This Time It Will Not Be War, It Will Be Competition
One of the common errors in analyzing Afghanistan’s future is viewing a possible American return solely through the lens of military presence. Meanwhile, United States foreign policy has changed, and rather than relying on the large-scale deployment of military forces, Washington now seeks to pursue its security and strategic goals at lower cost and through more diverse tools.
The operation targeting Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul was an example of this shift. That operation was carried out without a large American troop presence and demonstrated that technology, intelligence networks, and precision operations have largely replaced the traditional pattern of war.
For this reason, if the United States decides in the future to increase its role in Afghanistan, this presence will likely take the form of intelligence cooperation, diplomacy, economic pressure, limited counterterrorism operations, and engagement with regional actors, rather than a large-scale military campaign.
Meanwhile, the role of extremist groups remains important. One of the main objectives of the American presence after 2001 was to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for groups that threatened the security of the United States and its allies. Although the Taliban have repeatedly stressed that they will not allow Afghan soil to be used against other countries, the activities of groups such as ISIS-Khorasan remain a serious concern for the international community. If this threat grows in scale in the future, Washington’s outlook could shift as well, although such a shift would not necessarily mean the start of a new war.
Another important factor is the growing competition between the United States and China. Today, Afghanistan is important not merely from the standpoint of countering terrorism, but it has become part of the geopolitical competition among the great powers. Mineral resources, geographic position, and proximity to Central Asia and western China have turned this country into a significant point in regional equations. For this reason, increased Chinese or Russian influence in Afghanistan is being carefully monitored by Washington, although this alone is not sufficient for an American military return.
In the American political landscape, Bagram Airbase also continues to hold symbolic significance. Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized the relinquishing of this base and considered it important for monitoring regional developments, particularly in relation to China. Even so, there remains a wide gap between proposing a political idea and implementing it, and many American analysts believe that a return to Bagram, without an agreement with the Taliban and acceptance by regional countries, would be extremely difficult in both practical and political terms.
On the other hand, regional conditions have also changed compared to 2001. China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and the Central Asian countries each pursue their own particular interests in Afghanistan, and it seems unlikely that they would agree to the re-establishment of an American military base in their neighborhood. This same fact confronts any scenario of a large-scale military return with serious obstacles.
Bringing these developments together, three plausible scenarios can be outlined for the future of relations between the United States and Afghanistan.
The first scenario is a continuation of the current situation, meaning the United States continues to follow developments in Afghanistan without a large-scale military presence, through diplomatic pressure, humanitarian assistance, intelligence cooperation, and limited operations. This scenario appears more consistent with the current trajectory of American foreign policy.
The second scenario is an increase in America’s role as a result of intensifying competition with China and Russia. If Afghanistan becomes a more significant arena for competition among the great powers, Washington might increase its influence through political, economic, and security channels, without resorting to a large-scale deployment of military forces.
The third scenario, which is less likely to occur, is a limited military return in response to a major security crisis, for example, if a transnational group were able to turn Afghanistan into a base for a direct threat to the interests of the United States or its allies. Even under such circumstances, it is unlikely that the pattern of the 2001 intervention would be repeated.
In the end, what can be said with greater certainty is that the form of competition has changed. If the United States once again plays a more active role in Afghanistan, this role will be defined less by tanks and military campaigns and more by intelligence, technology, economics, diplomacy, and geopolitical competition.
Afghanistan remains at the intersection of the interests of regional and global powers, and it seems unlikely that any actor could set it aside from their strategic calculations for long. Even so, a distinction must be drawn between Afghanistan’s strategic importance and an American military return. The importance of this country is an undeniable reality, but from this one cannot automatically conclude that Washington will once again follow its past path.
Ultimately, Afghanistan’s future does not depend solely on the decisions of the United States, China, or Russia. What will determine this country’s fate more than any other factor is the ability of domestic actors to manage foreign relations, establish stability, define national interests, and make use of great power competition for the country’s development. If Afghanistan can use this competition to attract investment, achieve economic development, and strengthen stability, this competition could become an opportunity for the country’s future. But if it once again becomes a battleground for confrontation among foreign powers, it will be the people of Afghanistan who pay the cost, an experience this land’s history has witnessed many times before.
Great powers come and go, but what will shape Afghanistan’s future in the long term, more than anything else, is the will of the people of Afghanistan themselves to build lasting institutions, create national consensus, and define shared interests. Perhaps this is also the most important lesson of the past half century: no foreign actor, however powerful, can replace domestic responsibility and will in building Afghanistan’s future.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
